Arbitration is considered an alternative to traditional Court litigation. Comparing both the mechanisms of dispute resolution gives an idea that arbitration has an edge over the age-old traditional court litigation as the former offers more privacy, is speedy in nature when it comes to redressal of disputes and is less expensive than the latter. However, the present arbitration regime in India is proving to be wrong in terms of affordability. The high cost of arbitration is making the whole regime unsuccessful and as the cost has various factors involved in it, the need to overlook the same becomes extremely important. Due to the absence of any authoritative regime regarding the arbitration cost, the issue pertaining to the same is persistent. But now the Supreme Court has settled down the debate with regard to the cost of the arbitrators. In the judgment pronounced recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court settled a few disputes as to the nature of the Fourth Schedule of the Arbitration Act, at what stage the arbitrator’s fees should be fixed and the interpretation of the sum in dispute as mentioned in the Fourth Schedule.
The Law Commission had earlier suggested the changes with regard to the fees of the Arbitrators and the same were incorporated in the Amendment Act 2015 and 2019. The amendment came in 2015 and introduced the Fourth Schedule (which was crafted on the basis of the Delhi International Arbitration Centre (Administrative Costs & Arbitrators’ fees) Rules (DIAC Rules) Model Fee) and inserted Section 31A in the Arbitration Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) through which the cost regime was defined and the said provision defines the term “costs” to be considered for a particular set of arbitration. Through the 2019 Amendment, sub-section 3A was inserted in Section 11 which stipulates that the Arbitrator appointed by the parties shall have to abide by the rates specified in the Fourth Schedule. However, the Courts had observed otherwise, as some recognized it to be suggestive in nature in cases where the arbitrator was appointed by the parties and mandatory where the tribunal has been constituted by the Court. Now the differing views of the High Court made a ruckus in the present cost regime.
Considering the fact that the Arbitrator works as an adjudicating body and for the work they do, remuneration should be given but what should be the quantum of the same? The fee structure should align with the intention of the Arbitration Act. If Arbitration costs more than litigation or some other method of dispute resolution then what is the point of having it as an alternative, all the efforts of the legislature and the judiciary will be wasted that were taken till now. It’s important to analyze the present legal regime related to the Arbitration cost and for that, it becomes important to look at the provisions of the Arbitration act governing this aspect and the amendment that came into effect in 2015 that changed the cost regime specifically focusing on the goal of increasing the affordability of the Arbitration.
Interpretation of Section 31A: What is the intention behind the amendment?
In the judgment of the Union of India v. Singh Builders Syndicate (“Singh Builders”), the Supreme Court took note of the exorbitant fees charged by the Arbitrators and held that,
“What is found to be objectionable is parties being forced to go to an arbitrator appointed by the court and then being forced to agree for a fee fixed by such Arbitrator. It is unfortunate that delays, high costs, and frequent and sometimes unwarranted judicial interruptions at different stages are seriously hampering the growth of arbitration as an effective dispute resolution process. Delay and high cost are two areas where the Arbitrators by self-regulation can bring about marked improvement.”
While discussing the issue of arbitration cost, the Supreme Court also took note of Institutional Arbitration and the benefits of the same as they have a fixed schedule of fees which causes less hindrance in the Arbitration procedure as the Arbitrators are bound by the same. The same suggestive view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Sanjeev Kumar Jain v. Raghubir Saran Charitable Trust, wherein it was suggested to have reasonability while deciding the costs, to disclose the fee structure before the appointment of the arbitrator, and every High Court to have a scale of Arbitrator’s fee calibrated with reference to the amount involved in the dispute.
Taking note of the judgment, the Law Commission of India in its 246th Report recommended some amendments to the Arbitration Act with regard to having a model schedule of fees. Pursuant to the report, the Amendment Act of 2015 came into existence and Fourth Schedule was introduced in the 1996 Act along with Section 31A. Both these provisions were introduced to tighten the loose end (Arbitrators fees), but the wordings preferred in both provisions were deemed to be of no use as it implies discretion on the Courts and on the tribunal to decide the Cost.
Section 31A of the Act covers fees and expenses of the arbitrators, administrative fees of the arbitral institution, and other expenses related to arbitral proceedings and the award. The point to be considered here is the reasonability of costs that can be recovered and not the actual costs, hence, this means that to determine the reasonableness of the costs, the factors will vary and will depend upon case to case basis. Section 31A(2) of the Act states the position as to who will bear the cost of the arbitration wherein the general rule will be governed by the Loser pays principle and departure from the same will warrant a reasoned order. The provision starts with the word “if” which implies discretion on the Court or the tribunal to make an order as to the payment of costs. The wordings of the provision are not in consonance with the intention of the legislature which introduced the new regime on costs.
After introducing Section 31A, it was presumed that Courts will take note of the provision and the cost part will be dealt with by the Courts or the tribunals at the early stage of the arbitration proceedings but to the surprise of everyone, neither the courts nor the tribunals took efforts to determine the costs because of the discretion provided in the provision which makes the introduction of Section 31A pointless.
Meaning of “Costs”: What we can infer?
As per the explanation provided under Section 31A(1) of the Arbitration Act, the costs consist of different components such as fees and expenses of the arbitrators and courts, administrative fees of the arbitral tribunal, legal and other expenses incurred with regard to the arbitration and court proceedings. However, what is defined in the explanation is the reasonable costs and not the actual costs incurred by the parties, hence, the degree of variance may differ on a case-to-case basis. The assessment to determine the reasonability of the costs incurred is not straightforward and the factors that need to be taken into consideration may vary.
What is covered within the scope of costs defined is the cost of reference which is broader in nature and which means costs incurred by the parties while adjudicating the matter before the arbitral tribunal and another one is the cost of the award which means the administrative cost of the reference. In the case of ONGC Ltd. v. Dolphin Offshore Enterprises (India) Ltd., the Bombay High Court observed the meaning of the term “Costs” and held that the cost of the proceedings includes the cost of reference, cost of the arbitration proceedings, and cost of the parties. It should be the case that the winning party be compensated not just the arbitral tribunal’s fee but all the expenses borne by the party during the arbitral proceedings.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Highway Authority of India v. Gayatri Jhansi Roadways Ltd., held that arbitrator’s fees can be counted under the head of “costs”, but it might not be the case that Sections 31(8) and 31A would directly govern the contracts in which a fee structure has been provided. What is covered within the definition of the Costs is related to the reasonable amount that can be claimed by the party which is incurred during the arbitral proceedings. The only catch is the subjectivity involved with this which makes it difficult for the parties to reach a conclusion as to what can be termed as a reasonable cost and whatnot.
NATURE OF FOURTH SCHEDULE: MANDATORY OR DISCRETIONARY?
In the case of DSIIDC Ltd. v. Bawana Infra Development Pvt. Ltd., wherein the issue was raised as to the mandatory nature of the Fourth Schedule and whether the arbitrator is bound to follow the same. Answering the question in the negative, the Delhi High Court held that in the case where the arbitrator is appointed by the parties the fee schedule is decided by the arbitrator if no agreement is there in place and if the arbitrator is appointed by the Court u/s 11 of the Arbitration Act, the rules framed by the High Court u/s 11(4) will govern the arbitrator’s fees and in absence of the same, Fourth Schedule will be directory in nature. On a similar footing, in the case of Kumar & Kumar Associates v. Union of India, wherein the arbitrator was appointed u/s 11 of the Act, the Court made a strict direction that the Fourth Schedule will be binding on the Arbitrator.
In the case of NHAI v. Gayatri Jhansi Roadways Ltd., the Delhi High Court observed that if the parties have decided the fees while appointing the arbitrator then the Fourth Schedule will not be mandatory to follow in determining the Fees of the Arbitrators but this will be the picture only in cases of Ad-Hoc Arbitration and in other scenarios the parties will not be at any liberty to enter into an agreement with regards to the fees of the Arbitrators. Similarly, in the case of Pashchimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam v. IL& FS Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd., the arbitrator was appointed by the parties and the Court observed that no power has been vested in the Courts to determine the fees of the arbitrators, and Fourth Schedule is merely suggestive in nature keeping note of Section 11(1) of the Act.
In the case of G.S. Developers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd. v. Alpha Corp. Development Pvt. Ltd., the Delhi HC held that the Fourth Schedule is mere guiding in nature as the same has not been incorporated in the Rules by the High Court, hence, the Arbitrator is free to determine his own fee. With regards to the question of determining the fees of the Arbitrators when there exists an agreement pursuant to the same, the Bombay HC in the case of Transocean Drilling Services (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd., observed that the tribunal is bound by the agreement signed between the parties as it is the source of the tribunal’s power.
CEILING AMOUNT IN THE FOURTH SCHEDULE: WHAT EXACTLY DOES THE PROVISION TRANSPIRE
The Fourth Schedule enlists two conditions - first when the tribunal consists of a sole arbitrator and the other where it consists of two or more arbitrators. In both situations the schedule specifies a ceiling amount as fees that are to be paid to the tribunal which is Rs. 30,00,000/- in cases where the tribunal consists of two or more arbitrators and Rs. 37,50,000/- in cases where the matter has been adjudicated by the sole arbitrator. The wide interpretation of the schedule has given rise to a lack of uniformity but the question remains the same whether the Fourth Schedule is mandatory or directory in nature in cases of Ad-Hoc Arbitrations.
The Supreme Court in the recent judgment of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Afcons Gunanusa JV (“Afcons Judgment”), the issue was regarding the computation of ceiling amount by interpreting the sixth entry of the fourth schedule. The entry defined the sum in dispute and the model fee which can be charged by the Arbitrator(s). As per the sixth entry, there are 3 sects, first is that the if the amount involved in the arbitration is Rs. 20,00,00,000/- the fee charged by the arbitrator(s) will be Rs. 19,87,500/-. Secondly, if the amount exceeds Rs. 20,00,00,000/-, for every amount exceeding the 20,00,00,000/- cap, 0.5% of that amount (variable amount) will be charged by the arbitrator(s) in addition to their prescribed fees of Rs. 19,87,500/-. Lastly, there exists a restriction on the maximum amount that is to be charged by the arbitrator(s) which is Rs. 30,00,000/.
Now, the whole issue is related to the interpretation of the ceiling limit of Rs. 30,00,000/-, i.e., whether the ceiling limit is for the whole fees including the fee given and the variable amount or does it applies to only the variable amount, i.e., extra 0.5% amount that is to be paid if the amount involved in the dispute is exceeding Rs. 20,00,00,000/-. The Supreme Court had an issue with a different grammatical sense of the act culminating in the English and the Hindi version of the Arbitration Act. The issue was that in the English version of the Arbitration Act, at Serial No. 6 of the Fourth Schedule, there exists no comma and because of this reason, the construction of the language conveys the meaning that the ceiling should only be applicable to the variable amount.
While deciding on this aspect the Supreme Court took the task to cull out the legislative intent behind this provision. While referring to the DIAC Rules from where the sixth schedule has been taken, the Supreme Court noted that the rule consists of a comma and this ultimately entails that the ceiling would be applicable to the base amount and the variable amount. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while referring to the 246th Law Commission Report and the intent indicated by the same held that the introduction of the Fourth Schedule was to put an end to the exorbitant fees charged by the arbitrators, and if there are 2 options available for the legislature to select, it would be appropriate to choose the lower amount since it goes parallel to the legislative intent.
The Patna High Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Bihar State Sugarcane Corporation Ltd. had held that the ceiling of Rs. 30,00,000/- as referred in Entry No. 6 of the fourth schedule is applicable to both the base amount and the variable amount. However, disagreeing with the ratio of Bihar State Sugarcane, the Delhi High Court in the case of Rail Vikas Nigam Ltd. Simplex Infrastructures Ltd., had held that the usage of the word “plus” in Entry No. 6 would entail an inference that the ceiling is applicable to variable amount only. The judgment of the Delhi High Court was challenged before the Supreme Court which was upheld in the Afcons Judgment.
The Schedule specifies the ceiling limit in two different scenarios, however, it failed to notice that whether in the case of a tribunal consisting of two or more arbitrators, the fees prescribed are to be divided separately considering the ceiling limit of Rs. 30,00,000/- to be collective in nature or the ceiling limit will be considered individually.
In the case of Punjab State Power Corp. Ltd. v. Union of India, the Punjab & Haryana High Court while deciding the quantum of fees of the tribunal consisting of three arbitrators posed the question that whether the fees are to be paid individually on a pro-rata basis or be paid collectively to the arbitrators. Diverging from the general norm, the High Court held that the fees will be calculated by 1/3rd pro-rata distribution of the composite fees determined under the Fourth Schedule. If we go by the same rationale, then it will go against the intention of the legislature that focuses on the good treatment of the arbitrators which will further the case of an arbitration-friendly environment.
However, the Supreme Court in the Afcons Judgment resolved the issue of ceiling applicable to an individual arbitrator and the entire arbitral tribunal. The Supreme Court went on to hold that there is nothing in the schedule that entails such interpretation of the provision, secondly if such interpretation is taken into consideration then it will lead to the disparity. The ultimate conclusion that the Supreme Court has reached is that the ceiling is applicable to each arbitrator and not the tribunal as a whole.
LOSER PAYS PRINCIPLE: a developing theory
The principle revolves around the theory of the unsuccessful party bears the expense of litigation or arbitration. As per the Loser Pays Principle, the winning party or the award creditor will get indemnified by the award debtor at the end of the arbitration. Now, this particular approach recognizes the calculation of the costs at the conclusion of the proceedings. Many Common Law and Civil Law countries follow the same principle and recognize the rights of the winning party not to bear the legal costs because of the wrongdoing of the losing party.
Law Commission of India, in its 246th Report, suggested incorporating the principle in the domestic arbitration regime in India and the reasoning for the same was stated to be restrictions that can be imposed on the frivolous litigations/ claims of the parties. The principle revolves around the idea of reducing the fake claims to be raised in an arbitration proceeding, to penalize the losing party and for early disposal of the cases, however, the principle has to be evolved in such a manner to cover the position where proper allocation is to be made. As it is hard to identify the actual winner in an arbitration proceeding, the principle gives either no result or a result detrimental to the interest of justice.
The principle is considered to be a best practice across many jurisdictions, but the chances or the reasons to apply this principle are inefficient in itself as there is yet another set of justifications required to identify as to who actually won the arbitration case. This conundrum can be considered while applying the principle but it is the right practice to minimize the foul claims to be raised in the proceedings, a practice prevalent in India.
MEANING OF “SUM IN DISPUTE”: INFERENCE DRAWN
The term “sum in dispute” appears in the Fourth Schedule of the Arbitration Act. While the meaning of the term was set out by the judicial pronouncements to be the aggregate value or amount involved in a dispute (including the amount of claim and the counter-claim), the other provisions of the Arbitration Act did not allow the same interpretation to be made. Provisions of Section 23, 31, 31A, and 38 talk about the submission of claims and counter-claims, cost structure, and deposits and while perusing these sections, one can easily dissect the meaning of sum in dispute, i.e., whether this particular term includes the aggregate amount of claim and counter-claim or otherwise.
In many judgments, it has been held that the Arbitral fee under the fourth schedule is based on the cumulative value of the claim and counter-claim made by the parties. In the case of Delhi State Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. (DSIIDC) v. Bawana Infra Development (P) Ltd., the Delhi High Court referred to the legislative intent behind the introduction of the fourth schedule and while referring to the same the bench referred to the DIAC rules (which is the guiding factor of the fourth schedule). The High Court noted that in the DIAC rules, it has been clearly provided that the term “sum in dispute” shall include the counter-claim made by any party, hence, the intent of the legislature is crystal clear which points to the conclusion that “sum in dispute” would be an aggregate value of claim and counter-claim.
In the case of Jivanlal Joitaram Patel v. National Highways Authority of India, the Delhi High Court referred to the case of DSIIDC and held that the expression “sum in dispute” as referred to in the fourth schedule has to be interpreted in the sense that it includes the total amount of claim made by the claimant and the total amount of counter-claim made by the respondent and Sections 31(8), 31A and 38(1) of the Arbitration Act can only be made applicable when the tribunal fixes its own fees. The said judgment was in consonance with the earlier judgment of Supreme Court Singh Builders wherein it was held that the “sum in dispute” as referred to in the Fourth Schedule is the aggregate amount of claim and counter-claim and hence no separate fee is payable on counter-claims.
As Section 38 was referred to in the above-mentioned judgment it would become necessary to explain the contours of Section 38. The said section deals with the deposits to be made by both parties and it talks about the discretionary power of the tribunal to direct the parties to deposit an amount in the form of an advance for the costs (as per section 31(8)) which it will incur to adjudicate upon the claim submitted to it.
The proviso to this section explains a situation where the tribunal has the power to direct the parties to make separate deposits in a case where the claim and the counter-claim have been submitted separately. Now, if we focus on the term “sum in dispute” and proviso to Section 38(1), we will be having diverse views as there is a proper bifurcation given by the legislature in terms of claims and counter-claims.
The interpretation of the Fourth Schedule is directly linked with the interconnection between Section 31(8), 31A and 38(1). For differentiating between the claims and the counter-claims, Section 23(2-A) will be helpful which talks about the submission of counter-claim by the respondent which the tribunal will adjudicate upon if the same falls within the ambit of the arbitration agreement. This will then help the tribunal to determine the costs in accordance with Section 31A if a party files a frivolous counter-claim which leads to a delay in the arbitration proceedings.
The intent behind taking up the counter-claim with the claim in the same proceeding was not because of the reason that the counter-claim arose due to the claim but to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings. The Arbitration Act treats both, the claim and the counter-claim distinctively and allows the tribunal to fix a deposit of costs for the claim and counter-claim separately. However, in the case of NTPC Ltd. v. Afcons R.N. Shetty and Co. Pvt. Ltd., the Delhi High Court held that while interpreting the term “sum in dispute” as referred to in the fourth schedule, the amounts contained in the claims and counter-claims can be considered separately and exception can be carved out for the same. The Delhi High Court observed that there can be a huge gap between the amounts claimed by both parties and taking the aggregate of both amounts to calculate the fees of the Arbitrator(s) will burden the party claiming the smaller amount to pay extra fees. The same judgment was challenged in the series of appeals filed before the Supreme Court which was resolved by the judgment of ONGC v. Afcons.
In the case of Voltas Ltd. v. Rolta India Ltd., the Supreme Court held that counter-claims were independent claim proceedings by the respondent and the applicability of limitation would be determined with reference to the date the same was instituted before the tribunal. Similarly, in the case of State of Goa v. Praveen Enterprises, the Supreme Court was of the view that the respondent can seek independent recourse to arbitration for deciding the counter-claim but raising a counter-claim in the same proceedings obviates a multiplicity of proceedings.
The Supreme Court in the Afcons Judgment held that the term referred to in the fourth schedule of the Act refers to the amount in a claim and counter-claim separately and not cumulatively. And as the sum is separate, the arbitrator(s) can charge the fees separately for both heads and the fee ceiling contained in the fourth schedule will separately apply to both. However, the dissenting opinion authored by Justice Sanjiv Khanna opined that the expression “sum in dispute” consists of the sum total of both, the claims and the counter-claims.
The Supreme Court observed the different provisions of the Arbitration Act and held that even though the claim is dismissed or withdrawn, the counter-claim will be adjudicated independently and the same cannot be considered as a set-off even if the counter-claim may arise from similar facts as a claim.
The scenarios in such situations may vary where in one case the parties have already agreed to the terms of the payment, second where the parties have not agreed on the payment terms and the court while appointing the arbitrator directs to follow the Fourth Schedule and the last where the parties have not agreed and the Courts have also neglected the payment part. Now in the last situation, the party who wants a speedy and effective redressal will be at loss as the arbitrator will have the liberty to charge exorbitant fees and as nothing is there on paper which governs the pro-rata distribution of payment, the other party will take advantage of the same.
In arbitration, the major focus should be on Party Autonomy. If the parties have agreed to the terms related to fees of the arbitrators, and as to what all will be covered as the costs of the arbitration, the tribunal is bound by the terms agreed between the parties. In the case of Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services, the Supreme Court emphasized on the concept of Party Autonomy although in a different aspect but the principle was placed on top to guide the spirit of arbitration regime in India. Similarly, in the recent case of Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Future Retail Ltd., the Supreme Court re-emphasized the principle of Party Autonomy as the guiding principle of the Arbitration Act. The parties agreeing to arbitrate a dispute has received a primacy over the provisions of the act. Arbitration and the arbitral tribunal is a subject matter/ outcome of the contract entered between the parties, and every aspect that is covered under the contract is binding on the parties and on the tribunal as well. The Legislature and the Judiciary’s focus on the principle of Party Autonomy is a significant move to channelize the functioning of the arbitral tribunal and also to control the parties and the arbitrators to venture outside the contract.
The main crux of awarding the cost is to make the loss that the succeeding party has incurred. Before the 2015 amendment, the provision of Section 31(8) of the Arbitration Act governs the whole conundrum. However, the provision was way too much wide and the interpretation of the same was not even sufficient to dictate the terms of awarding the costs. If there is no authority to govern the cost regime, then, consequently, the winning party will lose a substantial part of the award in the arbitration costs. The question here stands as to what will be the recourse if the other party succeeds in frustrating the arbitral proceedings and resultantly the winning party will have to bear the cost of the same. The position does not align with the interest of justice and in the favour of the innocent party who was not at fault but had been compelled to seek a remedy through arbitration. In such scenarios, the Loser Pays principle plays a significant role to restrict the parties to raise frivolous claims and frustrate the arbitration proceedings. The principle is yet to prove its effectiveness in the Indian arbitration regime but will be interesting to see as to how the parties will consider this aspect.
Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has decided on the issue pertaining to arbitrators’ fees and with respect to the conundrum of the Fourth Schedule. The judgment is highly appreciated as it has given much-needed clarity on the aspect of the nature of the fourth schedule, however, the close analysis of the judgment will present the loophole it holds. The dissenting opinion of Justice Sanjeev Khanna in terms of the interpretation of the expression “sum in dispute” and on the powers of the arbitral tribunal to fix its own fees in absence of any agreement between the parties.
While deciding on the issue of applicability of the ceiling limit, the Supreme Court took note of the legislative intent and also referred to DIAC rules to hold that the ceiling limit is applicable to the cumulative of the base amount and the variable amount and is in accordance with the legislative intent to reduce the exorbitant fees charged by the Arbitrators but at the time of interpreting the expression “sum in dispute,” the majority did not go with the legislative intent. Justice Sanjeev Khanna specifically refers to the DIAC rules and observed the legislature’s conscious exclusion of the separate reference to the amounts mentioned in claims and counter-claims.
From the perspective of making India an arbitration hub, the suggestive changes should be taken care of which will work as authority for future litigations to come. The “Loser Pays Principle” should be adopted in the Indian Arbitration regime as it will restrict the parties to delay the proceedings and only the genuine issues will be raised during the arbitral proceedings. However, serious concerns have to be looked upon to identify that the innocent party should not be subjected to the applicability of this principle. Now, this will increase the discretionary power of the tribunal to consider different aspects before applying this principle and to ask the losing party to bear all the expenses of the arbitration.
After perusing different authorities the intention of the legislature is still in dubious situation as to what exactly the position the legislature wanted to resolve this issue. Whether it is to make India “Arbitrators’ friendly” or “Arbitration friendly.” While there should be a focus on party autonomy but on a similar footing, the cost regime should be developed and should be looked upon.
 Final Year Law Student pursuing B.A., LL.B. (Hons.) at Maharashtra National Law University, Aurangabad.  Ajay Bhargava, Arvind Ray & Vansha Sethi, Cost Regime under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, Lexology (September 11, 2022, 7:45 PM), https://www.lexology.com/commentary/arbitration-adr/india/khaitan-co/costs-regime-under-arbitration-and-conciliation-act.  Badrinath Srinivasan, Need for overhaul of the Costs Regime in Indian Arbitration Law, Kluwer Arbitration (September 12, 2022, 7:15 PM), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/03/05/need-for-overhaul-of-the-costs-regime-in-indian-arbitration-law/ Dr. P.C. Markanda, Law Relating to Arbitration and Conciliation, 10th Edn., p. 968. Tanya Aggarwal, Fee Schedule of Arbitral Tribunal: Focusing on the Sole Arbitrator’s Fee, SCC Online Blog (September 11, 2022, 6:15 PM), https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2020/06/11/fee-schedule-of-arbitral-tribunal-focusing-on-the-sole-arbitrators-fee/.  Punjab State Power Corp. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2017 SCC OnLine P&H 5375.  Aastha Chawla, Cost Allocation Rules in Arbitration: A Solution to frivolous claims?, Mondaq (October 2, 2022, 7:15 PM), https://www.mondaq.com/india/arbitration-dispute-resolution/1169440/cost-allocation-rules-in-arbitration-a-solution-to-frivolous-claims#:~:text=The%20Losing%20Party%20pays%20it,follows%20an%20outcome%2Dbased%20approach.&text=As%20per%20this%20approach%2C%20the,the%20entire%20legal%20cost%20incurred.  Kartik Seth & Anchal Kapoor, Arbitrary Arbitrator Fees and the Law post 2019 Amendment, Bar and Bench (September 16, 2022, 6:30 PM), https://www.barandbench.com/columns/arbitrary-arbitrator-fees-and-the-law-post-2019-amendment#:~:text=20%2C00%2C00%2C000%2C%20the,is%20payable%20as%20arbitrator%20fees. Anhad S. Miglani & Shaurya Punj, Saving Arbitration from Arbitration Costs: The Case of Arbitrator’s Fees, SCC Online Blog (September 16, 2022, 11:10 PM), https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2020/08/10/saving-arbitration-from-arbitration-costs-the-case-of-arbitrators-fees/#_ftn1.