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*Ishika Chauhan **Yash Bhatnagar Introduction On 31 January 2023, the Singapore International Commercial Court (Court) delivered a vital judgment about the issue of apparent bias of an arbitrator in a Singapore seated arbitral proceeding where it dismissed the application to set aside the award along with the application to remove the Presiding Arbitrator on the grounds of apparent bias. The Court observed that parties who agree to arbitrate their dispute do not have a right to a "correct" decision but only a right to a decision within the ambit of their agreement to arbitrate and a decision that is arrived at following a fair process. The dispute arose between CFJ ("the Seller") and another v CFL ("the Purchaser") regarding the sale of shares in a member of one to members of the other. After the pronouncement of the partial award, the Seller filed a Notice of Challenge to the Singapore International Arbitration Centre ("SIAC") seeking the removal of the President from the arbitral Tribunal because there were justifiable doubts over his independence or impartiality. This article explores the landmark judgment while analyzing the problems that arise in a dispute due to the apparent bias of an arbitrator, backing it by the obiter of the judgement and existing precedents over the contention. Brief Facts Of The Case On 23 July 2012, the Purchaser acquired a 49% stake in one of the Seller's subsidiaries through a Share Purchase Agreement ("the SPA") to which the Seller and the Purchaser were parties. Subsequently, the Purchaser alleged that the Seller had, among other things, deceived it into investing in the Subsidiary by making several representations. The SPA was governed by English law and contained an arbitration agreement that stipulated Singapore as the seat of the arbitration. The Purchaser invoked arbitration against the Seller primarily for the tort of deceit about misrepresentations, along with two other claims about a breach of contractual warranties and a contractual claim for indemnification. Over the course of two years, three partial awards were issued by the Tribunal. After the second partial award issuance on 29 January 2020, the Seller challenged the President's appointment. Argument On Behalf Of The Seller The Seller presented a two-fold argument on the issue of independence and impartiality of the President- The Seller vehemently argued that the Panel to which the President was appointed has a direct link to the Purchaser. It tried to establish the connection by making the following submissions- (a) Firstly, the Seller tried to draw a link between the Purchaser and the Ruritanian Government by mentioning that the State owns the Purchaser. Thus, there exists a close and patent relationship between the two. (b) Secondly, the Seller draws a connection between the Ruritanian Government, the Ruritanian Court, and the Panel. It contends that there is no actual "separation of power" between the executive and judiciary in the Ruritanian Constitution. Since the Ruritanian Court founded the Panel, it became a part of the Government. (c) Lastly, the Seller draws an association between the President and the Government. It claims that by accepting the offer to be a part of the Panel, the President was directly engaged with the owner of the Purchaser, i.e., the Government. The President's non-disclosure of his appointment to the Panel promptly raises doubts. The President disclosed this information to the parties almost after two years. Argument On Behalf Of The Purchaser The Purchaser presented expert evidence from an expert on Ruritanian law in response to Seller's argument regarding President's direct link with the Purchaser via Government. The expert expressed that Ruritania's judiciary exercised its power independently of the Ruritanian Government, and the law per Ruritania's constitution protected its adjudicatory independence. The Purchaser also contended that the Third Partial Award dismisses doubts over the President's impartiality since several findings in the Second and the Third Partial Award were favorable to the Seller. Reasoning Of The Court The test to determine apparent bias While referring to the case of BOI v BOJ [2018] 2 SLR 1156, the Court expounded that the test is to check whether there exist facts and circumstances that give rise to reasonable suspicion or apprehension of bias in the fair-minded and informed observer. This includes: (a) Classification of facts and circumstances that are significant for checking the existence of bias. (b) Understanding whether the fair-minded and informed observer would reasonably entertain an apprehension of bias from those facts and circumstances. The Court elaborated that the fair-minded and informed individual is not personally concerned with the matter's outcome other than the general public's interest in the fair and proper dispensation of justice. Burden of proof The Court also opined that the burden of proof lies on the party questioning the arbitrator's independence and impartiality to show that the fair-minded and informed observer would harbor justifiable doubts about the objectivity of the person in authority. Hence, it would be a reasonable inference that it is on the Seller to prove those above, and it seeks to do by alleging that the Purchaser and the Panel are connected through Government and, by extension, the appointment of the President to the Panel. To assess the alleged case of apparent bias, regard must be given to the facts and circumstances that would have been known to the fair-minded and informed observer. Such facts and circumstances would be based on the evidence the parties have placed before the Court and assert to be relevant to this question. However, the Court held that the Seller's case flounders on establishing a link between the judiciary and the Government since it failed to produce any evidence to support the same. Who is a fair-minded and informed observer? Court explained that a fair-minded and informed observer is not supposed to have "detailed knowledge of the law"; the observer cannot be taken to have "specialized knowledge," but a knowledgeable observer would "take the trouble to inform himself or herself on all relevant facts that are capable of being known by members of the public generally." In this regard, the Court summarised that the knowledge of Ruritania's judiciary operating independently from other branches of Government is not specialized. Thus, a fair-minded and informed observer could draw a logical distinction between the Ruritanian Court and the Government. A fair-minded and informed observer would undertake a comprehensive investigation, and unlike the Seller, they would not draw the second connection. The test of disclosure Regarding the argument of disclosure made by the Seller, the Court observed that an arbitrator does not have to disclose every appointment to the parties. The Court referred to the case of Halliburton Company v Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd [2020] UKSC 48 for to discuss the test of the disclosure; an arbitrator only needs to disclose appointments and matters "which would cause the [reasonable observer] to conclude that there was a possibility of a lack of impartiality." In conclusion, there is no reasonable suspicion of bias; it would follow that the question of disclosure does not arise, and thus, the President's non-disclosure does not raise doubts. Assessing the circumstances as they exist To assess the application of the arbitrator's removal, a reference should be made to the existing circumstances at the time of the hearing, considering that the purpose of such an application is to stop an arbitrator from getting involved in further proceedings. The Court agreed with the argument made by the Purchaser while referring to Halliburton for the proposition that the Court must "assess the circumstances as they exist on the date of the hearing for removal of the arbitrator." Analysis The issue of the apparent bias of an arbitrator is essential in international arbitration, as it can impact the legitimacy and fairness of the arbitral process. The principle of impartiality and independence of arbitrators is one of the fundamental pillars of international arbitration, and a lack of either of these qualities can raise concerns of bias. While talking about breach of Natural Justice in the current case, The SICC distinguished between instances when a tribunal ignores points presented by the parties and a tribunal's comprehension of the matter or the law, or the tribunal opting not to deal with an issue it felt superfluous, in rejecting the Seller's allegations for breach of natural justice. A breach of natural justice, according to the SICC, must be "obvious and nearly unavoidable," yet there wouldn't be one of the tribunal had just misunderstood a key topic or proposition. International jurisprudence has recognized that the standard for determining whether there is an appearance of bias is objective. In other words, the test is whether a reasonable and informed third party, knowing all relevant facts and circumstances, would conclude that there is a real possibility that the arbitrator is biased towards a particular party. This principle is further evolved through the obiter of CFJ v. CFL Judgment. The case hence gives rise to the fact of appointment of an informed and fair-minded observer and sets up a precedent of effective two-stage check on the arbitration proceeding, which will eventually make the process more equitable. In the past, Russian courts have set aside awards on the basis of non-disclosure. by an arbitrator as well. This decree read with the CFJ Judgement is well enough to contextualize a robust mechanism for the free and fair arbitration proceeding. The leading case on this issue is the ICSID annulment decision in the case of Hrvatska Elektropriveda v. Slovenia. In this case, the ad hoc committee held that the test for apparent bias is whether "an informed and reasonable third party would conclude, on a balanced assessment of the facts, that there exists a real possibility that the arbitrator was biased." International arbitration rules such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration provide guidelines on the issue of apparent bias. For example, the ICC Rules state that an arbitrator shall be impartial and independent throughout the arbitration. If doubts arise regarding an arbitrator's impartiality or independence, the parties may challenge the arbitrator. If a challenge is made, the arbitral Tribunal will decide. If the challenged arbitrator does not withdraw, the other party may request the competent Court or authority to decide on the challenge. Overall, the issue of the apparent bias of an arbitrator is crucial in international arbitration, and international jurisprudence has developed standards and guidelines to ensure the legitimacy and fairness of the arbitral process. Court's Holding and Conclusion At the outset, the Court rejected the Seller's claims entirely. It held that there exists no case of apparent bias of the President, therefore, dismissed the application of the Seller. The principle of impartiality and independence of arbitrators is fundamental to the legitimacy and fairness of the arbitral process. International jurisprudence has recognized that the standard for determining whether there is an appearance of bias is an objective one, and that the test is whether a reasonable and informed third party, having knowledge of all relevant facts and circumstances, would conclude that there is a real possibility that the arbitrator is biased. The case (CFJ v CFL), in point, strengthens the norms and solidifies the 2nd principle of Natural Justice in the field of Arbitration and Conciliation as well; Nemo Judex in causa sua. *Ishika Chauhan is an undergraduate law student from Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, India. They hold interests in various fields of law including intellectual property, dispute resolution, and insolvency Laws. **Yash Bhatnagar is an undergraduate law student from Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, India. They hold interests in various fields of law including Corporate Governance, Intellectual Property, Cyber Security, Data Protection, and Human rights.

-Haaris Moosa[1] Facts and Judgment The judgment of the Delhi High Court in Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. National Research Development Corpn[2] puts forth important questions regarding the use of the defence of nullity for challenging the enforcement of arbitral awards under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ('CPC, 1908’). The rationale of the section is to avoid multiplicity of litigation for settling questions relating to the status of discharge, nullity and non-executability of the decree etc.[3] In the instant case, the defence of nullity was raised based on the bar of limitation under section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, according to which the claims preferred after the period of limitation are to be dismissed. However, the Delhi High Court in this case went on to place reliance on Morgan Securities & Credits Pvt. Ltd. v. Morepen Laboratories Ltd [4] wherein all remedies other than section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (‘1996 Act’) for challenging the enforcement of an arbitral award were proscribed. The court in Morgan Securities held that the proscription extended to all the objections under section 47 of the CPC, 1908. The court went on to hold that ‘a challenge to an award on the ground that it is a “nullity” or is otherwise illegal can be addressed only in proceedings that may be initiated in accordance with Section 34 of the Act.’[5] The court in Hindustan Zinc repeats this ratio by holding that section 34 of the 1996 Act is exhaustive and challenges falling outside it cannot be accepted. Discussion The Supreme Court in Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd.[6] retrospectively nullified (from the date of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 No. 3 of 2016) all arbitration agreements that involved unilateral appointment of arbitrators. The awards that were pronounced by such unilaterally appointed arbitrators were held to be non-est. Consequently, a large number of cases involving vehicle finance agreements, wherein unilateral appointment of arbitrators by the lender was the norm for years, became legally untenable. It is settled law that a non est award is no award. In the experience of this author, arbitrations between the lender and the borrower in the vehicle finance industry are mostly ex parte, under Section 25 of the 1996 Act, which says that the arbitrator can continue the proceedings if the defendant fails to submit the statement of defence in the time period agreed upon by the parties. This is because of the disproportionate bargaining power of the lender, which results in the selection of arbitral venues and seats in the agreements that parties find difficult to travel to. In the experience of the author, the borrowers become aware of the arbitration award only when the notice for execution under Order 21 Rule 22 or 37 of the CPC, 1908 and Section 36 of the 1996 Act is served on them. Order 21 of the CPC, 1908 allows the Decree Holder to enforce the decree against the Judgment Debtor and thus realise the fruits of the judgment/claim/award. Section 36 of the 1996 Act makes it clear that enforcement of the arbitration award is to be “in accordance” with the provisions of the CPC, 1908. Rule 22 and 37 of Order 21 deal with situations that warrant the issuance of notice to the Judgment Debtor. An execution petition (under section 36 of the 1996 Act and Order 21 CPC,1908) can only be filed after the 120 days required for preferring a challenge to the arbitration award under section 34 of the 1996 Act. This leaves the borrowers holding the bag since they would have an ex parte arbitral award against them passed by a unilaterally appointed arbitrator without having the legal right to make a challenge under section 34 of the 1996 Act. Recently, the Supreme Court has categorically held that arbitration awards cannot be challenged under writ proceedings and especially during their enforcement.[7] In such a situation the only remedy for the borrower/award debtor is an objection under section 47 of the CPC. Hindustan Zinc proposes to take away this right. Further, a three judge bench of the Supreme Court in Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman[8] had earlier held that “Again, when the decree is made by a Court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make it, objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of the record”. There are several judgments from various High Courts which have adhered to the above Supreme Court ruling. The Calcutta High Court in Saraswat Trading Agency v. Union of India[9] had held that the Court was duty-bound to declare the non-executability of a decree if it is a nullity. Similarly, the High Court of Chhattisgarh, while dealing with an argument of non-executability of an arbitration award in R.S. Bajwa & Company v. State of Chhattisgarh[10] had ruled that the declaration of nullity can be done by “any court in which it is presented,” and that “nullity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon and even at the stage of execution or even in collateral proceedings.” Furthermore, the High Court of Kerala in India Cements Capital Limited v. William[11] while dealing with the enforcement of an arbitration award, held that the court is obliged to decide the question of non-executability due to nullity under Section 47 of the CPC, 1908, and that “the remedy available under Section 47 of the Code cannot be denied to an affected party”. A division bench of the High Court of Kerala in Food Corporation of India v. A. Mohammed Yunus [12] had also categorically held that when the challenge is to the manner of appointment of the arbitrator, interference by the executing court is warranted. Even though the court in Hindustan Zinc engaged with the submissions of the counsel for the judgment debtor based on Khanna Traders vs. Scholar Publishing House P. Ltd. & Ors[13] a single bench judgment of the Delhi High Court, wherein the defence of nullity under section 47 of CPC, 1908 was accepted relying on Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi, the court in the instant case refused to accept it citing another single bench judgment of the Delhi High Court in Morgan Securities. Conclusion It is evident from the above discussion that the decision of the Delhi High Court in Hindustan Zinc Ltd. [14] goes against the ruling laid down by the Supreme Court in Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman[15] and has the potential to perpetuate the misery of award debtors who have received ex parte unilateral arbitration awards against them, especially in case of vehicle financing contracts. [1] A pureplay lawyer specialising in Commercial Arbitration, Customs and Insolvency based out of Kochi, Kerala. LLM in International Law (Class of 2020) from South Asian University, New Delhi. Email - harismoosa@gmail.com [2]2023 SCC OnLine Del 330 [3]Justice Kurian Joseph and Namit Saxena, Mulla , The Code of Civil Procedure, Volume 1 (20th Ed., Lexis Nexis 2021),728 and 729 [4] 2006 SCC OnLine Del 774 [5] 2023 SCC OnLine Del 330, Para 22 [6] (2020) 20 SCC 760 [7]Bhaven Construction v. Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd. 2022 (1) SCC 75; Deep Industries vs. Oil and Natural Gases Corporation Limited and another 2020 (15) SCC 706. [8] (1970) 1 SCC 670 [9] 2004 SCC OnLine Cal 141 [10] 2008 SCC OnLine Chh 14 [11] 2015 SCC OnLine Ker 24805 [12] 1987 SCC OnLine Ker 12 [13] 2017 SCC OnLine Del 7684 [14] 2023 SCC OnLine Del 330 [15] (1970) 1 SCC 670

Shubhendra Mishra[1] Introduction The Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (hereinafter ‘Act’) was framed as a single comprehensive act for regulating and developing small-scale industries and enterprises, primarily to promote their growth and provide security to their interests. It had always been a longstanding demand of the sector to free itself from a plethora of laws and regulations that acted as a deterrent because of the limited availability of resources and awareness to deal with them. Pursuant to this conundrum, well-deliberated legislation was pronounced to provide adequate solutions. But as with any other legislation in the country, this Act is also influenced by arbitrary aspects which have crept into the roots of the legislation and gone uncatered to. This article aims to deal with a similar noticeable example of the Act, that is, Section 19, highlighting its arbitrary aspects and providing adequate reasoning as to why an amendment for the same is a pressing priority now. Purpose of Section 19 of the Act: An unjust discrimination between buyer and seller Section 18(2) of the Act provides for reference to the process of conciliation if a dispute arises between the parties with regard to any amount due under Section 17 of the Act while making a reference to the Micro Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (hereinafter ‘Council’). But if such a settlement process fails to reach a justified conclusion and results in termination, then either the Council takes up the matter for arbitration or refers it to some institution that provides dispute resolution services for such arbitration. The provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter ‘Arbitration Act’) shall then apply to the dispute as if the arbitration was in pursuance of an arbitration agreement referred to in sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Arbitration Act. Now, according to section 19 of the Act, if an arbitral award has been passed pursuant to such an arbitration proceeding under section 18 and an application for setting aside any decree, award or other order is to be made before any court of law, the law mandates the deposition of 75% of the total amount of the arbitral award pronounced, and time and again it has been upheld in various High Court and Supreme Court judgements that this provision is mandatory in nature and not merely directory. An analysis of its jurisprudence will take us to the conclusion that it exists mainly to protect the interests of the seller of a micro or small enterprise by upholding the validity of the arbitral award and to provide for facilitating promotion and development and enhancing the competitiveness of micro, small and medium enterprises and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. According to the Courts, this discrimination exists on valid grounds as a buyer, when challenging an adverse award, has to make a pre-deposit. However, when a seller is non-suited, he need not make any pre-deposit for challenging the order, which is adverse to him. Therefore, if a defeated seller is called upon to make some deposit, it will appear irrational or arbitrary. This justification is based on the idea that deposition is necessary with respect to the secured assets if taken possession of or sold, may fall short of the dues therefore, such a deposit may be necessary. An analysis of this reasoning also points out this provision's arbitrary and discriminatory nature. In the case of Kerala SRTC v Union of India, the counsel for the petitioner argued that Section 19 of the Act is arbitrary and discriminatory and, therefore, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as it creates discrimination between the seller and buyer and militates the right to equality under Article 14 of the constitution. It was also contended that the right to move to a competent court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is similar to the right to appeal provided under the unamended Section 17 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter ‘the SARFAESI Act’). The judgement of Mardia Chemicals Ltd v Union of India was relied upon as a contention to argue that the stipulation regarding pre-deposit should be declared unenforceable, however, this argument was ultimately rejected. The reason behind such rejection was the dissimilarity that exists in the purpose with which the above-compared acts were framed and the objectives that they aim to fulfil. Lack of Confidence in Courts and Legislative overreach Any string of analysis cannot take us to the conclusion as to why the cap has been set mandatorily at 75% since, logically, if the arbitral award passed is pristine in nature, then the courts should simply mandate the deposition of 100% of the arbitral award to save the time and promote efficiency in the pronouncement of judgments. Setting the cap below 100% clearly demonstrates two chains of conclusions that can be derived. Firstly, the legislation deprives the courts of their confidence in determining whether an award passed under the Act is arbitrary and, in this way, undermines their existence and power. Secondly, this is a prime example of legislative overreach as such a law indicates that the legislature can encroach upon the judiciary whenever intended, as it directs the court to take a deposition of 75% of the amount mandatorily. In this way, the power of the court to hear appeals for challenging the award under section 34 of the Arbitration Act gets restricted. Even if the award passed is arbitrary, the courts are now left with no option other than to take a deposition of 75% before hearing the appeal. No Backdoor Remedy If The Arbitral Award Passed was Adverse: Abuse of provisions of Section 19 There are multiple loopholes through which the provisions of this law can be abused without any hindrance. Firstly, the courts also fail to consider the facts as to the unruly or arbitrary nature of the award passed due to an arbitration proceeding commenced ex-parte through section 18(3) of the Act. It should be noted that the law provides that an arbitration proceeding cannot be commenced ex-parte if any of the parties are not provided with sufficient opportunity of hearing even though an arbitral tribunal has been vested with the power of a civil court, because it will lead to a violation of the principle of natural justice of audi alteram partem, which mean no case should be decided without hearing both the parties. But still, by the skilful use of the provisions of section 19 of the Act, an award can be passed ex-parte with utmost arbitrariness. Still, no remedy will lie against it unless the aggrieved party deposits 75% of the arbitral award to the court. Secondly, in a situation where a party has to deposit the said amount, does not possess adequate funds for the same, will not be able to file an appeal before the court. Thus, the only option left with the party would be to declare itself insolvent or dilute its existing assets, which will not be justified in every case, especially where the arbitral proceeding has resulted in an unfavourable award. The courts also fail to consider the situation where a dispute may arise between enterprises of similar standards, for example, two micro or small enterprises. In such a situation, where the buyer itself is a micro or small enterprise, it becomes very difficult or almost impossible for the buyer to make a deposit of 75% of the award, which in the majority of the circumstances is a hefty amount and such deposition is too big of a sacrifice to be done before their appeal is heard and a justified conclusion is reached by the courts. Therefore, the deposition of 75% of the award before the dispute is resolved could be prejudicial to the interests of the buyer. Thirdly, situations may arise where an arbitral proceeding is presided over by three arbitrators, that is, the minimum number of arbitrators required for constituting an arbitral tribunal under Section 11(3) of the Arbitration Act, but the award is passed only by two of the arbitrators because one of the arbitrators has expired or retired or was not involved for any other reason when the award was passed or was unable to sign the arbitral award passed. In such a scenario, the scope for passing an adverse or arbitrary award expands tremendously. For dealing with such a situation, no exception or alternate remedy exists. The Way Forward Need of the hour is an amendment for adding an exception to Section 19 of the Act. The exception should cover majorly the aspects including any of the following: firstly, if the chances of the aggrieved going insolvent are evident and can be adequately proved by them, then the courts should allow the appeal of such a person to be heard before them without mandating the deposition. Secondly, if the provision of a mandatory deposition is to be upheld, then the percentage of such deposition should be reduced to an extent so as to not give rise to the impossibility of satisfaction of the provision. In totality, the financial conditions of the aggrieved at the time of the appeal before the court should be the primary factor to be considered before the imposition of the statutory mandates because a deposition of 75% of the award could be burdensome for the buyer and could have a detrimental effect on the ability of the buyer to make the remaining payment. If no exceptions are added, the courts can follow the precedence of Mardia Chemicals Ltd. Etc v UOI & Ors. Etc, which resulted in the striking down of a similar provision in the SARFAESI Act. In this case, it was contended and held that such an oppressive provision should not have been made. It works as a deterrent or as a disabling provision impeding access to a forum meant for the redressal of the grievance of a borrower. The amount of deposit of 75% of the demand, at the initial proceeding itself, sounds unreasonable and oppressive more particularly when the secured assets/the management thereof, along with the right to transfer such interest has been taken over by the secured creditor or in some cases property is also sold. The requirement of a deposit of such a heavy amount on the basis of a one-sided claim alone, cannot be said to be a reasonable condition at the first instance itself before the start of adjudication of the dispute. The courts can also follow a similar line of reasoning to address this issue with respect to section 19 of the Act. This section deprives the courts of their power to hear appeals and is manifestly arbitrary under certain circumstances which have been previously enumerated in the article. In the case of Seth Nandlal v State of Haryana, it was held that – “right of appeal is a creature of the statute and while granting the right the legislature can impose conditions for the exercise of such right so long as the conditions are not so onerous as to amount to unreasonable restrictions rendering the right almost illusory.” Therefore, if an existing provision unreasonably hampers the power of the courts and the right of the people to appeal, it should either be amended or struck down completely. Conclusion The main thrust of the contentions in this article to challenge the validity of the impugned enactment is that no adjudicatory mechanism is available to the other party to ventilate their grievance through an adjudicatory authority when access to the justice is the hallmark of any legal system. The effectiveness of an enactment decreases when it is at odds with the basic principle of law-making, that is, the law should be lenient, but its enforcement should be strict. Indeed, when a transaction of a similar nature as enumerated under the Act takes place and there is a default with respect to the same, logically the seller will be at the suffering the end but that should not prevent the legislature as well as the courts to foresee the possible loopholes that exist as a result of one-sided legislation and its possible misuse, which can grow rampant if left unattended to. [1] Shubhendra Mishra is an undergraduate law student from Dr Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, India. He holds interests in various fields of law, including Arbitration Law, Insolvency law, Corporate Law, Mergers and Acquisitions and Securities Law. He can be reached at shubhendra.rajat102@gmail.com.

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Team Arbitration Workshop Gaurav Rai Editor, The Arbitration Workshop Gaurav Rai is a Senior Associate at Legafin Law Associates and his practice focuses on Domestic Arbitration. He completed his B.B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) from National Law University Odisha in 2015 and his Master of Laws (LLM) from University College London in 2016. He has previously worked as an Associate at AKS Partners and as a Legal Assistant with the Office of Justice A.K. Patnaik, Former Judge, Supreme Court of India and assisted him in his work as an Arbitrator. His interests lie in the area of Arbitration Law, Contract Law and Law of Sale of Goods. He has written and published more than 15 papers on blogs and journals, most notably in the International Arbitration Law Review as Gaurav Rai, Gautam Mohanty and Anushna Das, Pre-arbitral steps in a multi-tier dispute resolution system in India - analysing the current quagmire and the way forward , Int'l Arb. L. Rev., 2020, 23(3), 212-232. ​ He can be contacted at gaurav@thearbitrationconsultant.in Gautam Mohanty Editor, The Arbitration Workshop Gautam Mohanty is currently a Doctoral Candidate at Kozminski University, Warsaw Poland. He has completed his B.B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) from National Law University Odisha in 2015 and has a Master of Laws (LLM) from Central European University, Hungary in 2017. He is working as an Arbitration Consultant in the offices of Justice Deepak Verma, Former Judge Supreme Court of India. He is also an Assistant Professor on leave at Jindal Global Law School (JGLS) with a keen interest in International Commercial Arbitration, International Investment Law and Private International Law. ​ He is a graduate of the coveted Arbitration Academy, Paris. He has recently published his first book titled ‘Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Public Policy Exception- Including an analysis of South Asian State Practice ’ published by Springer Publications. ​ He can be contacted at gautam.mohanty1414@gmail.com Advaya Hari Singh Senior Staff Editor Advaya Hari Singh is currently reading for a Master of Law degree at the University of Cambridge. He completed his undergraduate studies in arts and law at the National Law University, Nagpur in 2021. During his undergraduate studies, Advaya interned in the arbitration and corporate teams of law firms, at the Principal Bench of the National Green Tribunal and was a research assistant to a Member of the International Law Commission. He currently serves as a Managing Editor of the Cambridge Human Rights Law Journal and a General Editor of the Cambridge International Law Journal. Abhay Raj Junior Staff Editor Abhay Raj is currently a fourth-year law student pursuing B.B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) from Jindal Global Law School, Sonepat. Being an avid mooter, he has done Frankfurt Investment Arbitration Moot and has coached multiple teams, providing him with insight into the field of Investment Arbitration. He has previously interned with the dispute resolution team of P&A Law Offices, Saraf & Partners, and assisted them on matters pertaining to arbitration and contract law. He currently also serves as a General Editor at the Queen Mary's Business and Law Journal. ​ He can be reached at rajabhayuk@gmail.com Arnav Doshi Junior Staff Editor Arnav Doshi is currently a fourth-year law student pursuing B.B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) from Jindal Global Law School, Sonipat. He has a keen interest in investment and commercial arbitration with the intersectionalities of insolvency and human rights law. The predilection for arbitration stemmed from the participation in the Frankfurt Investment Arbitration Moot which provided great insight into International Investment Arbitration. Apart from being an avid mooter, he was also selected as a student participant at the VIII Arbitration School organized by the Ukrainian Arbitration Academy. ​ He can be reached at: 19jgls-arnav.jd@jgu.edu.in Ishu Gupta Junior Staff Editor Ishu Gupta is a graduate of Symbiosis Law School, Noida, with a focus on commercial arbitration and litigation. He has worked as an intern with the dispute resolution teams of various law firms in India including Khaitan & Co., L&L Partners, and Link Legal India Law Services. His main interest lies in the area of arbitration law and commercial law. He has participated in numerous moot court competitions on divergent areas of law and mentored mooting teams from his college. He is also a published author with several esteemed journals and blogs. He can be reached out at ishu.gupta.law@symlaw.edu.in . Rituparna Padhy Junior Staff Editor Rituparna Padhy is a graduate law student at National Law University Odisha. She is keenly interested in Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Policy. She has been a content developer for Memo Pundits and CLAT Decodified and participated with distinction in conferences, paper presentations and even drafting competitions in the field of ADR. She can be contacted at 17ba079@nluo.ac .i n. Shivangi Tiwari Junior Staff Editor Shivangi Tiwari is a fifth-year law student at Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur. Shivangi has 14 months of prequalification experience and has authored around 15 research papers and articles on various subjects of law, including but not limited to the law of Contracts, CPC, Arbitration, CrPC, and Tax law. She is acutely keen to understand the various nuances and facets of Alternative Dispute Resolution, primarily arbitration. She enjoys taking part in co-curricular activities, particularly moots and debates. ​ She can be reached at shivangi.181995@hnlu.ac.in . Sneha Rath Junior Staff Editor Sneha Rath is currently a fourth-year law student pursuing B.A. LLB. (Hons.) at National Law University Odisha. She has a keen interest in debating, mooting, and legal drafting. In law, her interest extends to Arbitration, Securities, and IPR Laws. Some of her recent works include papers written on the recognition of Emergency Arbitrators in India, delineating NCLT's Jurisdiction under the IBC 2016, and criticism of the SAT's orders in the matters of disgorgement and regulation of credit rating agencies in India, which currently feature on SCC Online Blog, IndiaCorpLaw, and The Competition and Commercial Law Review. She has worked with different editorial boards and is currently the Editor-in-Chief of the Constitutional Law Society at NLU Odisha.

7 days ago Interview with Mr Robert Price, Partner, Latham & Watkins LLP Mr Price, welcome to the Arbitration Workshop! Firstly, we are extremely honoured that you agreed to give us an interview and to share... 142 Nov 30 Supervisory Jurisdiction of the High Court and its Application in the Arbitral Process *Gautam Mohanty & ** Abhay Raj I. Introduction The Constitution of India 1949 (“Constitution”), in its Article 227, postulates a specific... 128 Nov 12 A Step to the fore in Arbitration- Third-Party Funding Unnati Sinha[1] Introduction Third-Party Funding is a term that sounds foreign and is often seen as being illegitimate in India. However,... 91 Oct 14 Fees of Arbitrators under The Indian Arbitration Regime: Time to shift the focus on affordability -Samarth Kapoor[1] Introduction Arbitration is considered an alternative to traditional Court litigation. Comparing both the mechanisms... 281 Oct 1 Escalation Clauses & Pre-Conditions to Arbitration-A matter of jurisdiction or admissibility? Richa Jain[1] INTRODUCTION In a recent ruling of the Hong Kong Court of Appeal, the reputed Herbert Smith Freehills law firm has once... 240 Sep 23 Strides of Pride: Recent Changes and Developments in the Indian Arbitration Scenario Unnati Sinha[1] Introduction The Arbitration & Conciliation Act (“Act”)(hereafter referred to as "the 1996 Act") was initially made... 610 Featured Posts Interviews 7 days ago Interview with Mr Robert Price, Partner, Latham & Watkins LLP Mr Price, welcome to the Arbitration Workshop! Firstly, we are extremely honoured that you agreed to give us an interview and to share... Aug 21 Interview with Mr. Keval Sheth, Founder & Director, Konverj-Zeus Consulting Pvt. Ltd. Interview with Mr. Keval Sheth, Founder & Director, Konverj-Zeus Consulting Pvt. Ltd. Jul 16, 2021 Interview with Mr. Peter Ashford, Partner at Fox Williams LLP Mr. Ashford, welcome to the Arbitration Workshop! Firstly, we are highly honoured to have you agree to give us your interview. Secondly,...