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- Pranshi Gaur & Samarth Kapoor* The recent amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter, “the Act”) have been aimed to bolster the arbitration laws in India. The amendments were made with the intention to reduce judicial intervention in arbitration proceedings, develop a framework for speedy completion of arbitral proceedings, and make India a commercial arbitration hub. Anti-Arbitration injunctions are restraint orders granted by the courts against the continuation or the commencement of arbitration proceedings. The way the judiciary has performed its duty by promoting and upholding the sanctity of arbitration agreements is very much appreciated. However, the judiciary has been intervening in such matters by issuing injunctions against arbitral proceedings. This is because certain powers are granted by the Act u/s 8 and 45, to the courts to intervene in cases where the agreement seems to be vitiated by fraud, is null and void, is incapable of being performed, or is oppressive. This article would endeavor to understand the nuances of this principle as well as the circumstances under which, courts are entitled to grant such an injunction. What is Anti-Arbitration Injunction? The terminology used in, an injunction granted by the civil courts which negate the continuation or even the commencement of arbitration proceedings is called an anti-arbitration injunction.[i] Generally, the parties take this recourse before the commencement of the arbitration proceedings, but it is not restricted to that and the same can be availed before the tribunal passes the final award. Many say this rule vitiates the very essence of the idea behind making arbitral tribunals independent of judicial intervention; the power for which has been given u/s 16[ii] read with s. 5[iii] of the Act. However, the proponents of this remedy argue that this rule will be helpful in streamlining the arbitration procedure itself. It will play a key role in weeding out the cases where there is no arbitration agreement in the first place, or the agreement is vitiated by fraud or, where the initiation of arbitration proceedings in itself would be considered “oppressive” or “vexatious” in nature. There is neither any explicit bar nor any mention in the Act regarding injunctions to be granted by the Indian courts. The provision that revolves around this principle and the provision which rebuts the idea of judicial intervention in arbitration proceedings is enshrined in the Act. However, they are not directly linked with this remedy. Critics of this remedy rely on s. 5 and 16 of the Act. S. 5 provides for the independence of the arbitral tribunal to resolve all disputes related to any arbitration matter before it. On the same footing, s. 16 talks about the competence of an arbitral tribunal to rule on matters pertaining to its jurisdiction. This includes matters that relate to the validity of the arbitration agreement. The provision further states that the only remedy that an aggrieved has is to challenge the award passed u/s 34[iv] of the Act. The deliberate exclusion of s. 48 of the Act makes it clear that the provision is only applicable in domestic arbitration and not in the case of foreign arbitration. Also, the critics of this remedy, while arguing for the exclusion of the judicial intervention, forget to cite s. 8 and 45 of the Act.[v] While the Act backs minimal judicial intervention, it does not completely rule out the probability of it. S. 8[vi] of the Act talks about the duty of the court to refer parties to the arbitration. This provision got amended in 2015 to state that reference to arbitration should not be made if the court is prima facie satisfied that the agreement is null and void. It also mentions certain pre-conditions that are to be fulfilled before referring a matter to arbitration. In the case of P. Anand Gajapathi Raju v. P.V.G. Raju (Died),[vii] while analyzing the provision, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that, “The conditions which are required to be satisfied under Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 8 before the Court can exercise its powers are (1) there is an arbitration agreement; (2) a party to the agreement brings an action in the Court against the other party; (3) subject matter of the action is the same as the subject matter of the arbitration agreement; (4) the other party moves the Court for referring the parties to arbitration before it submits his first statement on the substance of the dispute. .... The language of Section 8 is per-emptory.” S. 45[viii] of the Act deals with the duty of the Courts to refer the matter to arbitration in case of foreign arbitration. However, the provision clearly states that in case the courts, prima facie, find that the agreement is void or is incapable of being performed, then such reference shall not be made. Now, by a conjoint reading of the provisions of s. 8 & 45, one can clearly make out that the remedy provided in the form of anti-arbitration injunction suits has its place in the Act itself in the form of limited judicial intervention. The Hon’ble Apex Court has, on many occasions,[ix] held that courts are free to decline application seeking reference to arbitration if there exist some serious allegations of fraud for which heavy scrutiny of evidence is needed and courts guided by the Indian Evidence Act, Code of Criminal Procedure, and Code of Civil Procedure may be more competent to decide the issue. The Kompetenz-Kompetenz Principle Indian arbitration law follows the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz (or Competence-Competence) which is enshrined u/s 16 of the Act. According to this provision, the arbitral tribunal is sufficient to determine and rule out the issue of its own jurisdiction, including the validity of the arbitration agreement. This cardinal principle finds its place in the Indian arbitration law with an objective to ensure that the arbitration proceedings won’t be hindered just because of the primary objection raised by one of the parties. This principle is recognized by many scholars as the “backbone principle” of arbitration law and finds its place in laws governing arbitration globally. In the case of Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Ltd. v. Northern Coal Field Ltd.,[x] the Supreme Court, while examining and interpreting the provisions of s. 11 & 16 applied the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz and held that the dispute related to the arbitrability should be decided by the tribunal itself and courts can interfere only when there is no agreement at all or whether the consent to enter into an agreement is vitiated by fraud or misrepresentation.[xi] Similarly, the recent case of N.N. Global Mercantile v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd.[xii] observed the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle and held that, “The doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz implies that the arbitral tribunal has the competence to determine and Rule on its own jurisdiction, including objections with respect to the existence, validity, and scope of the arbitration agreement, in the first instance, which is subject to judicial scrutiny by the courts at a later stage of the proceedings. Under the Arbitration Act, the challenge before the Court is maintainable only after the final award is passed as provided by Sub-section (6) of Section 16.” Further, the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd.[xiii] and Kvaerner Cementation India Ltd. v. Bajranglal Agarwal[xiv] are also in line with this judgment as both the cases interpreted s. 16 to determine whether the tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction due to the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle. In both, the judgments court had emphasized this principle, but the issue still persists. With so many judgments quoting different opinions, one cannot render a position of exclusivity to the tribunal to decide matters of jurisdiction including the issue of the validity of arbitration agreements. Precedents laid down: The jurisprudence regarding the law Courts in India have, in the past, dealt with the issue of granting anti-arbitration injunctions on many occasions. Even after numerous deliberations and discussions about the same, the issue stands unresolved and the jurisprudence evolved is still not conclusive. In the case of Kvaerner Cementation, the Hon’ble Apex Court, while dealing with the issue of granting an anti-arbitration injunction held that civil court does not have the power to determine the jurisdiction of arbitration tribunals-(including the validity of arbitration agreement). With this judgment, the Supreme Court emphasized the objectives of the Act and the need for minimal intervention of the judiciary in arbitration matters. This judgment was reaffirmed in the case of A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam.[xv] In the case of National Aluminium Company Ltd. v. Subhash Infra Engineers Pvt. Ltd.,[xvi] the Supreme Court relied on the Kvaerner Cementation judgment and held that any dispute, whether in relation to jurisdiction[xvii] or the validity of the arbitration agreement, should be raised before the arbitrator only and Civil Courts have no jurisdiction over the matter. While some judgments rule out judicial intervention by relying on Kvaerner Cementation judgment, there are some judgments that support the idea of judicial intervention to some extent. In the case of SBP & Co., the Supreme Court partially overruled the Kvaerner Cementation Judgment, however as the 2001 judgment was reported after 11 years, i.e., in 2012, so it is quite difficult to adjudge that whether the Kvaerner Cementation has been overruled or is still contingent. In the SBP judgment, the Supreme Court held that the courts have the duty to first scrutinize the arbitration agreement before referring the matter to arbitration. The Supreme Court interpreted the provision of s. 16 and held that arbitral tribunals are competent only in those cases where the issue is raised before the arbitrator. This decision by the Supreme Court in the case of SBP & Co. was referred to in many subsequent cases. In the case of Chatterjee Petrochem Co. v. Haldia Petrochemicals Ltd.,[xviii] the Supreme Court accepted the power of the courts to grant an injunction and to rule on the validity of the arbitration agreement. Similarly, the Calcutta High Court in the case of The Board of Trustees of the Port of Kolkata v. Louis Dreyfus Armatures SAS,[xix] held that with respect to s. 8 and 45 of the Act, the courts have the power to grant the anti-arbitration injunctions in cases where the agreement is null and void, it is oppressive to continue the proceedings, or the agreement is incapable of being performed. Relying on Chatterjee Petrochem judgment, the Supreme Court in the case of World Sport Group (Mauritius) Ltd. v. MSM Satellite (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.,[xx] held that there is no explicit bar under the Act on the maintainability of anti-arbitration Injunction suits, hence the suit is maintainable. Similarly, in the case of McDonald’s India Pvt. Ltd. v. Vikram Bakshi,[xxi] Delhi High Court relied on the judgment of World Sport Group and held that if there is proof of the agreement being null and void, then the Civil Courts have the jurisdiction to grant anti-arbitration injunctions. A way to move ahead As discussed above, the jurisprudence around this concept remains unclear and confusing because of the different stance taken by the High Courts and the Supreme Court. However, it is clear by the judgments that Courts only grant injunctions in the cases of “Compelling Circumstances,” i.e., only in those cases where the agreement is null and void, or is prima facie incapable of being performed, or it would be oppressive to continue with arbitration. Going by the latest judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of Bina Modi v. Lalit Kumar Modi,[xxii] referring to s. 16 of the Act and relying on the judgments of Kvaerner Cementation and National Aluminium, the Court held that the Civil Court has no power to restrain or grant anti-arbitration injunctions in view of the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle. Also, it was held that the Act is in itself a complete code and it empowers the tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction, including cases w.r.t validity of arbitration agreement. However, the tables were turned by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Balasore Alloys Ltd. v. Medima LLC,[xxiii] where it was held that Indian Courts have the jurisdiction to grant anti-arbitration injunctions and the judgment given by the Delhi High Court in the Bina Modi case does not hold any precedential value. The important question that needs to be addressed is, “whether there is a need to amend the present Act to add a proviso to completely exclude judicial intervention and everything will be decided by the tribunal itself?”. The answer to this question will be negative as there is a fine balance between the autonomy of an arbitral tribunal and the power of courts under the Act, as according to the provisions of the Act, courts can intervene in compelling circumstances only. There is no doubt with regards to the Pro-Arbitration approach that India should adopt, but some situations can arise where judicial intervention is required. The law on this aspect is still evolving but it will be interesting to see what will be the approach of the Supreme Court and the High Courts in coming years with regard to the power of the Civil Court and the maintainability of anti-arbitration injunction suits. * 3rd Year Students (Batch of 2018-23), B.A., LL.B. (Hons.), Maharashtra National Law University, Aurangabad. [i] Lomesh Kiran Nidumuri, India's approach to anti-arbitration injunction suits: Step in the right direction?, Bar and Bench (May 7, 2021, 9:34 PM), https://www.barandbench.com/columns/indias-approach-to-anti-arbitration-injunction-suits-step-in-the-right-direction. [ii] The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, No. 26 of 1996, Acts of Parliament, 1996, §16. [iii] The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, No. 26 of 1996, Acts of Parliament, 1996, §5. [iv] The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, No. 26 of 1996, Acts of Parliament, 1996, §34. [v] Rajat Jaiswal & Shruti Khanijow, Anti-Arbitration Injunctions: Use and Controversy, Lexology (May 7, 2021, 1:48 AM), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=34200c24-71f4-4484-9f74-93a79aeba604. [vi] The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, No. 26 of 1996, Acts of Parliament, 1996, §8. [vii] P. Anand Gajapathi Raju v. P.V.G. Raju (Died), (2000) 4 SCC 539. [viii] The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, No. 26 of 1996, Acts of Parliament, 1996, §45. [ix]N. Radhakrishnan v. Maestro Engineers and Ors., 2009 (13) SCALE 403; A. Ayyaswamy v. A. Paramasivam, AIR 2016 SC 4675; Avitel Post Studioz Limited and Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Limited and Ors., (2020) 6 MLJ 544. [x] Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Ltd. v. Northern Coal Field Ltd., AIR 2020 SC 979. [xi] Mayank Jain, A-Z of ADR: Kompetenz-Kompetenz Principle, BIMACC (May 7, 2021, 5:14 PM), https://www.bimacc.org/a-z-of-adr-kompetenz-kompetenz-principle/. [xii] N.N. Global Mercantile v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd., (2021) 1 MLJ 708. [xiii] SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering, AIR 2006 SC 4675. [xiv] Kvaerner Cementation India Ltd. v. Bajranglal Agarwal, (2012) 5 SCC 214. [xv] A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam, AIR 2016 SC 4675. [xvi] National Aluminium Company Ltd. v. Subhash Infra Engineers Pvt. Ltd., 2019 (5) ArbLR 254 (SC). [xvii] Ravi Arya v. Palmview Investments Overseas, 2019 (6) ArbLR 321 (Bom.). [xviii] Chatterjee Petrochem Co. v. Haldia Petrochemicals Ltd., 2013 (15) SCALE 45. [xix] The Board of Trustees of the Port of Kolkata v. Louis Dreyfus Armatures SAS, 2014 SCC Online Cal. 17695. [xx] World Sport Group (Mauritius) Ltd. v. MSM Satellite (Singapore) Pte. Ltd., (2014) 11 SCC 639. [xxi] McDonald’s India Pvt. Ltd. v. Vikram Bakshi, 2016 (4) ArbLR 250 (Delhi). [xxii] Bina Modi v. Lalit Kumar Modi, 2021 (1) ArbLR 1 (Delhi). [xxiii] Balasore Alloys Ltd. v. Medima LLC, (2020) SCC Online Cal. 1698.

- Utkarsha Singh[1] & Iesha sharma[2] Introduction In India, the enforcement of arbitral awards is covered in two parts by the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. Part I of the act applies to the arbitration proceedings seated in India and includes purely domestic arbitrations (between Indian parties) as well as international commercial arbitrations (where at least one party is foreign). Part II of the law applies to foreign arbitration and is concerned with the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards. In addition, the Act specifies that arbitration between an Indian and a foreign party may be governed by foreign law and may have a foreign seat. However, the question of whether two parties of Indian origin can agree on a foreign seat of arbitration is not expressly addressed by the Act. Multinational companies often prefer a foreign arbitration venue for contracts involving their subsidiaries incorporated in India. However, they were discouraged from choosing a foreign seat due to uncertainty regarding the stand of the Indian laws and courts regarding this matter. These ambiguities stand resolved after the latest landmark judgment of the Supreme Court of India. Factual Background The parameters for choosing a foreign seat of arbitration were set in the recent case of PASL Wind solutions Private Limited V. GE Power conversion India Private Limited[3]the two companies were incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. The facts of the case arose from the order placed by PASL for the purchases of three converters (used for wind turbines) involving the dispute regarding the Warranty (Quality) of goods supplied. The settlement agreement between the parties consisted of the clause for Dispute resolution if at all the settlement lapsed between the parties. The Clause also reflected that such matter should be resolved by an “Arbitration Proceeding in Zurich, Switzerland” with adherence to the rules by the International Chamber of commerce (ICC). The imperative understanding of the Agreement which the parties entered was incorporated under the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The parties failed to resolve the issue, and went ahead to settle the dispute through arbitration. PASL filed for the arbitration proceedings on grounds that GE did not adhere to the agreement. The seat for arbitration was decided to be in Mumbai, India. During the pendency of the arbitral proceedings, GE believed that the ICC Tribunal had no jurisdiction when it comes to determining the proceedings of two Indian corporations for the foreign seat of arbitration. PASL argued that there was no such bar in the Indian Law. GE did not challenge such a decision, the final award was in the favor of GE, and PASL refused the payment of the final award. However, in consonance with this award, GE filed for interim measures before the Honourable Gujarat High Court to enforce the award passed by the Tribunal under Section 47 and 49 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 also for pending enforcement of an award under Section 9 of Arbitration Act. The PASL objected to the enforcement of the award as it was in contravention of the public policy and did not permit arbitration in a foreign seat and that the seat of arbitration should be in Mumbai. The Gujarat High Court enumerated that a petition under Section 9 of the Act was not maintainable and upheld the award in favour of GE. Both PASL and GE challenged the High court’s decision on the validity of the seat of arbitration. Pronouncement of the Case The Key arguments raised by the Parties in the Supreme Court concerning the designation of the seat of the arbitration outside India as read-in with the provision of the Indian laws. The Indian parties are free to choose the foreign seat of the arbitration, wherein the Indian company is a subsidiary of a foreign company, it may prefer to resolve the dispute at a neutral forum. The complexity of the transition contained therein is “Party-Centric” - which involves the agreements between the parties to select a substantive and procedural law for governance during their arbitration proceeding. The development resolves to assume the relevance of such cases for mutual exclusivity, where it complies with the Indian laws, the parties can have different seats for different contracts that are part of the same transaction. The choice of the commonly designated seat for the arbitration across the agreement is no longer applicable, irrespective of their nationality. The award passed outside India will be considered as a foreign award, it would be susceptible to be challenged in India during the execution proceeding in Indian Court on the narrow grounds of the New York Convention, Part II of the Arbitration Act, with the respect to the foreign award under Section 44 of the Arbitration Act. The Indian parties can opt for the foreign seat, and they have the recourse for interim relief in the Indian courts if the asset against which the foreign award is given for seeking the interim relief, is in India. There is an Exception that if the parties are in the agreement which is contrary as specified in Section 2(2), then parties are prevented from taking recourse under section 9 of the Arbitration Act. The option for the Indian parties to choose India as the seat for the arbitration remains open under Part I of the arbitration act and would be governed under Section 28 of the Arbitration act. The Court relented that the test of the seat for the applicability of section 28 of the Indian contract act is restricted to the substantive law of the contract and does not apply to the seat of the arbitration[4]. The Indian Contract Act does not expressly define the term “public policy” or “opposed to public policy”. Exception 1 of Section 28 of the Contract Law specifically and expressly saves the arbitration of disputes between two persons without reference to the nationality of the persons who may resort to arbitration where parties get the freedom of contract and it creates a balance with clear and undeniable harm to the public, even if the facts of a particular case do not fit within the crystallized principles listed in well-established "heads" of public policy. The court in the case Atlas Export Industries v. Kotak & Co[5], referred to the said exception to Section 28 and found that there is nothing in section 23 or section 28 that prohibits two Indian parties from having their disputes arbitrated in a neutral forum outside India. Therefore it can be clearly understood that the doctrine of public policy provided in the Indian substantive law does not prevent two Indian parties from referring their disputes to arbitration in a neutral forum outside India while exercising their right of party autonomy. Conclusive Analysis and Way Forward The decision in the case came as a relief on various fronts. Firstly, it provided recognition to the doctrine of party autonomy and highlighted the fact that the Indian laws do not place any bar over the parties to choose a foreign seat of arbitration. Secondly, the decision, in this case, brought to rest many conflicting decisions of the High Courts and of the Supreme Court itself. Thirdly, it is possible to infer from the judgment that there is no obstacle for two Indian parties while choosing a foreign substantive law to govern their contract, as long as the arbitration proceeding is seated outside India.[6] In this context, it is relevant to mention the recent decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Dholi Spintex Pvt Ltd v. Louis Dreyfus Company India Pvt Ltd, according to which two Indian parties can normally choose a foreign law to govern arbitration proceedings. The Court relied on the decision of three Supreme Court justices in Centrotrade Minerals and Metal Inc. v. Hindustan Copper Ltd. which emphasized the principle of party autonomy in arbitration and came to the conclusion that parties are allowed to adopt foreign law as their own arbitration law. The Delhi High Court, therefore, held that to reject a foreign law only because it is contrary to an Indian law would go against the very basis of private international law, to which India unquestionably and undisputedly subscribes. The question regarding the possibility for Indian parties to choose a foreign seat was critical for foreign companies (such as GE France and GE USA) which had their subsidiaries in India. The decision, in this case, came as a turning point in the history of foreign arbitration. These foreign companies preferred settling the disputes between Indian subsidiaries and other Indian parties outside India for various reasons such as neutrality, efficient supervision of courts, speedy and efficient disposal of cases in the court in case a challenge regarding the arbitration award arises. While the impact of the Supreme Court decision, in this case, remains to be seen, it has immensely contributed to generating an element of judicial certainty. [1] The name of the author of this article is Utkarsha Singh. She is a Fourth-Year student studying at the University of Petroleum and energy studies, Dehradun Email id- Utkarshasingh669@gmail.com [2] The name of the author of this article is Iesha Sharma. She is a Fourth-Year student studying at the University of Petroleum and energy studies, Dehradun Email id- ieshasharma2000.5678@gmail.com [3]SLP (CIVIL) NO.3936 OF 2021 [4] Bharat Aluminium Co. V Kaiser Aluminium Inc. (2012)9 SCC 552 [5] Atlas Export Industries v. Kotak & Co (1999) 7 SCC 61 [6] Paragraph 51 of the Judgment

-Rohan Gulati* INTRODUCTION While unraveling the curtains of party autonomy in arbitration, the aspect of two Indian parties selecting a foreign seat of arbitration had always been a hard tussle. This tussle was solely attributed to conflicting judgments delivered by the courts in India. Varied interpretations, fallacies, and at times, overlooking logical intricacies, the issue of selecting a foreign seat has certainly been a book with many chapters. Fortunately, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (“Court”) decided to write the last chapter of this book and settle all mounting issues on the subject once and for all. Recently, in the case of PASL Wind Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. GE Power Conversion India Pvt. Ltd.[1] (“PASL Wind”) the Court has affirmed that two Indian parties may select a foreign seat of arbitration and that nothing would stand in the way of brooding party autonomy. Whilst the judgment is laudable in every sense, there are a few red flags that stakeholders must be aware of as a result of this decision and moving forward. As a caveat, the purpose of this article is not to dim the lights upon the arbitration landscape in India and neither to portray a critique of the judgment in the case of PASL Wind. FLAGGING CERTAIN WORDS OF CAUTION The judgment of the Court in PASL Wind is certainly a flag bearer of the pro-arbitration stance that has been maintained by the Court. However, there exist certain pivotal aspects that may hinder and disrupt two Indian parties arbitrating outside India. These facets are predominantly an offshoot of the judgments in the past. Accordingly, this part succinctly discusses certain facets that stakeholders must be cautious of, in light of the recent decision in PASL Wind. A. The Absence of Patent Illegality in International Commercial Arbitration Section 34(2A) encapsulates Patent Illegality as a ground for setting aside an arbitral award under Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“1996 Act”). Before deep-diving into the moot point, it is perhaps appropriate to first understand the concept of Patent Illegality. An authoritative explanation of Patent Illegality was given by the Court in the case of Associate Builders v. DDA[2] (“Associate Builders”) wherein it observed that Patent Illegality would mean (i) contravention to the substantive law of India, (ii) contravention of the 1996 Act itself, or (iii) in case the arbitrator construes the terms of the contract in a way that no reasonable person could do. However, Section 34(2A) being exclusive to Part I of the 1996 Act, does not apply to Part II, as provided by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015. Section 48 is based on the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”) replicates Article V for refusing enforcement of foreign awards. Due to the absence of Patent Illegality under Section 48, the parties could potentially escape the scrutiny of such ground as Section 34(2A) would have no operation in a foreign seated arbitration. This may have certain ramifications to an extent. For instance, an arbitral award that lacks reasoning and is essentially a non-speaking award is considered to be perverse and liable to be set aside on the ground of being patently illegal. This finds support from the case of Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI[3] (“Ssangyong”)wherein the Court observed as follows: “41. What is important to note is that a decision which is perverse, as understood in paras 31 and 32 of Associate Builders… while no longer being a ground for challenge under “public policy of India”, would certainly amount to a patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. Thus, a finding based on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside on the ground of patent illegality. Additionally, a finding based on documents taken behind the back of the parties by the arbitrator would also qualify as a decision based on no evidence inasmuch as such decision is not based on evidence led by the parties, and therefore, would also have to be characterised as perverse.” Notably, transporting the afore-stated observation and applying the same to the case of Campos Brothers Farms v. Matru Bhumi Supply Chain Pvt. Ltd.[4], the Delhi High Court, while adjudicating upon a foreign award that lacked reasons, had refused to enforce the award on the ground being contrary to the public policy of India. At this stage, considering the absence of Patent Illegality under Section 48 and its components thereof, was the decision necessitated to be forced into the head of public policy? On this point, the decision in the case of Ssangyong had observed – what cannot be found to be contrary to the public policy of India certainly cannot be brought in by the backdoor of patent illegality. When read with the decision of the Court in PASL Wind, in case two Indian parties decide to arbitrate outside India, the parties would be able to escape the ground of Patent Illegality. Prima facie, this may not seem problematic. Albeit, from the afore-stated instance and the precedents so far, it is likely to raise certain questions as to the facets that parties could potentially derogate from. These facets perhaps reflect pertinent principles of arbitration law in India and at times the non-availability of such a ground may trouble the award-debtor and preclude him from pleading the same. Therefore, it remains indispensable that stakeholders are conscious and well aware of not being able to rely upon Patent Illegality as a ground for resisting enforcement under Section 48 of the 1996 Act. On the other hand, the courts must be cautious about trying to fit square pegs in a round hole. B. The Choice of Institutional Rules vis-à-vis Interim Relief under Section 9 Notably, the Delhi High Court in the case of Ashwani Minda v. U-Shin Ltd.[5] (“Ashwani Minda”), had made certain interesting observations concerning the choice of institutional rules and its effect on the availability of Section 9 of the 1996 Act. The Delhi High Court while dismissing the Section 9 petition had observed that as the parties agreed to arbitrate in accordance with the Japanese Commercial Arbitration Association (“JCAA”) Rules, and that there was an ‘implied’ essence of an agreement to exclude Part I of the 1996 Act in its entirety. Whereas, under Section 2(2) of the 1996 Act, there must be an [express] agreement to the contrary i.e., an agreement between parties to exclude the availability of reliefs that could be claimed under Section 9 of the 1996 Act in a foreign seated arbitration. Interestingly, there never existed any agreement to the contrary between the parties,[6] and neither did the JCAA Rules preclude parties from seeking interim relief from a national court. Thus, the Delhi High Court impliedly observed that the choice of institutional rules may potentially disentitle the parties from seeking relief under Section 9 of the 1996 Act in case of international commercial arbitration.[7] Given the judgment in the case of PASL Wind, two Indian parties arbitrating outside India under the aegis of certain institutional rules could very well be impacted by the decision in the case of Ashwani Minda. For instance, in case two Indian parties select the JCAA Rules for arbitration, and due to the absence of any rules qua the compatibility of JCAA Rules with interim relief from national courts, by applying the judgment of Ashwani Minda, such parties may not be able to seek interim reliefs from courts in India. On the other hand, in case two Indian parties decide to arbitrate as per the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”) Rules, they may be safeguarded by neatly drafted provisions such as Rule 30.3 of SIAC Rules allowing parties to seek interim relief from national courts that reads as follows: “30.3 A request for interim relief made by a party to a judicial authority prior to the constitution of the Tribunal, or in exceptional circumstances thereafter, is not incompatible with these Rules.” Therefore, while the decision of PASL Wind may seem lucrative enough, it remains imperative for parties to be cautious of institutional rules that are silent upon compatibility with claiming interim relief from national courts. Judgments like Ashwani Minda must be learning lessons and precursors to decisions like PASL Wind and the parties being inspired by the same. C. Indian Courts must not revive the Doctrine of Double Exequatur Interestingly, in the decision of PASL Wind, the Court observed that award-debtors will have ‘two bites at the cherry’ i.e., (i) when availing recourse to a court or tribunal in a country outside India for setting aside the award, and (ii) when resisting enforcement under Section 48 of the 1996 Act in the Indian courts. The point that the parties could have two bites at the cherry could perhaps lead to the revival of the Doctrine of Double Exequatur. Under the Convention on Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“Geneva Convention”) 1927, there existed a requirement that the award-holder must obtain leave from the court at the seat of arbitration first, and only then could the award be enforced in the secondary jurisdiction. This prerequisite under the Geneva Convention was termed as Double Exequatur. However, this requirement was done away with by the New York Convention, which superseded the Geneva Convention and does not require the award-holder to obtain leave from the court of the seat, under the laws of which, the award was made. Under the Indian framework, Section 48(1)(e) 1996 Act replicated Article V(e) of the New York Convention that dispenses the requirement of Double Exequatur. On the international front, the New York Convention did away with the concept, and in India, it was expressly put to rest in the case of Escorts Ltd. v. Universal Tractor Holding[8] (“Escorts Ltd”). The Court had held that Double Exequatur is not applicable in India in light of the 1996 Act and rejected the argument that a foreign award could not be enforced in India unless the relevant foreign court affirms the same. Pertinently, it is not necessary for the Indian court to adjourn the enforcement proceedings on account of the award-debtor having merely filed an application to set aside the award before the court at the seat of the arbitration. If it is done, it would lead to the revival of Double Exequatur that is incompatible with not only the New York Convention but also contrary to the judgment in Escorts Ltd. Therefore, merely because two Indian parties are arbitrating outside India and have impliedly agreed to have two bites at the cherry, must not put the Indian courts in a situation that may revive Double Exequatur. If there really exists a brooding sense of party autonomy, in appropriate cases, foreign awards must be enforced in India notwithstanding any judicial review before the court at the seat of arbitration. D. The (mis)use of Right to Appeal under Section 50 Section 50(1)(b) of the 1996 Act is a statutory sword essentially for the award-holder in a case where the court in India may decide to refuse enforcement of the award. However, this statutory sword has often been deployed by the award-debtor in light of sub-section (2) attached to Section 50 by way of a Special Leave to Appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The words – ‘right to appeal’ under Section 50 has been wrongly construed by award-debtors on several occasions. In this regard, the Court in the case of Shin-Etsu Chemical Company Ltd. & Ors. v. Vindhya Telelinks Ltd. & Ors.[9] had categorically observed that, in the absence of a constitutional or statutory provision for an appeal as of right, an appellant could not contend that it had a right to appeal to the Court. Article 136 does not confer a right to appeal but rather a discretion on the Court to grant leave in appropriate cases. Insofar as the contours of Section 50 are concerned, in the case of Vijay Karia & Ors. v. Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi SRL & Ors.[10], the Court authoritatively observed that, firstly, as per the travaux préparatoires, there ought to be only shot that the award-debtor may have i.e., at the instance of resisting enforcement under Section 48. Secondly, the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 136 cannot be used to circumvent the legislative policy and would only be open when there arises a sui generis question of law that has previously not been answered by the Court. Through a combined reading of the afore-stated decisions on Section 50, the avenue remains narrow and exceptional, and given the direction of precedents so far, the Court is likely to adjudicate with a mindset to not interfere with the foreign award on the first instance. Unnecessarily circumventing the law without any prospect of success, and utilizing the same as a dilatory tactic may attract heavy costs on the award-debtors as evidenced in the case of Responsive Industries Ltd. v. Banyan Tree Growth Capital LLC & Ors.[11] (“Responsive Industries”). In light of two Indian parties arbitrating outside, and enforcing the foreign award in India, must be alive to the fact that the contours of Section 50(2) must not be abused to flood the docket of the Court under Article 136 without any possibility of success. This must be a strong caveat to all award-debtors given the turn of events in the case of Responsive Industries. CONCLUSION The decision of PASL Wind gives strength and clarifies the position regarding two Indian parties arbitrating in a foreign jurisdiction of their choice. However, there are multiple stakeholders that range from the judiciary to the litigants and to the multi-national corporations who must be aware of the caveats concerning two Indian parties arbitrating outside India. Indian courts must be cautious during enforcement proceedings to not create unnecessary hurdles and impediments in enforcing foreign awards. Concurrently, award-debtors must not unnecessarily tangle genuine award-holders in several rounds of litigation as it may lead to adverse orders. It is imperative that all stakeholders understand the nuances carefully, stand well versed with the red flags, observe caution where needed, as arbitration in India is now ‘a whole new ball game.’ * Rohan Gulati is a Junior Staff Editor for the Arbitration Workshop Blog. He is currently a fourth-year law student pursuing BB.A LL.B at Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad. His primary area of interest is Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) with a specific focus on arbitration law. He can be contacted at rohan.gulati@student.slsh.edu.in [1] 2021 SCC OnLine SC 331. [2] (2015) 3 SCC 49. [3] (2019) 15 SCC 131. [4] 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8350. [5] 2020 SCC OnLine Del 1648. [6] Ratan K. Singh and Gracious Timothy Dunna, “India and Interim Measures in International Commercial Arbitration: Impressions from Bitter Experience” (Scconline.com, 17 April, 2021) accessed April 28, 2021. [7] Id. [8] (2013) 10 SCC 717. [9] (2009) 14 SCC 16. [10] 2020 SCC OnLine SC 177. [11] Special Leave Petition (SLP) Nos. 11404-11405/2020.

Alexandros-Cătălin Bakos Introduction: By the end of 2020, the Cairn Energy PLC and Cairn UK Holdings Limited (the Claimants) v. India Tribunal (sat in the Hague) rendered an Award which might prove to be of high importance for the world of international investment law, owing to the multitude of issues that it raises for states, investors, and for stakeholders in general (a brief presentation of the Award and of possible – but not exhaustive – issues of interest is made below), especially in the area of taxation and the limits that international investment law may bring to state discretion in this area. At the same time, an interesting, but less evident, issue that was clarified by the Cairn v. India Tribunal is the extent to which works that may be connected to the applicable investment treaty in a dispute may be relevant to the interpretation of that treaty as travaux preparatoires (or preparatory works). Before moving on to this aspect of treaty interpretation and the Tribunal’s findings as regards it, however, a brief presentation of the dispute is in order. Background to the dispute: It would not be an exaggeration to claim that one of the most important developments in international investment arbitration – and international investment relations, in general – in 2020 was the Cairn v. India Award. Without going into too many details – as the Award’s contents were aptly summarized elsewhere – it is sufficient, for present purposes, to discuss the main aspects of the dispute. Essentially, it revolved around retroactive taxation of capital gains (which had not been taxable at the moment they occurred) – pursuant to intra-group restructuring activities. This was something that the arbitral tribunal considered to have been done in violation of the applicable bilateral investment treaty (BIT). More specifically, in violation of the fair and equitable (FET) treatment standard that was guaranteed via the United Kingdom (UK)-India investment treaty to UK investors committing their capital to India. The impact of this Award – both on the world of international investment arbitration, in general, and on India, in particular – cannot be understated. To start with, the amount of the damages (exceeding $1.2 billion) that were awarded to the successful claimants could potentially raise questions as to the Indian Government’s ability to pay what it owes pursuant to the Award. Irrespective of this the Claimants found a possible solution to this potential obstacle, as they moved to enforce the award before US courts. And they targeted assets owned not by India itself, but by one of its state-owned enterprises, Air India. Something reminiscent of recognition and enforcement proceedings brought by investors who had obtained favourable awards against Venezuela before investment treaty tribunals. This will clarify even further how, and to what extent, the exception to the separate legal personality of states and state-owned enterprises applies in such investment cases. Thus, it is not a far-fetched assertion to state that, in the context of a backlash against investment treaty arbitration and in the context of a multitude of reform discussions concerning investor-state dispute settlement (mostly via arbitration) – the most popular ones being, perhaps, the UNICTRAL Working Group III discussions – the Cairn v. India dispute will most probably be cited by proponents of reform to underpin their arguments. Nonetheless, the Cairn Energy award goes both ways. It is not the only time that India found itself a losing respondent before an investment treaty arbitral tribunal for its retroactive tax measures. Such outcomes may negatively affect the reputation of a host state looking to attract foreign investors, since the latter usually put a premium on the general regulatory framework concerning taxation – including enforcement practices – of a state to which they might commit their capital. Even if this is not necessarily a determinative factor to an investor’s decision to invest, it might nonetheless tip the balance towards a decision which would be unfavourable to the state looking to attract foreign investment. Travaux preparatoires and the Cairn v. India Tribunal’s assessment of their content Beyond the immediate impact of the Cairn v. India Award lies a plethora of other not so apparent, but nonetheless interesting, legal aspects. One of them is the public international law issue of preparatory works of a treaty. And the multitude of interesting questions that are raised when applying the interpretation rules of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) (or their customary law equivalent) pertaining to whether, and to what extent, can travaux preparatoires be resorted to when interpreting an international (investment protection) treaty: More specifically, Article 32 (Supplementary means of interpretation) of the Convention reads as follows: “Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” This provision, if read textually, comes as an aid, if the aforementioned conditions are satisfied, to the tribunal applying Article 31 of the Convention, which mandates the adjudicator to interpret a treaty provision “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. In other words, if after following these steps the meaning of a treaty provision is ambiguous or obscure or if the result is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, resort may be had to preparatory works or the circumstances of a treaty’s conclusion. It is beyond the scope of this brief blog post to discuss the multitude of issues raised by these provisions and their specific application to investment arbitration proceedings. Fortunately, this has been done before. Commentators would focus, for instance, on issues such as fairness, legitimacy, and consent and their role in using travaux preparatoires when interpreting investment agreements, with Vasani and Ugale arguing that “the need to resort to supplementary means of interpretation (in investment treaty arbitration) is even greater, as the system is based on voluntary compliance and depends on its being perceived as fair and legitimate. A well-reasoned decision drawn within the limits of the parties’ consent and the contracting parties’ intent assures the public and the parties that discretion is being exercised fairly. In this way, the entire system succeeds”. In any case, before going into any in-depth analysis of the need to resort to travaux preparatoires (although, logically, this might come first), it is perhaps better to ask a simpler question, but of equal importance – what exactly amounts to preparatory works of a treaty? To ask such a question, however, might seem somewhat counter-intuitive. Even if Article 32 of the VCLT does not define the type of materials that may amount to travaux preparatoires (for a take on what might be included, see this article by Shirlow and Waibel), it may not be entirely clear why disputes could arise as regards this issue. But one of the contested issues that arose before the Cairn v. India tribunal was exactly this. Essentially, India tried to argue that the UK-India BIT’s FET standard did not have an autonomous meaning, but one grounded in the customary international law minimum standard of treatment (see para. 1704, fn 2146 of the Award). For practical purposes, it is enough to mention here that the difference between the two standards – generally speaking – is that applying the minimum standard of treatment (MST) could potentially lead to a higher threshold that must be reached in order to hold the state liable for not observing its international obligations (at the same time, it must also be acknowledged that the MST may have evolved towards greater protection for investors, as found by the Bilcon v. Canada tribunal, in the NAFTA context – especially at paras. 434-8). Of course, whether this would have been the case in Cairn v. India is another issue, which I will not address here. Moving back to India’s argument, what is most interesting about the present Award is that the Respondent tried to underpin its position by linking the FET standard to the MST one by reference to a journal article, written by Eileen Denza and Shelagh Brooks, two of the officials involved in the negotiations of the UK’s investment treaties, and published in 1987. This would qualify as preparatory work to the UK-India BIT, India’s argument goes, and would clarify the way in which the FET standard should be interpreted. Essentially, the authors discussed in the cited article how one of the UK’s draft BIT (among those preceding the UK-India BIT) was heavily influenced by the 1967 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property (pp. 910-1 of Denza’s and Brooks’ article). This Draft Convention essentially equated the FET standard with the minimum standard of treatment (see p. 9 of the forecited Draft Convention, with comments). The Tribunal, however, avoided discussing the merits of the article and its substantial relevance (historically, the UK changed its Model BIT in 1991, after Denza’s and Brooks’ article was published, and before concluding its BIT with India) or the influence of the Draft Convention on the UK’s treaty practice. It simply stated that “[t]he Denza and Brooks article, the historical accuracy of which the Tribunal has no reason to doubt, does not qualify as travaux préparatoires within the meaning of the Vienna Convention. Nor have any such materials developed by the Contracting Parties to the present Treaty been submitted into the record of this arbitration, which would show that the negotiators expressed a shared understanding (or even exchanged views) that FET, as used in Article 3 [of the applicable treaty], was to be understood in the light of the 1967 OECD draft Convention's commentary. In short, there is no evidence that FET is to be interpreted other than in accordance with Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, which in the absence of (i) proper travaux préparatoires, (ii) a subsequent agreement between the Parties regarding the interpretation of the Treaty or the application of its provisions, (iii) evidence of a subsequent practice of the Parties which establishes the agreement of the Parties regarding the Treaty's interpretation, or (iv) evidence that a special meaning is to be given to FET showing that a different meaning than that borne by the plain meaning of the text, mandates the interpreter to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used in the Treaty.” (para. 1704 of the Award, fn 2146). While it is not entirely clear from the Award what exactly was argued by the Respondent to constitute travaux preparatoires, it seems that Denza’s and Brooks’ article was considered an indispensable link in the Respondent’s argument. The Tribunal also expressly denied the relevance of such scholarship as a form of preparatory work, so it is reasonable to assume that this is what India attempted to qualify as travaux preparatoires. In fact, what the Cairn tribunal seems to have done (albeit implicitly) in rejecting the relevance of Denza’s and Brooks’ article was to clearly separate the treaty provision (containing the FET standard) – and its interpretation by possible reference to historical preparatory works, if existing – from a different secondary source of international law: the “the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations” (as provided for in Article 38 contained in the Statute of the International Court of Justice). In other words, it did not matter that these teachings (in this case, writings, to be more precise) belonged to persons taking part in the negotiation of the treaty under consideration before the arbitral tribunal. And it did not matter that what was written therein was related to the treaty that was being interpreted by the arbitral tribunal. As long as what was mentioned in those teachings/writings was formally contained in a secondary source of international law, it would be treated as such. To be considered preparatory works, the relevant sources need to satisfy other criteria. For instance, the Inceysa v. El Salvador tribunal considered that communications sent between the parties to the applicable treaty in that dispute before that agreement entered into force satisfied such criteria (para. 192). Thus, the emphasis there was on exchanges between the parties, which could be qualified as pointing to a common intent. Somewhat more liberally, for instance, the Berschader v. Russia tribunal seems to have leaned towards accepting unilateral declarations by the organs of one state party to the applicable treaty, made in connection with the ratification of that treaty, as a form of travaux (para. 158). Such liberal approaches might raise the question of the extent to which arbitral tribunals are willing go when construing the relevance of certain documents, or acts, as preparatory works influencing a treaty’s interpretation. It is in this context that the Cairn v. India tribunal findings must be considered. The added value of the Tribunal’s decision, thus, is that the Tribunal seems to have clarified what cannot amount to travaux preparatoires, even if connected to officials involved in treaty negotiations. Conclusion: While at first it may not necessarily seem so, the Cairn v. India Tribunal’s clarification that academic writings pertaining to officials who took part in the negotiations of the applicable treaty in a dispute may not be used as preparatory works with a view to interpreting that agreement is a welcome development. Since even domestic explanatory materials could be qualified as travaux preparatoires (or as relevant to the conclusion of a treaty), thus going beyond what is strictly discussed, and debated, during treaty negotiations, it is important to show to what extent can an interpreter go beyond such treaty negotiations. Of course, since there is no formal duty of binding precedent in investment treaty arbitration, there is no guarantee that the Cairn v. India Tribunal’s approach will be replicated – especially if a different Tribunal might consider the former’s approach incorrect.

Harsh Patidar & Monish Raghuwanshi* PART - II This part of the Article succinctly coruscates Third-Party Funding by highlighting its merits, demerits, and complexities that can be ascribed to third-party funding. In peroration, this article curtly ails to delineate certain recommendations and suggestions in the form of remedies to get rid of all the complexities associated with TPF and to make the arrangement of TPF an effective and viable route for litigation funding. Benefits of Third-Party funding IN ARBITRATION The business of law is evolving in recent time which mandates the need to have third party funding in domestic and international arbitration. In the middle of this context, it is not only increasingly timely but extremely important to explore the interplay between conflict funding and arbitration. A way to reconcile the increasing need of business for the funding of legal issues with maintaining the dignity and ultimate enforceability of awards should be found out. Dispute settlement proceedings can be a considerable burden for the parties and as a result of the dispute itself, financial problems occur. Companies that are eventually party to arbitration disputes should take into account the possible benefits of third-party funding and should be aware of the potential risks. I. Provides access to justice to under-resourced parties Third-Party Funding of an arbitration dispute has the potential to provide adequate justice and access to justice for parties having fewer resources and are facing financial burden. This enables under-resourced parties to go ahead with the arbitration proceedings which would otherwise be halted due to lack of finances. II. Reduces the arbitration costs The exorbitant costs of claiming and advancing arbitration can be discouraging. Third-Party funding in arbitration supports claims which are worthwhile but would not be followed simply because of the substantial costs otherwise. Even a business with a substantial amount of funds should consider third party funding to their arbitration dispute. This reduces the expenses involved and affects positively its cash flows and allows capital that would otherwise be incurred in legal fees to be allocated to other productive areas of that business. Also, without a set mold of a third-party funding agreement, parties can negotiate on the terms and conditions of the agreement making it flexible and a less costly affair. III. Minimises the risk Arbitration proceedings are associated with risks making the parties unwilling to take such risks. Third-Party Funding eliminates the risk factor involved in an arbitration proceeding as the costs involved therein are relieved for the parties. The third-party funder does not play any role in taking decisions on the case or the negotiations involved in order to reach a consensus in the arbitration matter. The emphasis of the third party is on properly evaluating the potential of success of the case for which the funding is proposed, taking into account all of the considerations such as the competency and experience of the legal representative of the claimant, increasing or lowering the speed in the execution of the proceedings. Also, the funder cannot at any time interfere with the process or with the decisions of the claimant. IV. Extra layer of scrutiny The additional layer of oversight that comes with the third-party funding may be another benefit of a funding arrangement with an external party. A third-party funder is like any other organization and it is doubtful that they will back a claim unless they are optimistic about its success. The funder only takes into account the cases that guarantee merit. This acts as a validation for the party and could also contribute to an early settlement. Third-party funders also have their own legal advisors to review claims and often evaluate the merits of a claim by independent research and evaluation. They give an objective and independent assessment of the situation and provides an extra layer of scrutiny by a realistic approach. Plugging the complexities ASSOCIATED with third-party funding in arbitration & litigation In India, there exists no legal embargo to third-party funding arrangements, yet, there are certain convolutions associated with third-party funding. They are as follow: I. Public Policy Considerations The laws of “public policy” do not ascribe to a customary or a fixed rule. The main question of whether an agreement is against the public policy or not is to be determined on formal doctrines only. Public policy can a constitute breach of an Act and whatever is contrary to the acceptable principles when made the main consideration of a contract. II. Mere right to sue In pursuant to the contention that the contract is against the public policy, one can contend that a specific arrangement is nothing but an assignment of a right to sue that is inhibited by Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Further, in the Sri Sarada Mills case,[1] the Supreme Court of India held, “claims to damages for breach of contract or claims to damages for tort and assignment of the mere right of litigation, are bad. The reason behind this rule is that a bare right of action for damages is not assignable because the law will not recognize any transaction which may savour maintenance or champerty. It is only when there is some interest in the subject matter that a transaction can be saved from the imputation of maintenance. That interest must exist apart from the assignment, and to that extent, must be independent of it.”[2] III. Conflict of interest In TPF, a funder can resort to a pre-established connection with a person belonging to the Arbitral Tribunal, in that case, the autonomy and impartiality of an arbitrator might be alleged if such facts appear before opposite party. From fifth Schedule of the Arbitration Act,[3] which takes an arbitrator’s indirect interest into consideration, one can infer that it might envisage third-party funding. IV. Confidentiality In India, the Arbitration Act[4] has added Section 43A that binds the parties and Arbitral Tribunal to restore the confidentiality of all the proceedings pertaining to arbitration. Thus, there exists a possibility of the opposite party challenging violation of confidentiality on the ground of such a third-party funding arrangement cannot be set at naught. Emerging International Trends in Third-Party Funding A. Innovative risk transfer arrangements The third-party funding arrangements for the party comprise of the cases where the party does not want to incur the costs of litigation but would pay from his pocket, a share of the envisaged value of a triumphant party, upon dismissal of the averment. The parties not only want the litigation connected costs funded but also the risk of a contrary decision transferred. For this, the market includes certain paraphernalia which provides insurance and some sort of arrangements that transfer the risk of an issue for a plummeted price paid by the funder. B. Proliferating legal imposition for third party funding Countries like Australia, Hong Kong, etc, are abandoning the clunky common law principles of champerty, and maintenance, and have made third-party funding legal. Recently, Singapore brought the amended Civil Law Act and the Civil Law Regulations, 2017 legalizing third-party funding in arbitration. C. Emergence of artificial intelligence Nowadays, Artificial Intelligence abled algorithms are being used to ascertain the results of disputes, and to assess and price the risk in funding a matter. For example, “Legalist”, a tech third-party funding entity, uses an Algorithm that ascertains the possibilities of winning the matter using its database of 10 million court disputes before making an investment. D. The portfolio funding Under portfolio funding, a plenitude of averments brought by a claimant in contrast to identical or non-identical defendants is funded. This aids the claimant to seek more favourable terms since the funder’s finding and return is rampant across the averments, trivializing exposure to only one claim. Further, funders are being contacted to carry out transactions such as payment to creditors of an insolvent entity who would otherwise have to await the output of a claim before receiving the payment, proliferating the proceeds of a settlement, and even funding the expenses of the business, which may be based on a triumphant claim. The Future Ahead In India, states like Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu have recognized third-party funding after amending Order 25 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. This Order authorizes the courts to secure expenses for litigation by asking the financier to fund by becoming a party in order to deposit the costs in court. On adverting to some infrastructure companies such as Patel Engineering and Hindustan Construction Company have countenanced third-party funding in relation to their unresolved and unsettled averments in the sphere of arbitrations. The pivotal purpose seems to be to relax their advantageous status and position. It is axiomatic that third-party funding is evolving as an endeared path for alleviating tensions and conflicts in debt-laden construction entities. The ambiguity prevailing over the market demands emanating in the light of COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with the worldwide economic nosedive, can discourage claimants from making cogent and strong averments by adverting to these on the basis of a monetary deficit. Arbitration financing as a means in the current financial health can help micro-level entities and other claimants encountering difficulties in accomplishing their administration and maintenance costs or widening their regime by saturating the fund saved on litigation. Conclusion Third-Party Funding in Arbitration is a new emerging trend all over the world. With an upsurge in the arbitration claims and costs and risks involved in it, third-party funding gives relief to businesses and commercial organizations. The benefits of third-party funding clearly exceed any supposed shortcomings which have been noted in the above discussion. However, the complexities revolving around the adoption of this concept in arbitration needs to be addressed by means of adequate contractual regulation. Given the increased number of new third-party funders entering the market as well as globalization, many funders are operating across many jurisdictions. Therefore, the implementation of uniform external regulations is needed for different jurisdictions. In India, there is no clear regulation regarding third-party funding. It is, however, established by judicial precedents that third-party funding other than that of advocates is an accepted practice in India in litigation proceedings. Such an agreement between the third-party funder and party to a dispute takes into account the doctrine of public policy and the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. As there is no fundamental difference between litigation and arbitration proceedings, the third-party funding in the arbitration claims should be validated in India through a statute. *Harsh Patidar is a III Year, B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal, harshpatidar.ug@nliu.ac.in Monish Raghuwanshi is a II Year, B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal, monishraghuwanshi.ug@nliu.ac.in [1] Sri Sarada Mills Ltd. V. Union of India, (1973) AIR 281. [2] Id. [3] The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, No. 26, Acts of Parliament, 1996 (India). [4] Id. § 43, cl. A.

Harsh Patidar & Monish Raghuwanshi [1] PART- I Abstract India’s development as one of the main five economies on the planet made it quite possibly the favoured countries for wooing foreign investment lately. Nonetheless, hassles and interruptions brought by the COVID-19 pandemic could bring about another influx of matters related to litigation. The COVID-19 has hit hard the economy, due to which parties to litigation matters may get themselves incapable to bear the significant expenses of litigation or arbitration. Nevertheless, India is a cost-preferred jurisdiction for litigation and arbitration. Accordingly, bringing back the emphasis on the resource class being TPF (third-party funding). This article is divided into two parts. In this part, the authors have dealt with an introduction to TPF, the third-party funding in the Indian context, and the TPF under various other jurisdictions such as Singapore, Australia, etc. Introduction Third-party funding[2] refers to an agreement by a third party to the dispute to provide a party, funds or other material support in order to finance part or all of the cost of the proceedings, either individually or as part of a specific range of cases. Such support or financing is either provided in exchange for remuneration or reimbursement that is wholly or partially dependent on the outcome of the dispute or provided through a grant or in return for a premium payment. Such an agreement between the litigant and the third-party funder is profoundly known as the Champerty agreement and the remuneration or share in the proceeds is maintenance.[3] Champerty is defined[4] as “a bargain between a plaintiff or defendant in a suit and a third person, campum partire, to divide between them the land or other matter sued for in the event of the litigant being successful in the suit, whereupon the champertor is to carry on the party's suit or action at his own expense; the purchasing of an interest in the thing in dispute, with the object of maintaining and taking part in the litigation”.[5] This concept of champerty first came in the United Kingdom where it was regarded as a tool for access to justice for poor litigants who are unable to bear the exorbitant costs of litigation. However, this process was widely abused as a stranger without any substantial interest in the litigation was “officious intermeddling” in litigation, which often resulted in the oppression of the person against whom the action is brought.[6] This form of gambling and trafficking by the stranger to litigation attracted tortious and criminal liability. But, gradually rising costs of litigation increased the demand for third-party funding which led to the abolition of the common law offense of champerty[7] making it an accepted practice in litigation proceedings. However, such an agreement should not per se be opposed to public policy and should be in furtherance of justice and to resist oppression. Arbitration in the current scenario is being extensively used for the settlement of commercial disputes all over the world. With such a rise in the arena of arbitration, the cost involved therein is in upsurge which mandates the need for third-party funding in the arbitration proceedings. However, the question that comes flagging here is whether this principle of champerty in litigation is applicable to arbitration proceedings or not? Third-Party Funding in THE Indian Context The arbitration is in the embryonic stage in India and the institutionalization and stride taken by the Indian Courts have led to an upsurge in the arbitration commercial settlement claims. Due to the Covid-19, lots of businesses are in disruption in India and the costs of the dispute settlement mechanisms from litigation to arbitration are on a hike. The funding of arbitration costs by a third party may ease such economic distress of the businesses and commercial organizations. However, the position of third-party funding is not clear and there is an absence of statute regarding the validation or prohibition in this regard. Indian Courts have not explicitly disregarded the concept of third-party funding to a party in litigation or arbitration proceeding. The judicial precedents of the Privy Council and Supreme Court on many occasions have dealt with this issue. Earlier, in 1825, in the case of Ram Gholam Singh v. Keerut Singh[8], the Sudder court declared “a contract to give half of a large estate for a comparatively small advance as unfair and called the transaction as savoured strongly of gambling”. Later, in the case of Tara Soonduree Chowdhrain v. The Court of Wards[9], a champerty agreement was held void on the grounds of being contrary to the public policy. Later, the courts started recognising a champerty and maintenance agreement in India. On the question of the applicability of English law, making champerty and maintenance an offence in India, Sir R. Couch, C.J. in the English case of Pechell v. Watson[10] observed that “the English Common Law, and the Statutes as to maintenance and champerty, are not applicable, and are considered as having no force in India”. In furtherance to this, the Privy Council in the case of Chedambara Chetty v. Renga Krishna Mithu Vira Puchaiya Naickar[11] held that “the law in India is not the same as it is in England. The Statute of Champerty being part of the Statute Law of England, has, of course, no effect in the mofussil of India; and the Courts of India do admit the validity of many transactions of that nature, which would not be recognized or treated as valid by the Courts of England”.[12] However the Courts will administer according to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience and will take into account the question that “whether the transaction is merely the acquisition of an interest in the subject of litigation bona fide entered into, or whether it is an unfair or illegitimate transaction got up for the purpose merely of spoil, or of litigation, disturbing the peace of families, and carried on from a corrupt and improper motive”. The validity of a third-party funding agreement depends on the Indian Contract Act, 1872[13] under which such an agreement should not violate the doctrine of public policy. This doctrine of public policy is based on the maxim “ex turpi causa non oritur actio” which means that an agreement against public policy would be void without any effect.[14] The Privy Council on the question of the applicability of the doctrine of public policy in the champerty and maintenance agreement, in the case of Ram Coomar Coondoo and Anr v. Chunder Canto Mookerjee[15], observed that “a fair agreement to supply funds to carry on a suit in consideration of having a share of the property, if recovered, may not be opposed to public policy. But agreements of this kind ought to be carefully watched, and when found to be extortionate, and unconscionable, so as to be inequitable against the party; or to be made, not with the bona fide object of assisting a claim believed to be just, and of obtaining a reasonable recompense therefor, but for improper objects, as for the purpose of gambling in litigation, or of injuring or oppressing others by abetting and encouraging unrighteous suits, so as to be contrary to public policy, the effect ought not to be given to them”.[16] The Supreme Court of India in In Re: G, A Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court[17], further cleared its position on the validity of champerty and maintenance observing that “it can be accepted at once that a contract of this kind would be legally unobjectionable if no lawyer was involved. The rigid English rules of champerty and maintenance do not apply in India, so if this agreement had been between what we might term third parties, it would have been legally enforceable and good. It follows that there is nothing morally wrong, nothing to shock the conscience, nothing against public policy and public morals in such a transaction per se, that is to say when a legal practitioner is not concerned”.[18] Now it is a well-settled law that a champerty and maintenance agreement is valid in India.[19] However, this should not be opposed to public policy under the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The interpretation of public policy is wide and non-exhaustive. The question that lies here is whether a champerty agreement is void in India if an advocate is the third party. The Supreme Court in Bar Council of India v. AK Balaji[20] dealt with this question of law and went on to hold that “funding of litigation by an advocate is impermissible. However, there appears to be no restriction on third parties (non-lawyers) funding the litigation and getting repaid after the outcome of the litigation”. The concept of third-party funding is a recognised practice in litigation. The development in the adoption of the practice of third-party funding in arbitration proceedings is in a nascent stage in India. There is no fundamental difference in the litigation and arbitration proceedings as both resort to the settlement of disputes and work in furtherance of the principle of justice, equity and good conscience.[21] In this regard, the English Court in Bevan Ashford vs. Geoff Yeandle Ltd. observed that “The law of champerty has its origins in, and must still be based upon, perceptions of the requirements of public policy. I find it quite impossible to discern any difference between court proceedings on the one hand and arbitration proceedings on the other that would cause contingency fee agreements to offend public policy in the former case but not in the latter...If it is contrary to public policy to traffic in causes of action without a sufficient interest to sustain the transaction, what does it matter if the cause of action is to be prosecuted in court or in an arbitration?”.[22] Therefore, the validity of a third-party funding agreement in the arbitration proceeding in India would fundamentally depend on the doctrine of public policy under the Indian Contract Act, 1872. A Comparative Study: EVINCING DIASPORA OF TPF IN OTHER COUNTRIES A. Position in Australia In Australia, TPF is allowed. However, the situation is becoming knotty with a galore of juridical and law-making advancements in the year in review, affecting the arrangements of TPF and the advancements regarding TPF of representative proceedings, with TPF being kept under a certain level of regulation and control. Despite legislation, the status under the jurisdiction of Australia is that the formal tenets of the law of contract, in pursuance of which a contract might be considered as antithetical to public policy or illegal, are not disconcerted. This indicates that a TPF in the contract can be set at naught by the courts in Australia if it were not in consonance with common law public policy provisions and considerations.[23] There exists no legal regulatory framework that is applicable to litigation funding. The funding by the litigants is regulated and controlled under the administration of the Court, the Trade Practices Act 1974, the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 and various other State consumer protection laws and regulations. In common law, there exist no legal limitations for TPF in the litigation sphere and mechanisms other than the Rules of the Court and the Court’s acknowledgment of whether the proceedings result in abuse of procedure pertaining to third party funding. Notably, in the judgments of the High Court in the Fostif case[24] and Trendlen case,[25] there appears to be relevant satellite litigation in third party funding issues comprising of frivolous litigation over the legality of the funding mechanisms. Many legal scholars have contended that the absence of a legal setup and framework for TPF at the State level might proliferate ambiguity, notwithstanding the stance of the High Court on TPF in litigation. Indisputably, there has been a clarion call to set up a legal framework as well as a monetary framework for the regulation of third-party funding, to safeguard the interests of the litigants and to ensure the existence of third-party litigation funding. Talking about the limitations on the charges and additional amount in the form of interest funders can claim that no law extant in Australia imposes any restrictions on the costs that a funder could ask from the party. The court in the Fostif case ruled that “contract law considerations such as illegality, unconscionability and public policy may still arise in relation to a litigation funding agreement but there is no objective standard against which the fairness of the agreement may be measured. Accordingly, whether a particular clause in a litigation funding agreement may contravene public policy will be answered having regard to the circumstances of each particular case”.[26] A priori, the courts in Australia can nullify a TPF in litigation funding agreement in circumstances where the interest owned by the funders’ amounts to an equitable subterfuge in the perception that it indulged captivating a barter by resorting to clandestinely benefiting of a person’s incompetency to adjudge for him, on grounds of inability, requirement, lack of awareness, etc. B. Position in the UK In the United Kingdom, Section 58B of the Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990 allows TPF agreements between legal service contributors and litigants and allows TPF in litigation, whereby the third party could get a portion in the form of a share of the “damages”. Section 58B (1) of the Act reads as follows: “A litigation funding agreement which satisfies all of the conditions applicable to it by virtue of this section shall not be unenforceable by reason only of it being a litigation funding agreement”. Further, Section 58B (2) defines litigation funding agreement as: “(a) a person agrees to fund the provision of advocacy or litigation services to another person, and (b) the litigant agrees to pay a sum to the funder in specified circumstances”. Thus, third-party funding is legally regulated. Additionally, the report of the legal department (1996) had anointed “maintenance” and “champerty” as “the procurement, by direct or indirect financial assistance, of another person to institute, or carry on or defend civil proceedings without lawful justification. Champerty is a particular form of maintenance, where the maintainer’s agreement with the litigant gives them a share in the proceeds or subject matter of the action; action referred to as a division of the spoils”. The woes of the courts date back to the medieval time frame and the main dispute of the shielding of the sanctity of the justice delivered to the public. A bastion of TPF in litigation can distort the judicial procedure; they can whip up dubious or frivolous legal assertions to conceal evidence or even witnesses, or artificially alter the amount of any damages that can be remedied. In these ways, a crusader can try to guarantee a triumph in the court of law as a way of hounding or exhorting pressure on their adversaries. The judiciary in England has shown a casual attitude toward third-party funding set up, taking exigencies of funding problems into consideration, and proclaiming that access to justice for litigants is of paramount importance. In the year 2009, Lord Justice Jackson was questioned by the Master of the Roster, “to review the rules and principles governing the costs of civil litigation and to make recommendations in order to promote access to justice at proportionate cost”. In the conclusive report presented by him, he patronaged TPF as supplementing an amplification and sometimes the only way of TPF in litigation, assisting ingress to justice: “I accept that third party funding is still nascent in England and Wales and that in the first instance what is required is a satisfactory voluntary code, to which all litigation funders subscribe. At the present time, parties who use third party funding are generally commercial or similar enterprises with access to full legal advice. In the future, however, if the use of third- party funding expands, then full statutory regulation may well be required. In 2010, the Civil Justice Council, an advisory non-departmental public authority funded by the Ministry of Justice came with a consultation paper titled, A Self-regulatory Code for Third-Party Funding”. C. Position in Singapore At present, third-party funding is prohibited in Singapore. The present prohibitions extend to funding for international arbitration proceedings. As a common law nation, Singapore’s laws on third-party funding have their existence in English law. Singapore law disallows third-party funding in two ways: “Firstly, Singapore law generally treats third-party funding agreements as contrary to public policy or illegal – and for that reason, unenforceable. This policy is informed by the common law doctrines of maintenance and champerty. In brief, maintenance is the giving of assistance or encouragement to a litigant by a person who has neither an interest in the proceedings nor any other motive recognised by law as justifying his or her interference. Champerty is a subset of maintenance – it is the maintenance of an action in exchange for a promise to give the maintainer a share in the fruits of the proceedings. Typical third-party funding agreements fall foul of both doctrines and are therefore generally unenforceable under Singapore law”; and secondly, “Singapore law regards maintenance and champerty as torts at common law. An affected party could (at least in theory) sue the party (or parties) in tort if the affected party has suffered special damage as a result of the relevant tortious arrangement”. The embargo on third-party funding under Singapore law is far fetching. The Singapore Court of Appeal has delineated that “the principles behind the doctrine of champerty apply to all types of legal disputes and claims, including arbitration proceedings”.[27] There are various statutory and common law exceptions to it: Firstly, the Singapore Companies Act allows the liquidator belonging to an insolvent entity to sell to the third party who will provide funding.[28] Secondly, a TPF agreement would not be repealed if that same agreement is ancillary to the circumstance where the property interest gets transferred. Additionally, the factum that the funder may be benefited from a third-party funding agreement does not mean that the funding set up falls foul of the principle of champerty and maintenance.[29] Further, Singapore has decided to follow the “light touch” approach to govern and regulate third-party funding agreements. For instance, the Law Ministry of Singapore has made its target as important to “precedence to party autonomy and flexibility, with disclosure as the foundational principle, taking light touch mindset into consideration for the sake of regulation which had been accepted in jurisdictions where TPF is allowed”. It is undeniable that in order to be victorious, monitoring shall be commensurate with the real stakes in existence. However, scanty monitoring of a high-stake company could result in market misconduct, immoderate monitoring of a high-stake company or an entity stultifies growth. Since funding is “non-recourse”, it is self-regulating in nature: funders would lose their cash cows if they fund frivolous and vexatious claims. To be cont. [1] Harsh Patidar is a III Year, B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal, harshpatidar.ug@nliu.ac.in Monish Raghuwanshi is a II Year, B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal, monishraghuwanshi.ug@nliu.ac.in [2] INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, REPORT NO. 4, QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE ON THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 50, (2018). [3] Winnie Lo v HKSAR, (2012) 15 HKCFAR 16. [4] JOWITT'S DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW, (Daniel Greenberg, Jowitts, 5th ed. 2019). [5] Damodar Kilikar & Ors. v. Oosman Abdul Gani & Anr., 1961 KLJ 356. [6] Legislative Council Panel on Administration of Justice and Legal Services, Abolition of the common law offence of champerty, March 25, 2014, https://www.doj.gov.hk/en/legco/pdf/ajls20140325e2.pdf (Last visited on Mar. 28, 2021). [7] Criminal Law Act, 1967, § 13, No. 58, Acts of Parliament, 1967 (UK). [8] Ram Gholam Singh v. Keerut Singh, 4 Sel. Rep. 12. [9] Tara Soonduree Chowdhrain v. The Court of Wards, 13 B.L.R. 495. [10] Pechell v. Watson, 8 M.& W. 691. [11] Chedambara Chetty v. Renga Krishna Mithu Vira Puchaiya Naickar, L.R. 1 Ind. Ap. 241. [12] Id. ¶ 15. [13] Indian Contract Act, 1872, No. 9, Acts of Parliament, 1872 (India). [14] Kamarbai and Ors. v. Badrinarayan & Anr., AIR 1977 Bom 228. [15] Ram Coomar Coondoo and Anr v. Chunder Canto Mookerjee, (1876) ILR 2 CAL 233. [16] Id. ¶ 38. [17] In Re: G, A Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court, 1955 1 SCR 490. [18] Id. ¶ 11. [19] DAMODAR KILIKAR, supra note 5. [20] Bar Council of India v. AK Balaji, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 214. [21] Kshama Loya Modani and Vyapak Desai, Asia no longer third to Third Party Funding-Meets the Financing world of Arbitration, KAULA LUMPUR REGIONAL CENTRE FOR ARBITRATION (Dec. 2017), https://nishithdesai.com/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/NDA%20In%20The%20Media/News%20Articles/180129_A_Asia-No-Longer-Third-To-Third-Party-Funding.pdf (Last visited on Mar. 28, 2021). [22] Bevan Ashford v. Geoff Yeandle Ltd., [1998] 3 W.L.R. 172. [23] Clyne v. NSW Bar Association, [1960] 104 CLR 186. [24] Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v. Fostif Pty Ltd, [2006] 229 CLR 386. [25] Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v. Trendlen Pty Ltd, [2006] HCA 42. [26] CAMPBELLS, supra note 24. [27] Otech Pakistan Pvt Ltd v. Clough Engineering Ltd and Anr., [2007] 1 SLR(R) 989. [28] Re Vanguard Energy Pte Ltd, [2015] 4 SLR 597. [29] Lim Lie Hoa and another v. Ong Rebecca Jane, [1997] 1 SLR(R) 775.

-Alpesh Yadav[1] INTRODUCTION Even as the global economy has grappled with the effects of pandemic COVID-19, the urgency of addressing climate change has remained unchanged rather has further intensified. The recent flash flood which occurred on 7th February 2021 in the State of Uttarakhand washed away two hydroelectric projects in the outer Garhwal Himalaya region, impacted several other major hydro projects located downstream, took lives of hundreds of villagers and damaged properties and infrastructure of the region. The sudden flooding is believed to be caused due to glacial lake outbursts releasing water trapped behind the ice causing flood. The Government proclaimed the calamitous event as a natural disaster. However, if we believe the reports published in international newspapers[2] of the very next day, they quoted that scientists had warned the Government long back that the Himalayas had been warming at a dangerously high rate and the region's ecosystem had become too physically exposed to the dangers of development projects. The scientific committee appointed by Supreme Court in 2014[3], had also advised against building dams in the paraglacial zone, i.e., river valleys in which the floor is higher than 7,000 feet, but such objections were disregarded. Both the hydropower projects that washed away in the flood were constructed in this zone. The Scientific Committee appointed by the Apex Court of India in 2020[4] advised against the construction of 33 feet wide 500 miles of highway in high Himalayans hills of Uttarakhand but such advice was also ignored. While climate change is on high priority on the global political and business agendas, balancing the infrastructural requirements and environmental risk could always be difficult and there could be several such claims and conflicts. Public and private parties are increasingly subjected to regulations, impacting commercial relationships, and therefore rise in potential for disputes is inevitable. It is not within the remit of the present article to put forth a detailed analysis or critique on India’s approach towards the impact of climate change. What is attempted herein is only a primer on the important legislations related to the environment and how it could be practical to adopt arbitration to resolve climate-related disputes. CHANGED CLIMATE Climate is the pattern of variation in temperature, humidity, atmospheric pressure, wind, precipitation, atmospheric particle count and other meteorological variables in a given region over long periods. The climate of a location is also affected by its latitude, terrain, and altitude as well as nearby water bodies and their currents. Earth's climate is dynamic and is always changing through a natural cycle. However, the changes that are occurring now are at an alarming speed and human activities contribute maximum to its causes. The excessive carbon dioxide released in the atmosphere acts as a blanket, trapping heat and warming the planet. Change in climate and global warming are amongst the most serious challenges that mankind is facing today. If we look at the issue from India’s perspective, we are one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change. About half of India's population is dependent upon agriculture or other climate-sensitive sectors. About 12% of India is flood-prone while 16% is drought-prone. India is the third-largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world after China and the United States. The underlying causes of environmental degradation in India can be classified as social, economic, and institutional. The social factors include excessive population, poverty, and unchecked urbanization, the economic factors include non-existent or poorly functioning markets for environmental goods and services, unprecedented industrial growth without any measures to check the resultant environmental degradation. The institutional factors are lack of awareness and poor infrastructure making the implementation of environmental law extremely difficult and ineffective. CLIMATE CHANGE DISPUTES Climate change is not just another issue, it has several aspects and interconnections with science, technology, economy, trade, diplomacy, and politics and can be the mother of many issues. It is inherently a global concern because of the interconnectedness of our ecosystems and communities, small changes can ripple out throughout the world and eventually affects all living organisms. It is different from other problems faced by humanity, and it compels us to think differently at many levels. The concept of climate change is broad, and disputes arising in these contexts can be in myriad forms. DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN INDIA Environmental legislations existed in India right from the British Regime, however, a well-developed framework came into existence only after the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972. The outcome of this conference was the constitution of the National Council for Environmental Policy and Planning within the Department of Science and Technology in 1972. This Council later in 1985 evolved into a full-fledged Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF), an apex administrative body in the country for regulating and ensuring environmental protection. Constitutional sanction was given to environmental concerns by incorporating them into the Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamental Rights and Duties by way of the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution after the Stockholm Conference, 1976. The Directive Principles of State Policy and the Fundamental Duties chapters explicitly enunciate the national commitment to protect and improve the environment. Substantive laws for the prevention and/or regulation of any activity that may cause climate change that existed/existing in India: During the British Regime ● Shore Nuisance (Bombay and Kolaba) Act, 1853 ● The Indian Penal Code, 1860 ● The Indian Easements Act, 1882 ● The Fisheries Act, 1897 ● The Factories Act, 1897 ● The Bengal Smoke Nuisance Act, 1905 ● The Bombay Smoke Nuisance Act, 1912 ● The Elephant's Preservation Act, 1879 ● Wild Birds and Animals Protection Act, 1912. Post-Independence of India National Council for Environmental Policy and Planning was set up in 1972 and later evolved into the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) in 1985. Policy Statement for Abatement of Pollution and the National Conservation Strategy and Policy Statement on Environment and Development brought out by the MoEF in 1992. Environmental Action Programme (EAP) formulated in 1993 with the objective of improving environmental services and integrating environmental considerations into development programmes. ● National Environment Policy, 2006. ● Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974. ● Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977. ● Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981. ● Atomic Energy Act of 1982. ● Motor Vehicles Act,1988. ● The Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972. ● The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980. ● Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (EPA). ● The National Environment Appellate Authority Act, 1997. ● Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 (PLIA). ● National Environment Tribunal Act, 1995. ● Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notifications. The National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC), Prime Minister's Council for Climate Change, laid the framework to address India's development concerns and defined its approach for mitigation and adaptation of climate challenges. The Eight Missions developed for satisfying the principles of the National Action Plan on Climate Change are: ● National Solar Mission (started in 2010). ● National Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency (approved in 2009). ● National Mission on Sustainable Habitat (approved in 2011). ● National Water Mission. ● National Mission for Sustaining the Himalayan Ecosystem (approved in 2014). ● National Mission for a Green India (approved in 2014). ● National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture (approved in 2010) and ● National Mission on Strategic Knowledge for Climate Change. Besides the above legislations, rules and policies, there are several other plans and incentives by the governments for energy conservation and to mitigate the impact of climate change. Each State also has its own Action Plans on climate change. The Indian Constitution is one of the few in the world that contains specific provisions on the environment. The three constitutional provisions which have a direct bearing on environmental matters are: ● First and foremost, Article 21 states: "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law." The Apex Court has recognized that the several liberties that are implied by Article 21 include the right to a healthy environment.[5] ● Second, Article 48A requires that "the State shall endeavor to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wildlife of the country." ● Third, Article 51A establishes that "it shall be the duty of every citizen of India to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers, and wildlife and to have compassion for living creatures." The Indian Judiciary has been playing a vital role in implementing environmental principles, ensuring social justice, and protecting human rights. It can be rather said that, while adjudicating the environmental matters, the Supreme Court has actually brought the pattern of "judge-driven implementation" of environmental administration in India. The Courts have played a crucial role in implementing the environment law and doctrine of Polluter Pays, Precautionary Principle and the most significant Public Trust Doctrine[6]. The National Green Tribunal set up under the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 is a specialized court to adjudicate and ensure disposal of environmental disputes. The NGT has jurisdiction to deal with violations of environmental law, to provide compensation to victims of pollution, relief for environmental damage and restitution of the environment. The Tribunal is also empowered with appellate jurisdiction against orders passed by regulatory agencies. SUITABILITY OF ARBITRATION FOR CLIMATE CHANGE DISPUTES India, today has a plethora of constitutional and legislative provisions on environmental protection. The mainstream judiciary and NGT have played a pivotal role by developing and strengthening the environmental jurisprudence in India. Despite such a robust system in place, there are several glaring concerns that underpin the overall legal mechanism. Improper implementation of policies, callousness in enforcing judicial rulings, lack of expertise and technical know-how amidst the legal fraternity, loopholes in the legislative framework are still areas of concern. Moreover, the dynamic nature of environmental problems requires quick decision-making, whereas our Constitutional Courts are so overburdened with other pressing cases that it is difficult for them to give sufficient attention to environmental matters. The NGT is neither administrative tribunals nor constitutional tribunals and does not have the power for judicial review. The jurisdiction of the NGT is limited to only 7 statutes which act as a barrier for taking up environmental matters which do not fall within these statutes. Bench(s) at the NGT are not updated with legal developments in environmental law, as can be evident from the fact that several judgments delivered still talk about strict liability when the rule of absolute liability exists for quite some time. The Bench also lacks diversity and does not include stakeholders from various sectors/places. The existing strength of the tribunal is just six apart from the chairman, whereas the NCT Act mandates the appointment of 20 members (10 judicial and 10 experts) for the 10 benches in five zones with two courts in each zone. The fact is the premier institutions which is required to deal with the environmental issues that cannot be countenance never had full strength. Even though Central Pollution Control Board (“CPCB”) and State Pollution Control Board (“SPCB”) have quasi-judicial powers, but the issue is that not everyone empowered to file appeals there. Also, the members appointed to the CPCB and SPCBs do not have sufficient knowledge about the environment and most appointments are made based on political interest by MLAs, MPs, and bureaucrats[7]. In an age when India is witnessing a staggering rise in industrialization and development, the country is correspondingly facing environmental issues at a rapid pace. The present legislative structure to resolve environmental disputes is still not sufficiently equipped to meet the needs of the hour. It is therefore necessary to refer the issues to an autonomous multi-specialty body depending on the nature and complexity of the issues to address concern effectively. Also, due to the strict liability provisions in environmental statutes, parties in commercial arrangements typically allocate environmental risk in their contract. There may be an indemnity or exclusions to an indemnity clause. There may be a release or allocation of liability provision. There may be an “as is” clause. These are amongst the clauses that may generate disputes. Provisions for arbitration in contracts to include the resolution of such disputes could be a good way for effective resolution. Although some types of environment and climate-related disputes may not lend themselves to arbitration. Nonetheless, disputes with an environmental component that may arise in the context of contractual and commercial disputes can be resolved through commercial arbitration in India. Arbitration can have a unique role to play in the resolution of disputes that arise from the transition to a greener economy. The specific features of arbitration which make it ideally suited to resolve environment-related disputes include: a) the ability of the parties to choose arbitrators and experts with appropriate scientific and environment-related expertise, b) the ability to expedite proceedings and apply interim and conservatory measures particularly in cases involving potentially irreversible damage to the environment, c) the ability to apply specific governing or applicable law, including relevant environment-related statues, d) preservation of confidentiality and at the same time taking steps toward increased transparency in accordance with parties’ requirement and taking into consideration public interest involved, e) arbitral rules are flexible enough that they can be applied to any case. In a testament to the flexibility of arbitration, the continuity of arbitration proceedings in the global pandemic adapting virtual mode has demonstrated arbitration can be an optimal process to resolve disputes given its key advantages as an effective, customizable, and efficient mechanism. The arbitration community has shown its ability to pivot quickly and adapt seamlessly in changing global circumstances to better suit the reality of disputes in the uncertain landscape. The ability to customize the process, proceed efficiently and maintain confidentiality, hallmark the advantage and suitability of arbitration for climate change-related disputes. Customization Arbitrations allow parties to calibrate the right balance of procedural protections to efficiency. It gives the parties ability to select institutional rules or ad hoc rules that are conducive for resolving their dispute efficiently. They can select arbitrators best suited to resolve their dispute. An arbitrator with relevant experience and familiarity in an industry could expedite the resolution of a dispute significantly. This is especially true for environment-related disputes involving a high degree of technical knowledge. Efficiency The arbitration process is generally more efficient than pursuing the dispute in courts, especially considering the backlog of cases the courts have. It also gives parties more flexible and immediate options which may be crucial for resolving climate-related disputes. Further arbitrators can encourage settlement where appropriate and if parties agree to explore such possibilities. The tribunal itself can even conduct mediation, conciliation, or other procedures as appropriate to settle the dispute in such cases. Confidentiality Unlike courts, arbitrations are generally private allowing for confidentiality (including sensitive information) which may be important in the context of climate-related disputes. Furthermore, climate change and environment-related disputes invariably have an international dimension and therefore the inherent flexibility, an option of choosing a neutral forum, neutral venue and internationalism of the arbitral process make commercial arbitration an ideal dispute resolution method for climate-related disputes. The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 which is overwhelmingly signed and ratified by the majority of countries allows for seamless award enforcement possibilities worldwide. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 14 (2) expressly anticipates arbitration for resolution of interstate disputes arising out of the breach of its provisions “in accordance with procedures to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties as soon as practicable, in an annex on arbitration”. This was reaffirmed in Article 24 of the Paris Agreement on 12th December 2015[8]. Even in the side events at 21st Conference of Parties[9] (COP21) to UNFCCC held in Paris, wherein the historic Paris Agreement was signed, COP22 held in Morocco, 2016 and COP23 held in Germany, 2017, the importance of arbitration for redressal of climate-related disputes were discussed and commended. The International Bar Association Report published in 2014[10] also recognized arbitration may offer a number of advantages to the parties looking to resolve the disputes related to climate change. The IBA Report recommends institutions to develop rules and expertise specific to the resolution of environmental disputes to adapt arbitration for climate change disputes. Mr. David W. Rivkin, President of the International Bar Association (IBA), in his keynote address at the United Nations Conference on Climate Change (COP 21) held in Paris, December 2015 emphasized the importance of accessible and enforceable dispute resolution mechanism frameworks. Mr. Rivkin, while emphasizing on benefits of arbitration, stated that international arbitration has been used at least since ancient Greek times to resolve important disputes and to avert major political and diplomatic crises. In so doing, it has helped create the rule of law. International arbitration should similarly play a critical role in developing the legal framework of the post COP21 world. Mr. Rivkin further said international arbitration is flexible, not only in its procedural rules and tribunal appointment processes but in the different types of parties that may choose to use it and the types of disputes it can be applied to. Arbitration allows parties to provide for the independent, impartial resolution of disputes. By holding parties to their agreements and creating predictability and certainty, arbitral tribunals have promoted international rule of law and international commerce. Mr. Rivkin expresses his thought that affected populations should be able to participate in the arbitral process, provided the terms of the arbitration agreement or the rules used clearly encompass their rights and protections. Finally, Mr. Rivkin said that the commercial stakeholders in climate change-related issues, such as international monetary lenders, insurers, construction companies, states, and extraction industries, all stand to benefit from the certainty of contract, including in respect of internationally or state or industry imposed climate change or sustainable development objectives and targets. Mr. Rivkin concluded that there is huge potential to consider how the existing use of international arbitration and ADR mechanisms in resolving climate change-related disputes may be advanced and expanded, both in the context of contractual obligations and treaty mechanisms. Internationally, arbitration institutions such as ICC, PCA, SCC, HKIAC, LCIA, AAA, etc. are already administering a copious number of cases related to environmental disputes under private commercial and public-private partnership contracts and parties are benefitted in redressing the disputes in a reasonable time. Resolution of environment-related disputes through arbitration is not something new to India, the prominent amongst such arbitration was for the resolution of the dispute which arose between India and Pakistan over the construction of 330 MW Kishenganga Hydroelectric Project in the then State of J&K. Pakistan took India to arbitration at Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”), a Hague based institution, in 2010. The provision for arbitration paved its path from the Indus Waters Treaty Agreement, a World Bank brokered agreement designating commercial use of the Indus River system. The PCA partially ruled in favour of India by allowing India its right under the Treaty to divert waters from the Kishanganga for power generation in J&K. The PCA, however, maintain that India shall release a minimum flow of nine cubic metres per second into the Kishanganga river (known as Neelam in Pakistan) at all times to maintain environmental flows. The American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) has expressly listed environmental disputes, which include pollution control, environmental clean-up, chemical regulation, landfills, etc., as one of its areas of expertise. The International Chambers of Commerce (“ICC”) formed a task force on “Arbitration of Climate Change Related Disputes” to explore how ICC arbitration can be used to tackle climate change-related disputes. The ICC in its Report published in November 2019[11] concluded that it is uniquely positioned to arbitrate climate-related disputes and indicated a willingness to accommodate and administer such disputes. Interestingly, expenses guidelines of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (“SCC”), London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”), Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (“KCAB”) and the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, provide for the reimbursement of costs or expenses reasonably incurred by arbitrators, which include the cost of carbon offsetting their flights to and from case-related proceedings. CONCLUSION The need for a green economical architecture has widened the scope for diverse and complex legal relationships amongst private and public stakeholders and also the potential for the use of flexibly adapted dispute resolution mechanisms such as arbitration. The climate change-related action and regulations have increased dramatically after the Paris Agreement came into force and as a consequence of legislative developments thereafter, environment-related disputes are on increase and so will be the commercial arbitrations on climate disputes. If our country’s dream to become Global Arbitration Hub is to be achieved, it would be crucial for our system to widen the scope of arbitration and adopt and adapt arbitration for climate change-related disputes, at the international as well as domestic level. [1]* Mr. Alpesh holds Engineers Degree from Mumbai University and PGs in Construction Management from NICMAR and Institute of Engineers. He is pursuing Master of Business Law and PGD in Environmental Law from NLSIU. He has over 16 years of experience in Contracts Management and Arbitration. He can be contacted at alpesh.yadav@hotmail.com. [2] Article published in New York Times on 8th February 2021. [3] As advised by Dr Ravi Chopra, Director People’s Science Institute, Uttarakhand. [4] Committee led by Dr Ravi Chopra, Director People’s Science Institute, Uttarakhand. [5] Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, A.I.R 1991 SC 420, and Virendra Gaur v. State of Haryana, (1995) 2 SCC 577. [6] Adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in M.C. Mehta vs Kamal Nath & Ors. [1997(1) SCC388]. [7] As stated in Bhattacharya Committee Report, 1984, the Menon Committee Report and Supreme Court Judgement in Techi Tagi Tara v. Rejendra Singh Bhandari & Ors., 2017. [8] Art. 14(1) of the UNFCCC / Art. 24 of the Paris Agreement (by incorporation: “The provisions of Article 14 of the Convention on settlement of disputes shall apply mutatis mutandis to this Agreement”). [9] Formal Meeting UNFCCC Parties (Conference of Parties) (COP) held every year to assess progress in dealing with climate change. [10] IBA Climate Change Justice and Human Right Task Force published the report Achieving Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate Disruption (IBA Report). [11] This Report was prepared by the Task Force chaired by Mr. Windy Miles and Mr. Patrick Thieffry. The Report was unanimously approved by the ICC’s Commission on Arbitration and ADR in a meeting held on 2nd April 2019 in Paris. The Report is available at www.iccwbo.org and http://library.iccwbo.org/.

Shivangi Tiwari[1] and Nishtha Pandey[2] Case study Malibu Lagoon Task Force [3] In March 2000, business interests, resource agencies, conservation groups, and property owners initiated a programme to look after the health of the environmental lagoon. This initiative was taken up to address the improvement in native plants and animal species, protection of human health, and restoration of the function of the wetlands. The mediator worked with the participants and created a holistic membership list that had all the potential stakeholders. The members were grouped into 4 subcommittees and were assigned to review two of the eight chapters of the report by UNEP. They were asked to develop criteria for selecting a strategy, to rank each strategy, and further to reduce it to three from fifteen. The first attempt by the group led to commotion amongst them, the mediator then suggested that rather than fighting over the list, the group should agree upon a set of recommendations that included short-term and long-term high priority recommendations for wetland restoration projects and short-term and long-term priority projects for wetland treatment projects. The final historic recommendations report that was forwarded to the state and federal agencies represented a compromise on the issue that was a hindrance in the peaceful resolution of the problem, which is the timing and scope of work. The ground of consensus was the group agreeing to the fact that starting small and learning from the experiences in each step was always better than fighting over who would pay for the ultimate solution. Application of ADR in climate related disputes Environmental problems are the most widespread and equally challenging for the present as well as future generations. These problems revolve around important aspects of every sphere, ranging from science, sociology, economics, history and culture, property rights, and legal or regulatory constraints, and its effect could be seen on private individuals, the general public, multiple regulatory jurisdictions, and special interests. These problems are even more dangerous as they require an assessment based on unknown consequences. Moreover, when these disputes have impact on the common public they may become emotionally charged and push stakeholders toward rigid postures making it more difficult to negotiate. However, it is important to note that regulatory regimes and legal actions are only marginally effective as they cannot holistically solve the problem at hand. In this situation, ADR methods could exhaustively examine the challenge posed by the ubiquitous environmental problem. There is an increasing need to handle the environmental problems through the joint efforts of all the stakeholders so that the difficulty of ignorance and omission can be eliminated. Otherwise, a uniform approach would be unproductive with regard to the local needs. Hence the need of the hour is to devise a gradual mechanism that is applicable to all mediation processes and enables the mediators to effectively carry out the process. The process is the make-or-break segment of the entire resolution mechanism. If the process that is undertaken is efficient enough, it could result in achievable goals and better environmental outcomes and durable agreements. Examples of ADR successes ADR is increasingly applied to resolve environmental disputes. These are some examples to illustrate the diversity of processes, differences in the structure, and variety of products that are the outcome of ADR application to environmental disputes in various fields like of transportation, hydroelectric dams, and toxic waste sites. Washington State was facing several challenges associated with the permitting, design, and construction of major transportation projects. These included conflicting rules, delays in the permit processes, questionable environmental outcomes, and frustration by tribes that their cultural artefacts and environmental concerns were not being considered. Consequently, TPEAC process to resolve a number of disputes regarding the permitting of transportation projects in Washington was established by the legislature. The process aimed to streamline permits and achieve better environmental results on transportation projects. Consultants were hired to help develop the structure and processes. The committee initiated six technical subcommittees, with broad stakeholder representation, to work on different aspects of the problem.[4] The subcommittees were co-chaired by at least two members of the committee, which had different perspectives on the problems being addressed. Outside consultants acted as facilitators to get the process up. Subcommittees were modified over to meet new challenges. All resolutions by the subcommittee were unanimously adopted. The committee and the participating agencies adopted numerous products as standard practices. All participants acknowledged the establishment of trust relationships among the participants. After four and a half years a decision was made to ask the members of TPEAC to assume the new products and processes as part of their standard operating procedures and not to seek extra funding in the next budget cycle. The Washington State Office of Regulatory Assistance has adopted these products and processes as a model for all of state government. In California, the Dispute Resolution Service of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the FERC Office of Litigation initiated a mediated process to re-license several hydroelectric facilities. The issue was the balancing of ecological populations, hydro-power production, and municipal and agricultural uses for the water resources. The other issues included water rights for water districts, 100-year-old water rights applicants, a recent energy crisis, lack of reliable historical data, and a drought. Numerous administrative and legal challenges to the process were the product of past re-licensing processes. The settlement was reached using ADR after addressing the concerns. This permitted the licensee to file their pre convened terms and conditions of the project without any dissent and disapproval. In the GE-Pittsfield case in Western Massachusetts, PCB contamination that caused high levels of public concern was involved. ADR was used to address four major areas. Which are as follows: The liability responsibility of GE for clean-up; The community’s input on impacts of the clean-up process; The establishment of a panel of neutral experts to make recommendations for remediation in the near future; Finally, the agreement to use ADR in order to resolve any dispute that may arise during the implementation of the remediation plan. (EPA website, unknown) Stakeholders were neighbors, business entities, environmental groups, and regulatory agencies. It is important to note that the settlement agreement had strategies for adaptive management. This process necessitated extensive public outreach and community meetings to address all of the interests in the area. (EPA website, unknown) Concerns relating to ADR The use of ADR methods to resolve complex environmental issues includes a number of difficulties that need to be addressed. The question which is frequently asked is who is included and who is excluded in the process. The relevance of this question is substantially increased due to the notion that dispute resolution is an alternative to the traditional environmental decision-making processes which require significant public participation. As a general rule of thumb, stakeholders should be defined as broadly as possible. If the agreements and solutions devised are going to receive broad political and public acceptance, it becomes crucial. A group of stakeholders which is too narrow may simply lead to future disputes that will require all parties to return to the negotiating table or face litigation.[5] Processes involving public entities are to be open for the various interest groups which form a major part of the process; these groups must be given opportunities so that their views are considered even if they do not wish to be a regular participant. Moreover, the leeway to add more stakeholders should also be opened at all times during the process so that the interest which was not considered could be accommodated even at the later stages. Cost is one the major consideration, as although in limited issues, mediation is less expensive than litigation, however, it is not the case with environmental disputes as they involve multiple issues from a wide range of problems, so monetary consideration plays a huge role. Moreover, a lot of time is consumed while researching a particular topic. Hence many times the final agreement is reached on the consensus arrived at by the scientists and the concerned parties. The inclusion of the entire stakeholder is one of the important aspects of ADR (thomas-larner 2004). BATANA needs to be discussed with all the concerned parties, if even one of the parties is hesitant or does not participate with good faith in the process, it is better to postpone or terminate the process. The effectiveness and durability of any agreements are determined by the critical stakeholder involvement and therefore it should be a matter of early discussion. One of the strategies that could be used is to meet the reluctant parties and explain the ADR process to them, as in many cases their hesitation is the result of their ignorance about the ADR methods. Another strategy that could be applied, is to meet any representative of the reluctant parties, this also opens the avenue of another set of stakeholders and makes the resolution process even more inclusive. At last, it is up to the “willing party” to decide as to whether progress could be made with the available participants. Conclusion A host of events stretching from storms of historical segments to mundane events that influence a meagre number of people may give rise to Weather and climate disputes. Ensuing legal disputes vary all over the map. Looking upon some of the various reasons why mediation and arbitration are effective, it can be inferred that many such disputes are uniquely befitted to mediation and arbitration. The Paris Climate Agreement proved to be a milestone for Climate change, as it was for the first time the international community came forth to combat climate change and disputes ensuing thereof. Arbitration could be a boon to resolve disputes revolving around climate change. However, one of the major drawbacks of the Paris Climate Agreement is its inability to cater to the needs of the countries which are not a party to it. To address this shortcoming, many nations have put forward a proposal relating to the same before the International Environment Court, which would hopefully prove itself to be beneficial in such matters. The resolution of disputes relating to climate change by using ADR is growing rapidly, the reason for the same could be attributed to the fact that it helps to deal with the critical legal claims having a wide impact, which is not the case in conventional litigation. This is because climate change disputes could not be framed under a given set of regulations as they are very wide and complex. One of the benefits of ADR is that the parties could be asked to chip in their views and opinions and a middle path could be assessed for its acceptability and amenability to a large group of population. Moreover, ADR methods are also making their way to the legislation in several countries. However, it must be noted that ADR is not effective in every legal case, especially where the problem is very complex. Hence, mandates from the legal bodies and courts to resolve cases using ADR are still necessary. Application of administrative ADR helps in finding out the potential environmental threats and conflicts at an initial stage, when they are relatively easier to resolve, which indeed has a positive impact on the dispute resolution methods. It is overwhelming to note that the principles applied in Environmental ADR are in sync with the international environmental principles. [1] The author is a third-year law student at Hidayatullah National Law University and can be reached at shivangi.1995@hnlu.ac.in [2] The author is a third-year law student at Dr.Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University and can be reached at nishthapandey3103@gmail.com [3] Alana Knaster, ‘Resolving Conflicts Over Climate Change Solutions: Making the Case for Mediation’ (2010) accessed 29 March 2021. [4] Dan Swecker, 'Applying Alternative Dispute Resolution to Environmental Problems' (Mediate India - Everything Mediation, 5 July 2006) accessed 22 April 2021. [5] ibid

Shivangi Tiwari[1] and Nishtha Pandey[2] Oui, ce qui est en cause avec cette conférence sur le climat, c’est la paix [3] Abstract Climate change and its effects know no boundaries. Across the globe, rapid changes in weather and climate patterns are taking place. Due to disarrangements of this sort, the competition for scarce resources substantially increases, security risks for many countries escalate to a great extent as the pace at which these changes are taking place surpasses our ability to adapt.[4] To solve the disputes revolving around climate change, alternative dispute resolution methods, specifically arbitration and mediation, are of great significance. This paper seeks to emphasize that arbitration and mediation have an edge over the conventional legal processes in the arena of climate change dispute resolution. The paper initially navigates through the general introduction of arbitration and mediation followed by that of climate change disputes. Later the various types of climate change, their cause, and the rate of their increase are discussed concisely. Further, the paper exhaustively discusses why ADR should be preferred over standard legal methods of dispute resolution. The advantages of the ADR processes are enlisted and their feasibility is catalogued. In the end, the paper demonstrates that ADR has an upper hand over conventional legal methods of dispute resolution. After analysation, it was majorly found that, even though the instances of adopting ADR for dispute resolution of climate change have increased, it is far less than enough despite innumerable advantages over standard legal practices. Introduction Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is the method of resolving disputes without going for formal litigation. The term encompasses within its purview any means of dispute resolution which takes place outside the court. This method originated in the United States in the 1970s in the wake of growing dissatisfaction amongst the masses towards litigation. ADR involves the disputants and a non-partisan third party who helps the parties to come to an amicable solution by initiating communication, discussion of the differences and thereby finding out the means to resolve the dispute. In the modern days, the rapid increase in disputes relating to climate change has time and again proved that the most suitable method for the resolution of these disputes is through mediation or arbitration. Many reasons are backing the same as discussed below. Firstly, the urgency to resolve the disputes in a timely manner necessitates the use of arbitration and mediation. Mediations and arbitrations, if desired can be concluded in a very short time. The processes can typically get over many months sooner than a dispute can be resolved in the courts. Perhaps the most important factor backing a quick resolution of emergency claims is that often quick payment of certain claims namely claims for personal injury, physical damage to homes and businesses, and lost business income may turn down the loss of claimants by ameliorating any further losses.[5] Secondly and most importantly, a properly delineated dispute resolution approach to emergency claims ultimately results in enhancement party satisfaction both procedurally and substantively, because of its nature to benefit both the claimant as well as the payer. Thirdly, the considerations relating to continuity of business may also drive the businesses involved in weather and climate disputes to strive to resolve those disputes more rapidly than any other comparable legal problems. Fourthly, the uncertainty about the outcome of a dispute via litigation is another factor typically promoting the settlement in almost any kind of legal dispute. Lastly, the processes involved in ADR allow the parties to select dispute resolution neutrals, which are construed as the engagement of dispute resolution professionals who are equipped with relevant expertise far more in extent than in a typical court system. Climate change disputes involve complex environmental, scientific, commercial, and insurance issues apart from legal issues. Thus, the requirement of a “subject-matter expert,” or at least a neutral who is aware of or is capable of learning relevant technical information in a lesser time is of great importance. Modes of alternative dispute resolution There are different modes of alternative dispute resolution like negotiation, conciliation, mediation, and arbitration. The two most common amongst them are arbitration and mediation, which are discussed below. Arbitration The process of arbitration resembles a simplified version of the trial which requires limited discovery and simplified rules of evidence. The process cannot be set in motion without the existence of a valid arbitration agreement or any other mode of agreement embedded with an arbitration clause before the emergence of the dispute. The disputant parties refer their dispute to one or more persons known as the “arbitrator”. The parties must abide by the decision of the arbitrator. The decision is called the “Arbitral Award”. The fair settlement of the dispute is the main objective of Arbitration. The arbitrators do not need to be lawyers, the disputants are free to select arbitrators from any other field which in their opinion is more suitable for the resolution of the dispute. For example, parties that are indulged in a construction dispute can choose an arbitrator with an engineering background if they wish. To compose a panel, the parties can zero in on a single arbitrator. If no consensus as to the choice of arbitrator is reached, each side selects one arbitrator and the two arbitrators selected thereby elects the third arbitrator. Usually, the arbitration hearings last between a few days to a week, and the panel meets only for a few hours each day. Mediation Mediation is another alternative to litigation and is the most widely used method of Alternative Dispute Resolution. In this process, a third neutral party works intending to assist two or more disputants in reaching an agreement. It is an uncomplicated party-centered negotiation process where a third party acts as a mediator for the amicable settlement of the disputes by making the use of appropriate communication and negotiation skills. The parties are the ones to control the process. The mediator does not impose his views and does not decide what a fair settlement should be. The process of mediation is non-binding in nature. It is used for negotiating a wide range of case types. The process is private and strictly confidential, which is one of the biggest advantages of mediation. It is of the utmost importance that the mediator is impartial and utilizes his techniques to draw out dialogue between the parties most openly and constructively possible. Rise in climate change dispute Climate change has taken effect in the world over the last century, as its effects are no respecters of national borders. Alterations to weather patterns throughout the globe are unprecedented. These sorts of disruptions pose serious threats to many countries as competition for scarce resources grows and the pace of change exceeds our ability to adapt. These changes are, however, accelerated by some of the disastrous events that have intimidated the existence of mankind, like for instance, early-season drought-driven wildfires in Colorado, Summer Hurricane Debby in Florida and Georgia. In many recent cases, concerns about the weather and climate change have been an important issue. Hurricane Katrina, in 2005, gave rise to an important decision by the Fifth Circuit Court limiting immunity for the Army Corps of Engineers[6]. These events point towards the fact that weather and climate-related events are thick and fast and ensue litigation, in this already spanning arena of climate change-related disputes. Link between climate change and dispute The direct link between climate change and disputes lacks scientific evidence and is frequently inconclusive. However, climate change could be at best regarded as a dispute multiplier, as it extends the dispute or the effect thereof. Some of the prime examples for the same could be:-[7] Land and water - Climate change can intensify the land and water dispute as the land may become less fertile or flooded. Food security - Reduced rainfall and rising sea levels may lead to a decline in agricultural production and loss of arable land. This may result in civil unrest as the competition for consumption may take the centre stage. Migration and displacement - Climate change leads to scarcity and struggle for water and arable land which may, in turn, result in migration and give rise to a wide spectrum of problems. One of the gravest would be the animosity between the host and the migrant as access to new resources takes place. Increasing inequality and injustice - Climate change broadens the gap between the haves and have nots, and this is the major cause of disputes. The reason for the same could be attributed to the fact that during these changes there is a part of the population which is the hardest hit. This instills and intensifies the grievances and conflict between the resource users and outside actors such as governments. Classification of climate change disputes Climate change disputes usually arise from the problems that would occur because of climate change or the policies adopted by international organisations. Changing climate would demand many transitions that would have to be made in terms of land, urban dwellings, infrastructure, industrial setup and their functioning etc, and for these transitions, one has to enter into new contracts and have to resort to other legal mechanisms that are potential legal conflicts. Climate change could be broadly classified into three groups:[8] (i) Contracts relating to the implementation of energy or other systems transition or adaptation in accordance with the Paris Agreement commitments. These types of contracts may be entered by industry body, state or its entity, investor etc to synchronise with the Paris Agreement or other international documents which obligates one to cater to climate change. These are the transitions that usually take place in the infrastructure, land, energy etc and would require the parties to effectively allocate risks and enforce appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms. (ii) Contracts without any specific climate related purpose but where a dispute in question, could give rise to a climate or related environmental issue. Some contracts do not explicitly involve any terms regarding the climate or climate change, neither do they handle the subject matter that includes climate change or any related terms, however, these contracts do get affected due to the party's response to national laws, commitments towards Paris Agreement, national or international courts’ decisions related to the environment or climate change etc. (iii) Agreements entered into in order to resolve existing climate change or related environmental disputes, potentially involving impacted groups or populations. These contracts are entered into after a dispute has arisen. In such disputes, it gets very difficult for the parties to form a consensus on various aspects including dispute resolution. These types of disputes are very rare, but in those limited cases where the parties agree to be bound, they enter into a submission contract. A Prominent example of a submission contract is when a population is affected by investments made in the protected forestry impacting their livelihoods and access to natural resources.. Similarly, a population may be impacted by the establishment of a wind farm or solar power panel installation, affecting arable land or fisheries. Globally, climate change litigation is growing with no bounds. Claimants are now better funded, resourced and organized. They look into the trends of these Climate Change disputes globally and try to replicate on the national level, some even take cues from the international data, and set new targets. According to one count, the number of climate-related cases now stands in excess of 1,300, with cases having been brought in from at least 28 countries. The United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the EU are particular hot spots. Leaving behind conventional issues, there is an influx of innovative cases with different sets subject matter at hand. Moreover, the courts are also stepping in to create laws where the legislation is either absent or inadequate. Arbitration in climate change disputes How can parties access arbitration in climate change-related disputes? Just like many other disputes, the existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties is a prerequisite in cases related to climate change disputes. As arbitration is a popular and well-acclaimed method of dispute resolution in sectors that are most likely to be affected by the implementation of climate change policies (such as energy, construction, industrial systems and infrastructure), these sectors usually make use of arbitration clauses. In disputes where there is no pre-existing relationship between the parties, such as disputes arising in the industrial sectors, an agreement post-emergence of the dispute would be needed. Arbitration is considered to become a more common method of dispute resolution, more so because the parties usually try to avoid the costly parallel proceedings that may lead to conflicting decisions. [9] Current and potential use of arbitration in climate change related disputes The Commission on Arbitration and ADR of the International Chamber of Commerce (the “ICC”) published a report in November 2019. The report examines the role of arbitration and ADR in the resolution of international disputes related to climate change. According to the report, around 70% of all new ICC arbitration cases in 2018 arose out of the sectors which are expected to be impacted the most by climate change, with the construction, engineering, and energy sectors alone accounting for over 40%. The Report also highlights that investments related to climate change are increasing rapidly and that systems transition of the scale proposed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) will recalibrate regulatory risk and investment strategy in sectors where arbitration and ADR are present and are of relevance. Expertise of arbitrators and experts The ICC Report admits the relevance of, access to appropriate scientific expertise disputes relating to climate change. It also acknowledges the potentiality of the parties under the ICC Rules to have a conclusive influence on the choice of arbitrators, the powers of the parties relating to the same includes: Specification of the competence and skills which their arbitrators should have in their arbitration agreements; Calling for the ICC Court to consult them before making an appointment of a sole arbitrator or presiding arbitrator; and even The power to challenge the appointment of arbitrators can be on grounds of lack of impartiality or independence or otherwise. The ICC Rules also allow for the possibility of both party-appointed experts and/or tribunal-appointed experts in proceedings. This opens the door for the tribunal to have access to any climate change-related expertise which it may need to decide the issues in dispute. The ICC can also provide assistance in the appointment of tribunal-appointed experts by way of providing expert recommendations along with that it may also assist with the administration of expert proceedings.[10] Contrary to the institutions such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA“), no formal list of specialised environmental arbitrators or technical and scientific environmental experts is maintained by the ICC. This is highlighted as a potential working point by the ICC, as it issues a recommendation to the ICC to reach out to climate change scientists and other technical and modelling experts. Advantages of arbitration in climate change related disputes The Report notes that, apart from the advantage of being a neutral forum, the arbitration benefits from the New York Convention, which allows proper enforcement of arbitral awards and cross-border recognition. The non-alignment of international arbitration enhances its suitability, provided the likely presence of States and state entities as parties to the dispute. The Report underlines the various specific procedural features of arbitration which can be adapted to suit climate change-related disputes. The six procedural features which are identified in the Report are as follows: Access to appropriate scientific and other expertise Guaranteeing the availability of appropriate expertise is conceivably the most important feature of arbitrating climate change-related disputes. The appointment of arbitrators with relevant expertise can fulfil this prerequisite. The guidance relating to the drafting of the relevant legal, scientific and technical expertise of the arbitrators and experts is provided in the report. Recourse to measures and procedures for the early or urgent resolution of disputes Avoidance of any delays in the disputes relating to climate change, reasonableness, and avoiding any delay are of great significance. The expedited procedures mentioned in the ICC report, use of emergency proceedings, and other interim measures of relief are some of the other methods which are mentioned under the report. The appropriate and timely applications of the other management techniques are also very essential.[11] Opportunity for the application of climate change commitments and/or law The growth in the awareness and the adoption of commitment and policies relating to climate change by industries and regulatory authorities appear to become part of the body of ‘applicable law’ upon which the tribunals could count upon to resolve a dispute. Increased transparency The frequent involvement of the States and the State authorities along with the vested interest of the people is viewed as a potential cause for the need to improve the transparency in climate change disputes. This procedural feasibility is provided by Arbitration. Possibility for the involvement of third parties It is a frequently raised question that whether persons other than the ones who are the disputants could be allowed to take part in these proceedings, such as those citizens who are affected, non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations should be allowed to participate in the arbitration. Unequivocal and clear concurrence of the relevant parties is naturally paramount in determining such a question. In this respect, the Report addresses the joinder of additional parties and consolidation of compatible proceedings. Mediation in climate change disputes Mediation provides a chance for thoughtful solutions to the dispute which are highly catastrophic and sudden in nature. It generally deals with problems that are high on emotionality. Mediation allows the parties to explore “win-win” situations in which all of them are in much better condition than they would have been if they had chosen the option of litigating in the court. Mediation has been an active part of peaceful conflict resolution for thousands of years in a variety of societies around the world, in one form or the other. However, there are variations in this application in different countries over time.[12] The environmental catastrophes are increasing in all spheres including frequency, reach, and cost, and hence are generating conflicts around the world. Without mediation, open dialogue, collaborative negotiation, and a common approach to implementing solutions to these problems, improving aid and recovery, and systemic preventative approach to future disasters, and other such relieves would be ineffective, and would be delayed by years, if not decades.[13] The report of the Security Council identified the potential benefits that skillful, impartial third-party mediation can bring to the peaceful settlement of disputes. it was stated that mediation will be essential to combat the changes in climate. It becomes all the way more necessary when Copenhagen looms. However, it is also true that such an approach would require a new kind of leadership and decision-making skill that goes beyond the national interests.[14] Why mediation? The major reason for opting for mediation is to settle certain weather and climate-related legal disputes and create solutions that are not available in court. For example, an owner who unknowingly causes pollution is unaware of the remedy to be used and further course of action that should be adopted. In conventional litigation settings, the parties would argue multiple defences, but here, innocent property owners are not interested in owning polluted property. In these circumstances, defendants would often end up buying the polluted property, and then later handle the legal and economic consequences. Similar solutions can be available for weather or climate-damaged properties, where again, defendants may want to argue with regards to causation, damages, related defences, and those which are potentially responsible for economic loss to damaged properties. With the assistance of mediation as a legal tool, the concerned parties may agree to acquire the properties and then handle them appropriately as legal and economic factors may demand.[15] Mediation revolving around environmental issues involves multiple parties and technical issues necessitating more extensive upfront assessment work, convening of the appropriate parties, mutual learning, and collaborative fact-finding, as well as agreement building and implementation Therefore, opting for a conventional legal process in this situation, would make the process more tedious.[16] The researchers have time and again reiterated the effectiveness of mediation for environmental issues as they are more useful for building cooperative working relationships. Moreover, in the past too, it has been successful, though infrequently used for negotiating environmental conventions and treaties at both national and international levels.[17] Mediation is more effective than other forms of dispute resolution. In mediation parties are the decision-maker themselves and not the mediator, unlike in the case of arbitration. It has an upper edge from conciliation too as in mediation there is almost no operational time in bringing the parties to the mediation table.[18] Mediators and other conflict resolution professionals have considerable experience in formulating a mediation plan for decades and so. Hence, they have much better ways of reaching agreements. By adopting mediation, the United Nations, without significant financial investments, could significantly improve the quality of conversations and mediations at important climate change meetings.[19] Suggestions for effective mediation Mediators should strive to figure out beforehand the possibility of emergence of any new climate-related conflicts might emerge. For example, In Nigeria, the community of cattle herders, due to the degradation of the quality of land, flocked southwards into the areas which were traditionally occupied by the farming communities, later on, there were vociferous riots between the two communities. In 2018, more than 1,300 were killed in a six-month period.[20] Mediators should ensure that they turn to the right expertise who has the calibre of understanding the chief environmental and resource issues that may aggravate a conflict. Mediators should ensure that they craft the agreements in a way that leaves the doors open for maneuvering. Thus, ensuring that the agreements remain viable irrespective of the climate shifts. Mediators can actively help proponents look for ways in which cooperation over environmental challenges namely, climate change or shared resources such as transboundary water can help in peacebuilding and reconciliation between the divided communities. This can be particularly fruitful for people to work jointly, even in cases where political dialogue is not working. Feasibility for Mediation Parties who are considering whether or not to engage in mediation must first assess whether the dispute is amenable to the process of Mediation. One of the ways the professionals assess it is through the process of “Best Alternative to a Negotiation Agreement” (BATNA). [21]In this, the mediators examine the feasibility of a negotiated process and evaluate the conflict using a set of criteria: Uncertainty regarding the outcome. If parties are uncertain about the strength of their position, or on their influential acumen on the decision-makers, a court, or a jury, then, in that case, mediation provides them with the opportunity to have greater and more direct control over the result.[22] The cost of winning may be disastrous The possibility of more years of inaction, or frustration that none of the sides has been willing to make a concession is one of the key features, which the parties must be aware of, before adopting mediation as an alternative method of dispute resolution. 3. Common ground or trade-off balance exists The recognition of common ground is the most important part as it forms the basis of arriving at the settlement. Although it is impossible to ascertain whether a compromise could be reached at the early stages of the process, individual assessment by the parties regarding the issues upon which they could compromise will make the way ahead easy and less cumbersome. 4. Overlapping jurisdictions and diverse interests Diverse interests in a community could be no less than a nightmare. Moreover, different cultures, economic resources, and organizational structure act as a hindrance. However, mediation provides a structure for talks, with ground rules that identify the purpose of the talks and formalize the negotiation process. 5. Parties may need to preserve their relationship Winning in court or in the political arena may negatively affect the relationship among parties as in many cases they have to conduct business together. It is always desirable that parties reach a stage in a consensus process where they candidly explore tradeoffs [1] The author is a third-year law student at Hidayatullah National Law University and can be reached at shivangi.1995@hnlu.ac.in. [2] The author is a third-year law student at Dr.Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University and can be reached at nishthapandey3103@gmail.com. [3] Translates into ‘what is at stake with this climate conference, is peace’. H.E. Mr. François Hollande, President of France, Opening of the Leaders Event, COP21, Paris, 30 November 2015. [4] John Sturrok, ‘Mediation and Climate Change’ (Mediate India - Everything Mediation, December 2009) accessed 17 April 2021. [5] Krystyna Blokhina Gilkis, 'Alternative Dispute Resolution' (Legal Information Institute, 8 June 2017) accessed 18 April 2021. [6] R Wayne Thorpe, ‘Mediation and Arbitration in Weather and Climate Disputes’ (Natural Resources & Environment, Fall 2012) accessed 27 April 2021. [7] Mikkel Funder, Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde and Ida Peters, ‘Addressing Climate Change and Conflict in Development Cooperation- Experiences from Natural Resources Management’ (DIIS Report, 2012) accessed 28 March 2021. [8] Amanda Neil, Melissa Conway and Emma Roberts ‘ICC Task Force predicts climate change related disputes will increase exponentially’ (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 9 December 2019) accessed 27 March 2021. [9] Amanda Neil, Melissa Conway and Emma Roberts ‘ICC Task Force predicts climate change related disputes will increase exponentially’ (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 9 December 2019) accessed 27 March 2021. [10] Herbert Smith and Freehills ‘Arbitration of Climate Change Disputes’ (Herbert Smith Freehills, 20 December 2019). accessed 28 April 2021. [11] Juan Pablo Valdivia Pizarro, 'The Value of Arbitration and ADR in Resolving Climate Change Related Disputes: A View into the ICC Commission’s Report' (Linklaters, 31 March 2021). accessed 27 March 2021. [12] R Wayne Thorpe, ‘Mediation and Arbitration in Weather and Climate Disputes’ (Natural Resources & Environment, Fall 2012) accessed 27 March 2021. [13] Kenneth Cloke, 'Conflict, Climate Change, and Environmental Catastrophe: How Mediators Can Help Save the Planet' (2011) 12 Cardozo J Conflict Resol 307. [14] John Sturrock, ‘Mediation and Climate Change’ (Mediate India - Everything Mediation December 2009) accessed 25 April 2021. [15] R Wayne Thorpe, ‘Mediation and Arbitration in Weather and Climate Disputes’ (Natural Resources & Environment, Fall 2012) accessed 27 March 2021. [16] United Nations Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Enhancing Mediation and its Support Activities’ (Security Council S/2009/189:8, April 2009) accessed 20 April 2021. [17] Mediator Beyond Border International, ‘Supporting Statement for the Inclusion of Mediation in Climate Change Treaty Negotiations’(Mediation beyond Border- Partnering for Peace and Reconciliation) accessed 21 April 2021. [18] Supporting Statement for the Inclusion of Mediation in Climate Change Treaty Negotiations’(Mediation Beyond Border) accessed 21 April 2021. [19] Kenneth Cloke, 'Conflict, Climate Change, and Environmental Catastrophe: How Mediators Can Help Save the Planet' (2011) 12 Cardozo J Conflict Resol 307. [20]Oli Brown, ‘Heating up: mediation and climate change’ (Prio Climate and Conflict, 9 July 2019) accessed 18 April 2021. [21]Roger Fisher and William Ury, ‘Getting to Yes - Negotiating an agreement without giving in’ (1981) accessed 25 April 2021. [22]Alana Knaster, ‘Resolving Conflicts Over Climate Change Solutions: Making the Case for Mediation’ (2010) accessed 29 April 2021.

-Rohan Gulati* INTRODUCTION There has been a discernable trend in India where arbitration and courts have not been able to work without the other. Based on this trend, it is perhaps ironic that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“1996 Act”) was inspired and based on the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985 (“Model Law”) that is founded on the key feature of judicial non-intervention. However, the 1996 Act was not entirely based on the Model Law. Interestingly, the 1996 Act is the outcome of a synergized blend between the age-old Arbitration Act of 1940 (“1940 Act”) and the Model Law. While the 1996 Act adopted certain provisions of the Model Law, it retained, modified, and carried forward some from the 1940 Act. A prime example of a modified provision is Section 37 as we now read it under the 1996 Act. Section 37 is a statutorily conferred right to appeal against orders on certain grounds, however, it has often been an area of misinterpretation and misuse that has stalled several arbitration proceedings. In the recent case of Chintels India Ltd. v. Bhayana Builders Pvt. Ltd.,[1] the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (“Court”) has to put the rest a pertinent issue of law i.e., whether or not an order refusing to condone the delay in filing a Section 34 application is appealable under Section 37(1)(c) of the 1996 Act. Accordingly, this article strives to critically analyze the afore-stated judgment, and to facilitate analysis, it is divided as follows – Part I will briefly scan the development of the law; Part II will concisely discuss the facts; Part III will succinctly highlight the decision of the Court and reasons thereof; Part IV entails a critique of the judgment; and lastly, Part V concludes by suggesting a plausible way ahead. THE LAW: PAST & PRESENT Not to put the cart before the horse, it is pertinent to highlight the minute difference between Section 39(1)(vi) of the 1940 Act and Section 37(1)(c) of the 1996 Act in order to set the tone for the analysis. Section 39(1)(vi) of the 1940 Act read as follows: “39. Appealable orders.— (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act (and from no others) to the court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the court passing the order: An order— *** (vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award:” Whereas, Section 37(1)(c) of the 1996 Act stands as follows: “37. (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the court authorized by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the court passing the order, namely— *** (c) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34.” Therefore, the primary difference between the text of the 1940 Act and the 1996 Act only witnesses an inclusion of the words – “under Section 34.” Incidentally, Section 37 is a ‘consequential provision’ under the 1996 Act that is absent from the Model Law given its principle feature of judicial non-intervention. FACTS OF THE CASE Chintels India Ltd. (“Appellant”) had approached the Hon’ble Delhi High Court (“High Court”) by way of an application under Section 34 for setting aside an award dated 3rd May 2019 passed by an Arbitral Tribunal. Notably, the Appellant had also filed applications seeking condonation of delay of 28 days in filing and an additional 16 days in re-filing the petition. These applications were filed in light of filing the Section 34 application beyond the statutory limit of 3 months. The Appellant had averred the ground of change in counsel in his submissions concerning the applications seeking condonation of delay. However, the learned single judge of the High Court after perusing the record carefully, categorically observed that the applications seeking condonation of delay were itself filed only after the period of 120 days. Therefore, the Appellant must have filed the applications along with the Section 34 application at the first instance. In view of the afore-stated, the learned single judge of the High Court was not inclined to condone the delay and accordingly dismissed the applications that in effect led to the dismissal of the Section 34 application as well. Aggrieved by the decision of the learned single judge, the Appellant preferred an appeal under Section 37(1)(c) of the 1996 Act before a Division Bench of the High Court. However, the Division Bench of the High Court being bound by the decision of the Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Construction Co.,[2] held that such an appeal is not maintainable. However, the Division Bench granted a certificate to appeal under Article 133 read with Article 134A of the Constitution of India, 1950 to the Appellant that granted liberty to approach the Court concerning the pertinent question of law involved. DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT The Court mapped out the question of law involved lucidly and authoritatively held that an order refusing to condone delay under Section 34 that in effect leads to dismissal of the Section 34 application itself would be incorrect in law. To arrive at this decision, the reasons were manifold; Firstly, the Court observed that Section 39(1)(vi) of the 1940 Act is pari materia to Section 37(1)(c) of the 1996 Act. The reasoning behind the same was pointed towards the substance of the provision that is identical to the 1940 Act. Moreover, the 1996 Act went a step ahead to refine the provision and cover Section 34 in its entirety. Secondly, and pertinently, the court relied upon the ‘effect test’ that was discussed earlier in the case of Essar Constructions v. N.P. Rama Krishna Reddy[3] (“Essar Constructions”). Identical to the principles of cause and effect, the effect test pertains to the decision of the court on the ‘cause’ that leads to an ‘effect’. In the present context, the cause refers to the refusal to condone the delay, however, the effect will be the dismissal of the Section 34 application, being a harsh move on the award-debtor. To further provide clarity upon the effect test, the Court discussed Section 37(1)(a) wherein no appeal lies from an order referring parties to arbitration under Section 8 since that is the intended effect of the provision itself. Thirdly, the Court reiterated that the principle of minimal judicial intervention as enshrined under Section 5 of the 1996 Act could not be narrowed down to limit appeal provisions within the statute itself. In other words, the principle of judicial non-intervention cannot be absolute concerning the 1996 Act. CRITIQUE The judgment of the Court without an iota of doubt provides clarity and settles the law upon a pressing issue. In doing so, the Court overruled Union of India v. Radha Krishna Seth[4] and State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Construction Co.[5] that stated the law incorrectly. While the decision may seem worthwhile, it suffers from certain pitfalls. Accordingly, to facilitate a critique, the present part is divided into two distinct categories i.e. (i) The Good and (ii) The Bad & Ugly. (i) The Good First and foremost, the decision will favor the award-debtors wherein the application for condonation of delay had been dismissed by the courts that in effect dismissed the Section 34 application as well. The effect test as upheld by the Court will by and large favor award debtors that raise legitimate grounds for setting aside the arbitral award under Section 34 and would not have to worry in case the statutory limit for three months has elapsed. Given the diverse variety of social, geographical, and economic factors in India that often lead to delays in filing, the decision is certainly a precedent that the award-debtors would look to rely upon proactively. Noteworthy, the judgment opens up another avenue of remedy, albeit narrow, for award debtors under the 1996 Act itself. Prior to the judgment, in case of dismissal of the Section 34 application, the award debtors would rest hopes on Article 136 of the Constitution that provides for a Special Leave to Appeal before the Court. However, due to the present decision, the narrow scope of appeal under Section 37(1)(c) is more likely to be invoked. It may provide the award-debtor a reasonable opportunity in case the application under Section 34 was dismissed in effect due to refusal to condone the delay. Notably, the Court made a relevant distinction between the return of application under Section 34 due to lack of jurisdiction and the dismissal of the application under Section 34 on account of delay. While doing so, the Court distinguished the judgment in the case of BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC[6] and clarified that the case pertained to return of the application due to lack of jurisdiction of the court and whereas, the present case dealt with the refusal to condone delay that led to the dismissal of the Section 34 application itself. Prior to the present decision of the Court, there had been differing positions that caused a muddled regime. Therefore, in light of the same, the present decision settles yet another ambiguous area of arbitration law. (ii) The Bad & Ugly Pertinently, in order to arrive at the reasoning in the present judgment, the Court had to first consider Section 39(1)(vi) of the 1940 Act pari materia to Section 37(1)(c) of the 1996 Act and only then rely upon a case decided in accordance with the scheme of the 1940 Act i.e., Essar Constructions. However, considering that there have been ‘words of caution’ in relying upon the scheme of the 1940 Act and the cases decided as per the same if the basis of the present judgment is questioned, its foundation may start to fumble. In the case of Sundaram Finance v. NEPC India Ltd.,[7] the Court had authoritatively observed that the provisions of the 1996 Act must be interpreted and construed independently to avoid any misconstruction. In simpler terms, the 1996 Act must be interpreted on its own strength without being influenced by the scheme of the 1940 Act. Additionally, in the case of Ashok Traders v. Gurumukh Das Saluja,[8] the Court had observed that the 1996 Act is a long leap in the direction of alternative dispute resolution systems and the cases decided as per the 1940 Act must be ‘applied with caution’ for determining the issues under the 1996 Act. Whereas, in the present case, there seems to be an absence of any caution that the Court may have considered. Section 37(1)(c) of the 1996 Act could have very well been interpreted on its own strength and in doing so, the Court could have taken cue of the effect test from the case of Essar Constructions and reiterated the principle rather than considering Section 39(1)(vi) of the 1940 Act pari materia to Section 37(1)(c) of the 1996 Act. Retreating to the key feature of the Model Law of judicial non-intervention, the present decision appears to be in murky waters. The statutory right of appealable orders under Section 37 could very well be subjected to misuse on account of delaying the enforcement of the award. In a jurisdiction like India, where the fate of litigation is summed up based on delay and prolonged cases, decisions opening up multiple avenues for award debtors are strong weapons that could be deployed very often leading to delay in awards attaining finality. Ultimately, the faith in the arbitration process from the award holder's viewpoint is bound to diminish and may result in laxity and increased legroom for the award debtors. Lastly, the award debtor may not always be a private entity, and where the instrumentalities or extended limbs of the State are involved, they may drag their feet for a considerable time. This would result in the award-holder being entangled in several rounds of litigation despite possessing an award in their favor. CONCLUSION The present decision may have settled one area, however, it has added yet another hurdle before the awards attain finality as it may lead to prolonging litigation arising out of or in relation to arbitration. As a plausible way ahead, the courts must consider two indispensable aspects viz., (i) in case the Section 34 application is filed beyond the limitation period of 3 months, the application seeking condonation of delay must be filed with the Section 34 application itself and not on any date thereafter and (ii) the award-debtors must precisely set-out the grounds under Section 34(2) and/or 34(2A) for setting aside the award. The former aspect will be particularly helpful in not letting the award debtors misuse the present decision to condone the delay beyond the outer limit of 30 days [as per the proviso to Section 34(3)]. However, in case the award-debtors do not comply with Section 34(2) and sub-section (3) of the 1996 Act, the courts must preclude the award-debtors from utilizing the present judgment as a dilatory tactic in an attempt to impede the enforcement and finality of awards. * Rohan Gulati is a Junior Staff Editor for the Arbitration Workshop Blog. He is currently a fourth-year law student pursuing BB.A LL.B at Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad. His primary area of interest is Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) with a specific focus on arbitration law. He can be contacted at rohan.gulati@student.slsh.edu.in [1] 2021 SCC OnLine SC 80. [2] Order dated 12.04.2017 in C.A. Nos. 5247-5248/2007. [3] (2000) 6 SCC 94. [4] 2005 SCC OnLine All 8400. [5] (2006) 6 Mah LJ 678. [6] (2020) 4 SCC 234. [7] (1999) 2 SCC 479. [8] (2004) 3 SCC 155.

***Vidhi Pramesh Parikh INTRODUCTION Arbitration is a method of alternate dispute resolution (“ADR”) where the parties agree to appoint one or more arbitrators who make an unbiased decision concerning the dispute raised and the decision made by these arbitrators is binding on the parties and also admissible in the court of law. By choosing arbitration, the parties choose an alternative way to resolve the disputes instead of litigating in courts. The use of ADR methods has spiked during the last few years since parties get to avoid time-consuming and tedious procedures and opt for an easier procedure. An arbitrator is a neutral professional who is usually appointed by the parties to decide on the disputes or the differences between the parties. Gender inequality has existed for ages in every field that one comes across, including the field of law. RISE IN THE GENDER DISPARITY The discrimination between men and women in the workplace within any profession continues to persist. Male arbitrators outnumber female arbitrators by a huge margin. For instance, in 2017, Mumbai had 31 arbitrators out of which only 2 were women arbitrators[1] - the difference is huge. A 2012 survey by the ABA Women Dispute Resolution (WIDR) Committee showed that only 18% of all the arbitrators included were women.[2] Parties always tend to look out for seasoned, experienced, and well-known arbitrators, which makes it difficult for the new lawyers to make a mark. One of the key factors for the lack of successful woman arbitrators is generally called the “pipeline leak”[3]. Pipeline here means an exemplary resume that one should build to become a successful arbitrator with the help of legal education, experience, and various associations with other senior arbitrators or senior judges as arbitrators are chosen from a very limited pool of professionals. In most international arbitration cases, the arbitrators are chosen from a limited pool of professionals who are most likely already at a higher level - senior lawyers, judges, partners or the like. This unconscious or implicit bias to choose the existing established arbitrators (mostly male) could be considered as a silent killer of diversity in the legal profession. It is said to be one of the most significant reasons for the disparity between male and female representation on international arbitral tribunals. Men play an important role in achieving gender equality and promoting activities to empower women. The change in gender diversity has to be brought about at the grassroots level. In May 2016, a huge number of people came together to sign an initiative that aimed to increase the number of women arbitrators in the fraternity. According to the research undertaken by Lucy Greenwood, a woman arbitrator, the institutional appointments of female arbitrators increased from 12% in 2015 to 17% in 2016.[4] The 2019 report of the Cross Institutional Task Force on Gender Diversity in Arbitral Appointment showed that 34% of institutional appointments were female and 21.5% of appointments by the co-arbitrators were female, whereas only 13.9% of the party appointments were female.[5] John Bickerman, the former Chair of the American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution, highlighted the problem of gender discrimination in 2006 and remarked that “in terms of the big cases, we see the same names all the time, and they are the same very accomplished, well-established, high-profile white men that have been doing this for the past ten or fifteen years”.[6] William Tetley, a well-known lawyer from Canada, shared an experience where how this ‘men’s private club’ played a huge role in his career. He mentioned how without any prior experience or knowledge about the Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), he was asked by his acquaintance to be the judge on his case. Neither of the other arbitrators knew about his lack of experience or expertise but they instead praised his work, which further proves that how white men or men, in general, have had the upper hand in this field of work for decades.[7] Meanwhile, Ms. Julia Kenny, a partner at Palladium Legal (a reputed law firm both in India and UK), has served as an international arbitrator for over a decade. She has worked for clients from the UAE, Canada, South Africa, and more. She has even served as a lead arbitrator in disputes under the UNICITRAL, International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), and various other arbitration forums. She serves as a notable example of the success that women can experience as arbitrators, whether on a national level or an international level if given space and opportunity to grow. While gender discrimination between white men and women is a prevalent issue, people of colour go through even greater discrimination. The American Arbitration Association boasts that 25% of their total arbitrators are both women and people of colour, but the problem is that the other 75% of them are white males. In a profession where there is discrimination between men and women, women of colour have faced and shall further face an increasing number of hurdles due to their colour and ethnicity. It is imperative that a fair chance should be given to every individual. One should not be discriminated against or be given an undue advantage over others, whether due to nepotism or in any other unfair manner. The lack of women arbitrators on a global scale demotivates the upcoming generation from pursuing arbitration as a career. It is understandable that people would lose faith in meritocracy i.e., achieving something due to their merits and therefore lose the incentive to work diligently. Having no mentors shall become a regular practice to guide the minority groups in the profession. Such a vicious circle can be brought to an end only when gender diversity becomes a reality instead of an illusion. TODAY’S SCENARIO Today, there are various institutes, law firms, and practising lawyers who have introduced initiatives to bridge the gender disparity observed and to bring about gender diversity on an international level. Presently, there has been a hike in the number of cases that are referred to arbitration than litigation due to the various advantages that arbitration has. The International Chamber of Commerce posted its highest number of cases since 2016 with 946 new arbitration cases. In 2018, SCC had appointed 28% of its arbitrators as women which increased to 32% in the year 2019.[8] On the other hand, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) had 18% representation by women in the year 2018 which increased to 21% in the year 2019.[9] Recently, in January 2020, the Equal Representation in Arbitration (ERA) Pledge, which was taken in 2016, crossed a milestone of having 4,000 signatories. The ERA has also initiated an “Arbitrator Search” tool,[10] where users can search for female arbitrators by filing a simple form that requires basic personal information, the area of expertise, the applicable law, the language preferred, and similar details. Once the form is filled and the request is received by them, their Search Team shall find the best potential candidate for the stated requirements. As it is rightly said, every step counts, and this tool helps disputants find women arbitrators who are not very well-known but have excelled in their fields. In the 2020 ICC report for the year 2019, it was noted that the ICC itself appoints 25%-30% of its total arbitrators and that ICC appointed as many women arbitrators as were nominated by the parties: 131 women were nominated by the parties (42% of all the women arbitrators), 134 women were appointed by the ICC itself (43% of the all the women arbitrators) and 45 women were nominated as the president of the tribunal by their co-arbitrators (14% of all women arbitrators). It also saw 1,476 appointments and confirmations of arbitrators out of which 21% were women arbitrators.[11] The report also mentioned that the number of women arbitrators appointed has doubled in the past four years and that the parties and counsels can play a huge role in increasing the number of women arbitrators even more. In 2019, 34% of women arbitrators were appointed through institutions whereas 21% were appointed through their co-arbitrators. There are various arbitral institutions such as the LCIA, ICC and other prominent arbitral institutions who have supported the cause of increasing the number of women who participate in the arbitration process, and there has since been an upward trend. A few other instances are the Gender Equality Global Campaign, Alliance for Equality in Dispute Resolution, and the ADR Inclusion Network Pledge - all with the aim to bring changes to the gender disparity in the profession. CONCLUSION The practice of arbitration has seen a considerable spike during the COVID-19 times due to the ease of conducting meetings through virtual modes as well as the impossible circumstances where people cannot visit the courts. There have been hearings that have taken place over the newly adopt video calling mode being the new normal. This has also resulted in an increase in the number of cases that the arbitral institutions have had to take up. Consequently, these institutes are now appointing arbitrators in a greater capacity, meaning that there is also an increase in the number of women arbitrators who are being appointed. “If everyone is thinking alike, then nobody is thinking,” said Benjamin Franklin. Every individual could adopt a different approach to think things through. A diverse approach can bring various skills and experiences to the table and can improve the quality and fairness of the arbitral awards being made. Having an equal number of women arbitrators onboard also increases the faith in the system as there are higher chances that more parties come forward and choose arbitration. Diversity can be achieved even by changing various hiring policies where a clause can be added regarding the hiring ratio of professionals, which could highly improve the way that the opportunities are given. The institutes where arbitrators admit/register themselves can take the first step to regulate the disparity since they have the exact data about the arbitrators. Since they have a say in the appointment of arbitrators for a tribunal, they can try to bring about diversity at the forefront. Law firms and lawyers who not only advise the clients about their cases but also recommend the names of the arbitrators can also consciously make an effort to suggest women arbitrators. The arbitrators in their fraternity can promote this practice as well. Like it is said, “Every drop counts.” Henry Ford had quoted once, “If everyone is moving forward, then success takes care of itself.” In this context, the only solutions are spreading general awareness and taking prompt and consistent actions to curb the huge gender gap present in this profession. International arbitration is being talked about and practiced on a huge scale now. This profession has a great potential to grow if reformative steps are taken in the right direction. The initiative should be taken from the strongest stakeholders, which would motivate other sections to step in and take a step further. To bring about any positive change, one has to start taking a series of affirmative actions; gender parity cannot be achieved overnight as a miracle. One human uplifts another, and there has to be a conscious and voluntary effort by each person. The situation has improved from what it was a few years back, but it can be better. Reasonable and significant steps/initiatives should be taken to bring about a considerable change. Hopefully, there would soon be no woman who chooses to be an arbitrator but is denied any opportunity simply because she is a woman. *The name of the author of this article is Vidhi Pramesh Parikh. She is a second-year student studying at Jitendra Chauhan College of Law, Mumbai and she is also a member of the Institute of Company Secretaries of India. Email id- parikhvidhi1@gmail.com. ** The author is solely responsible for the veracity of the statements cited in the article. [1]https://www.msei.in/SX-Content/common/Investors/List-of-Arbitrators/2017/October/LIST-OF-ARBITRATORS---MUMBAI.pdf [2]https://www.americanbar.org/groups/diversity/women/publications/perspectives/2018/winter/where-are-women-arbitrators-battle-diversify-adr/ [3]https://indiacorplaw.in/2020/08/gender-and-ethnic-diversity-in-arbitral-institutions-where-do-we-stand.html#:~:text=The%20lack%20of%20gender%20balance%20on%20arbitral%20tribunals,to%20a%20smaller%20pool%20of%20possible%20female%20arbitrators. [4]http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/06/04/women-arbitration-rise/ [5]https://www.lcia.org/News/report-of-the-cross-institutional-task-force-on-gender-diversity.aspx#:~:text=In%202019%2C%2034%25%20of%20institutional,of%20party%2Dappointments%20were%20female.&text=Opportunities%20for%20qualified%20women%20to,wish%20to%20progress%20their%20careers [6]https://www.lalive.law/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Diversity-in-international-arbitration_dos-Santos.pdf, Page 9 [7]https://www.lalive.law/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Diversity-in-international-arbitration_dos-Santos.pdf, Page 14 [8]https://sccinstitute.com/statistics/#:~:text=SCC%20Statistics%202019,leading%20forums%20for%20dispute%20resolution.&text=Statistics%20regarding%20the%20appointed%20arbitrators,2018%20to%2032%20%25%20in%202019. [9]https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/icc-releases-2019-dispute-resolution-statistics/ [10] http://www.arbitrationpledge.com/arbitration-search [11]https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/cross-institutional-report-reflects-advances-in-gender-balance-in-arbitration/

- Pranjal Pandey* & Ayushi Pandit**~ In the recent case of V4 Infrastructure Pvt Ltd v Jindal Biochem Pvt Ltd.[1], the Delhi High Court has held that an arbitral tribunal cannot award interest on basis of reasons which are perverse, unjustifiable and contrary to the record. The Division Bench of Delhi High Court in the instant case was deciding on the appeal filed against the arbitral award under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996(“the Act”). The Court while deciding the challenge to the award observed that there was an inherent and glaring discrepancy in the claim made by the respondent and the relief granted by the arbitral tribunal. This mysterious change during the course of arbitration proceedings prompted the Court to intervene as this mystery shocked the conscience of the Court. The Court examined the arbitral award and expressed that the grant of refund along with eighteen percent rate of interest in addition to the damages by the arbitral tribunal was perverse, unreasonable and unjustified. The Arbitral Award The dispute arose out of the termination of a Space Buyer Agreement (agreement) between the appellant, V4 Infrastructure Pvt Ltd (VIPL) and the respondent Jindal Biochem Pvt Ltd (JBPL). In the statement of claim filed before the Arbitral Tribunal, JBPL claimed for specific performance of the agreement as well as damages for failure to handover possession of the property along with interest. The foremost controversy of the dispute revolved around the termination notice issued by the VIPL alleging that the JBPL had failed to discharge any of its obligations under the agreement. The Arbitral Tribunal adjudicated upon the allegations and found that the JBPL had not committed any breach of the agreement as in the termination notice issued by VIPL. The arbitral tribunal concluded that JBPL had performed its obligations under the agreement and was deprived possession illegally. Thus the Arbitral Tribunal rendered an award for a refund of the entire consideration amount under the agreement and damages for deprivation of use of premises along with interest at the rate of eighteen percent per annum from the date of payment, till the date of actual realization. The challenge to Arbitral Award The award was challenged by VIPL under Section 34 of the Act on the ground that the premise of the award was intrinsically flawed. The challenge to the award was based on the fact that the arbitrator had made an erroneous assumption premise Respondent had not claimed specific performance of the agreement. However, the learned Single Judge dismissed the challenge to the award under section 34 and confirmed the same by holding that there was no infirmity in the award. VIPL filed an appeal under Section 37 of the Act assailing the order passed by the Single Judge. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant readily paid the principal amount to the respondent awarded by the arbitrator and only challenged the damages and the rate of interest. Thus the scope of review before the Division Bench was limited to the aspect of damages and rate of interest awarded by the tribunal. The Appellant had questioned the reasonability of the awarded rate of interest and it was argued that the rate of interest of eighteen percent was exorbitant, unreasonable and unjustifiable in the facts of the case. The foundation of this argument was based on the fact that the respondent had filed the claim seeking relief of specific performance, and then without there being any abandonment and relinquishment of the said relief, the learned arbitrator has proceeded to award the alternate relief of refund of consideration with damages and interest. On the other hand, the respondent justified the damages and the interest awarded by the arbitrator on account of the hardship suffered by the respondent for many years. It was also contended that the scope of judicial review while exercising jurisdiction under Sections 34 and 37 of the Act is limited, and the impugned award does not suffer from any perversity that would invite interference by any Court. The Verdict The Court at the outset stated that it is trite law that the scope of interference in the award under Section 37 of the Act is quite restrictive. However, on account of the inherent and glaring contradictions between the claim made by the Respondents and the relief granted by the arbitral tribunal, the Court deemed it fit to intervene. The court observed several instances wherein the Respondent were willing to seek execution of the sale deed in their favour. The Respondent had sought specific performance of agreement as primary relief, before ripening of the dispute the Respondent sent a letter to the Appellant, requesting execution of the sale deed in its favour and even during arbitral proceeding at the stage of recording evidence the Respondent’s witness admitted that he is seeking specific performance of the contract. The court observed that there was conspicuous lack of material on record to show that the Respondent had abandoned the claim for specific performance and yet still the arbitral tribunal in the award stated that the Respondent had not sought the relief of specific performance and thus was entitled to the alternate relief of refund of entire payment. The Court inferred that the Respondent had a change of mind and the Respondent only became interested in pursuing the remedy of refund of the consideration amount, even after seeking specific performance as their primary relief. This inference was drawn by the Court on the basis that there was nothing on record to depict the Respondent abandoning the claim of specific performance before the Arbitrator. If the Respondent were genuinely interested in the property they would have argued for the relief of specific performance instead of pursuing the alternate remedy of refund of the entire consideration amount. This vital aspect was missed by the arbitral tribunal while making the award as well by the Single Judge while adjudicating upon the challenge of the award under Section 34. Keeping this proposition in consideration, the Court then examined the justification of giving eighteen percent interest in the arbitral award in addition to the damages. Perversity in the Award The Court highlighted that under the disparity between the statement of claims filed by the Respondents before the arbitral tribunal and the observations of the arbitral tribunal. In the statement of claims, the Respondent had sought the Specific Performance of Space Buyer Agreement, however, in the award the arbitrator observed that there was no such claim of specific performance. The Court led that these findings in the award are ex-facie incorrect and contrary to the pleadings and evidence on record. It was this perversity in the award which compelled the Court to intervene and re-examine the award. Grant of exorbitant interest rates The Court held that the Respondent’s claims were adjudicated on the erroneous premise that specific performance could not be granted and the transformation in the claims without any reasonable cause was not justiciable. As the award was completely silent on this aspect the Court held that rendering of eighteen percent interest this basis of the wrong presumption that specific performance could not be granted was perverse, unjustifiable and contrary to the record. Effect of the interim order The Court also took note of the interim order granted in favour of Respondent prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, which provided for maintaining status quo in relation to the property in question. This order was obtained by the Respondent for the preservation of the property in question, till the final adjudication of the relief of specific performance of the agreement and as a consequence of this order, the Appellant was deprived of the right to deal with the properties. Thus the Court held that the as the nature of the interim order obtained by Respondent was not justified, and thus Respondent should also bear the consequences of seeking and obtaining interim relief which was not commensurate with the final relief sought of refund of consideration amount. In the next part, the author analyses the legislative provisions relating to specific performance and damages as enunciated by the Court to justify the interference in the arbitral award. In the instant case, the Court examined the same issue from a different angle. The Court after critically analysing of Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 the Court held that the award of compensation under Section 21 is inherently linked to the claim for specific performance of a contract. Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act empowers the Court to award compensation in certain cases. When the contract has become impossible with no fault of the plaintiff, Section 21 enables the Court to award compensation in lieu of the specific performance. [2] It is pertinent to mention that the nature of relief to be awarded under Section 21 is one of the discretion of the Court which has to be exercised on sound principles and when the court gets into equity jurisdiction, the same would be guided by justice, equity, good conscience and fairness to both the parties.[3] Further, the Court emphasised that the compensation awarded would be determined as per Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (“Contract Act)”. Relief under Section 21 must pass the muster of Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 The Court noted that award of interest by way of damages at an exceptionally high rate of interest is not tenable when governed by the principles specified in Section 73 of the Contract Act. Section 73 provides that when a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has committed the breach, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from such breach. It is pertinent to mention that while discussing Section 73 and Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, the ruling of the constitutional bench in Fateh Chand can be said to be the torchbearer judgement.[4] In this landmark case, the Apex Court emphasized that while assessing damages the Court should award compensation as it deems reasonable in the light of all the circumstances of the case. Thus the circumstances do play a significant role in the process of assessment of damages. It is noteworthy to refer observation of Supreme Court in wherein after analysing various judicial pronouncements observed that “Reasonable compensation will be fixed on well-known principles that are applicable to the law of contract, which are to be found inter alia in Section 73 of the Contract Act. Since Section 74 awards reasonable compensation for damage or loss caused by a breach of contract, damage or loss caused is a sine qua non for the applicability of the section.”[5] Since it is imperative that the compensation awarded must pass the test of reasonability which would be determined as per the circumstances of every case, therefore any arbitral award arising out of an arbitration governed by Indian law must be governed by the same test of reasonability. By applying the said test in the instant case it was observed by the Court that as the grant of damages along with the exorbitant interest of eighteen percent on the assumption that the Respondent had not claimed relief of specific performance and was only seeking a refund of the sale consideration was not reasonable. As it was evident from the record that the actual scenario was quite the contrary, thus the Court declared that the arbitrator had committed a perversity in the award. In order to make the award reasonable and resolve the perversity in the impugned award, the Court declared the interest rate of eighteen percent as unreasonable, irrational and unjustified, and reduced the same to nine percent, thus striking a balanced approach. Thus the Court considered the equitable interest of both the parties as well as their conduct during the proceedings and gave a ruling which was fair, just, and reasonable for both the parties. Analysis In any arbitration proceeding in addition to direct claims, the claim for interest on those due amounts and damages form an important part of the claim. The interest component is awarded as an equitable remedy for the loss incurred to the claimant due to the delay in receiving the payments while the dispute is finally adjudicated upon. It is submitted by the author that the claim of interest is also based on the concept of fairness. Fairness is a multidimensional concept and it would also be unfair to the successful party if it were deprived of the fruits of its labour as a result of a dissatisfied party raising a multitude of arid technical challenges after an arbitral award has been made.[6] Thus in absence of an express bar, the arbitrator has the jurisdiction and authority to award interest for all the three periods pre-reference, pendente lite and future. Power of Arbitral Tribunal to award interest The arbitrator can grant interest at the rate specified in the contract or a reasonable rate of interest as long as there is no prohibition to grant interest.[7] The arbitrator cannot ignore the terms of the contract while awarding interest under Section 31(7) of the Act.[8] When the arbitrator grants interest in accordance with the terms of the contract between the parties, such award cannot be set aside by invoking the general principles of fairness or equity.[9] Even in the cases wherein the agreement, there is no specified rate of interest, the arbitral tribunal can exercise its discretion to award interest as compensation. The Supreme Court of India has laid down that the discretion of the arbitrator to award interest must be exercised reasonably.[10] The rate of Interest must be compensatory as it is a form of reparation granted to the award­holder, while at the same time it must not be punitive, unconscionable or usurious in nature. In essence, an award of interest compensates a party for its forgone return on investment, or for money withheld without a justifiable cause. Courts may reduce the Interest rate awarded by an arbitral tribunal where such Interest rate it is not found reasonable.[11] At this stage, it would be appropriate to refer a passage from the dissenting opinion of the then Chief Justice H.L. Dattu in the case of Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. State of Orissa: “The Arbitral Tribunal has the discretion to decide whether such interest would be imposed on the whole or a part of the money awarded, and further whether it would be imposed for the entire duration from the date of cause of action to the date of award, or on a part of it. However, such discretion is not unfettered and is not exercisable upon the mere whims and fancies of the tribunal. In Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Justice G.P. Singh, 13th Edn., 2012, at p. 482, it has been stated as “Even where there is not much indication in the Act of the ground upon which discretion is to be exercised it does not mean that its exercise is dependent upon mere fancy of the court or tribunal or authority concerned. It must be exercised in the words of Lord Halsbury, ‘according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion; according to law and not humour; it is to be not arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular’..”[12] Perverse Decisions The said passage even though in the dissenting opinion holds significant relevance while discussing the scope of power of the arbitral tribunal to award interest. In the instant case, the Court held that the findings in the award were contrary to the evidence on record and there was no evidence to depict the Respondent had relinquished the relief of specific performance of the agreement. As enunciated in the case of Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority [13]. It is settled law that where a finding is based on no evidence such decision would necessarily be perverse. Indeed, it is trite law that a court does not sit in appeal over the award of an arbitral tribunal by reassessing or re appreciating the evidence.[14] However, a finding based on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside on the ground of patent illegality.[15] Interest: An Equitable Remedy It is pertinent to mention that in the present case the appellants were willing to offer a settlement to the respondent on reasonable terms however the respondents refused to accept the same. This was a clear case of one party asserting its bargaining power on the other to reap out unnecessary profits. A similar case came up before the Delhi High Court where even after a repeated request by the respondent, the petitioner refused to offer any viable settlement to the respondent.[16] The Court upheld the rate of interest awarded by the arbitrator and held that since the petitioner took advantage of the law which had prescribed for an automatic stay on the enforcement of the arbitral award during the pendency of the petition under Section 34, therefore, the petitioner cannot claim any equity in the form of reduction of the rate of interest in their favour. Thus, it can be said that Interest rates should be adjusted to take into account any unreasonable refusal to consider and/or accept a reasonable settlement offer.[17] Conclusion ‘a man shall not be permitted to blow hot and cold with reference to the same transaction’ The case of V4 Infrastructure Pvt Ltd v Jindal Biochem Pvt Ltd gives an impeccable example of justified interference by the Court under Section 37. The said ruling depicts how cautious the Courts need to be while examining the award and how important the conduct of parties becomes. The Respondents in the said case never particularly pressed for specific performance of the agreement during the arbitration however they did seek an interim order for preserving of property. the contrary findings of Arbitrator on no claim of specific performance being made along with the acquiescence of Respondents on this aspect compelled the Court to look re-examine the finding of the Court. The decision sets a categorical example that the scope of power of the arbitral tribunal to award interest is not unfettered and comes with the riders of justice, equity and fairness. ~ This article is an edited version of the 4th Best Entry in the 1st Case Summary Writing Competition. Suggestions were made by the Editorial Team of the Arbitration Workshop based on which the changes were made by the Authors. * 5th Year, Maharashtra National Law University, Nagpur. The author has express interest in Corporate and Commercial Matters. The author can be reached at- pranjalpandey@nlunagpur.ac.in. ** 4th Year, Maharashtra National Law University, Nagpur. Immense Inclination towards International Commercial Arbitration and Capital Markets. The author can be reached at- ayushi.pandit@outlook.com [1] FAO(OS) (COMM) 107/2018 & CMs. 20269/2018 & 49639/2019,) 107. [2] Urmila Devi and Others vs. Deity, Mandir Shree Chamunda Devi 2018 (2) SCC 284 (Civil). [3] Kanshi Ram v. Om Prakash Jawal 1996 (4) SCC 593. [4] Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Das, 1964 SCR (1) 515. [5] Kailash Nath Associates v DDA (2015) 4 SCC 136, Para 43. [6] Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi SRL, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 177, 65. [7] Jaiprakash Associates Ltd Vs Tehri Hydro Development Corporation India Limited (2019) SCC Online SC 143. [8] Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 189. [9] Videocon Industries Limited v. Morgan Securities & Credits Pvt Ltd., (2019) SCC OnLine Del 7034; BPL Ltd. v. Morgan Securities & Credits Pvt. Ltd., OMP (COMM) 176/2017. [10] Vedanta Ltd., v. Shenzen Shandong Nuclear Power Construction Co Limited, (2018) SCC Online SC 1922. [11] Manalal Prabhudhayal v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., 2009 17 SCC 296. [12] Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 189, ¶ 69. [13] Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 3 SCC 49. [14] P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. v. B.H.H. Securities (P) Ltd., (2012) 1 SCC 594, ¶ 21. [15] Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Company Limited v NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 1. [16] PEL Industries Ltd. v. SE Investment Limited, (2018) SCC Online Dell 8746. [17]Gisèle Stephens-Chu & Joshua Kelly, Awards of Interest in International Arbitration: Achieving Coherence INDIAN JOURNAL OF ARBITRATION LAW, (June 25, 2020, 7:48 am) http://ijal.in/sites/default/files/IJAL_Volume_7_Issue_1_Gisele_Stephens_Chu_&_Joshua_Kelly.pdf.